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WINTER 1987

Mordechai Feingold

Barry D. Karl

Stanley N. Katz

Kathleen D. McCarthy

Patrick McCaughey

Alan Pifer

Francis X. Sutton

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Philanthropy, Patronage, Politics

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

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Preface to the Issue, "Philanthropy, Patronage, Politics"

PHILANTHROPY, PATRONAGE, POLITICS—an unlikely trinity—rarely considered together, though in fact inextricably tied, is the subject of this *Daedalus* issue. Given the importance of philanthropy and patronage, it is surprising that neither has figured very high on the list of research subjects, and that this is true even today. Yet, in the United States, and in other countries as well, such themes offer large analytic possibilities, providing invaluable information on individual motivation and social purpose. It is to be hoped that this *Daedalus* issue may make some contribution toward the development of a more sustained interest in the subject, creating a critical appreciation of a host of ancillary subjects, establishing more precise distinctions between charity and philanthropy, exploring patronage, a term insufficiently used today, and probing more deeply into the changing rationale for giving. No such inquiry can avoid the complex and delicate issues that touch on the claims of religion and science or the subject of human creativity—how it is perceived, supported, sustained, or at times inadvertently thwarted. Nor can it avoid consideration of contemporary voluntarism, so different in purpose from what was common when the power of the state was more restricted, when social amelioration depended largely on private giving of money or services. The equation between private giving, in every form, and public support for such donations is constantly changing; the values of a society are admirably expressed in what it chooses to support; so, also, are its ambitions and fears.

Barry Karl and Stanley Katz open the issue with an essay that provides a contemporary reading of the early history of American foundations, particularly those created by Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller. The authors recognize that the early histories of

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such philanthropies, whether written by friends or critics, rarely posed the kinds of questions that are now common, that are indeed made possible by the recent large-scale opening of foundation archives. Karl and Katz, raising questions that relate to the motives of the original donors, of their friends and advisers, are concerned to describe the political and ideological climate that prevailed at the turn of the century. While their interests are historical, their findings are relevant to today's foundations. At this time, when some foundation critics choose to use Marxist analysis, in its Gramscian form, to inquire into how the intellectual serves to develop and define a culture and how that culture in turn affects politics, it is possible to ask whether American foundations have not always served essentially conservative ends, recruiting intellectuals and scholars principally for that purpose. For Gramsci, the dominant class in a society will invariably use its power to articulate views and propagate opinions that keep subordinate classes in line; the genius of such a class is that it creates institutions, like foundations, to achieve these ends. This is rarely openly acknowledged; it may not even be covertly thought of. This does not make it less true. Karl and Katz are curious to discover whether the men of great wealth who created the first American foundations did, however unwittingly, seek to create a "hegemonic class" of intellectuals, who would support them in their views of industrial capitalism, or whether indeed their purposes were of a quite different kind.

Believing that there is a significant difference between charity and philanthropy—between supporting palliative measures to alleviate specific societal ills and a desire to solve major social problems—the authors recognize that the roots of modern American philanthropy are many. They derive as much from the ideas of the Enlightenment as from a Judeo-Christian tradition, but they must be seen also to have been massively affected by politics. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, as in the early years of the twentieth, there was a great need to define both the public and the private, deal with wealth and its excesses, develop an acceptable rationale for public funding policies, and do all this in a way that made new forms of taxation and governmental control seem legitimate.

This analysis, so different from that of another era, is more than an account of how certain rich men, responding to specific religious beliefs and injunctions, saw the need to invent a new philanthropic

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institution, and did so by creating the modern foundation. Karl and Katz, concerned to describe the early evolution of these foundations, emphasize that, like the businesses these rich men established, they were quickly taken over by a bureaucracy never originally intended. Also crucial, in their view, is the fact that the foundations were soon seen to be supporting a group of leading American intellectuals, who, for the most part, were exceedingly friendly to the purposes and ideology of American government. This did not mean that relations between foundations and the government were always amicable; in fact, disputes became increasingly common. Politics constantly intruded, but there was no withdrawing from the fundamental commitment of these first foundations "to give industrial society an educated class that would continue to produce generations of researchers, teachers, and managers in every field of culture and technology," all "committed in one way or another to the American system of government." While this did not keep foundations from wishing to be free of politics, from perpetually insisting that they were beholden to no single economic interest—least of all the one that had created the foundations—the idea of such total institutional freedom remained an unrealized ideal.

Today, when ideological debate between foundations, and, even more, between foundations and government, is particularly intense, it is difficult to know who the elites are that manage this debate, and in whose interest they are working. As for the general public's influence on such elites, that, too, is something of a mystery. The history of the American foundations, from the beginning, is a history suffused with politics.

If the first essay is overwhelmingly concerned with foundations early in the century, the second, by Francis Sutton, is preoccupied with one—the largest of all, the Ford Foundation—as it came to find its feet, principally in the late 1940s and 1950s. While the origins of the Foundation are superficially familiar, beginning with the wish of a very rich man to divest himself of a part of his fortune for public philanthropic purposes, all this happened under conditions markedly different from those common in the time of Carnegie and Rockefeller. To begin with, the automobile fortune was, in the first instance, severely depleted; it was Henry Ford II, the grandson of the founder, who in fact restored the finances of the parent company, making the Foundation possible. Immensely influential in setting the early course

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of the new institution, he hoped to recruit able leaders to administer its affairs. He expected their powers to be precisely defined, and looked for a leadership capable of creating a national and perhaps an international agenda.

Henry Ford II, in selecting Rowan Gaither in 1948 to study what the policies and programs of the new foundation should be, was expecting a map that would serve to provide very general institutional directions. Gaither, trained as a lawyer, but immensely respectful of scientific research, was intimately acquainted with MIT; he had learned there what scientists and engineers, properly supported, were capable of doing. The war was still a very real presence for him. If only scholars in the social sciences were capable of achieving comparable results, the study of human affairs would be greatly advanced. The scientific paradigm was the one that Gaither and his committee, almost entirely academic, and centered more in Cambridge than in New York, hoped to learn from. These innovators did not much resemble the men who had advised Rockefeller and Carnegie half a century earlier, whose experience had been of a very different kind. Sutton notes, for example, that "there was no one in the group with major international experience." When it went out to learn, it did so in a fairly parochial manner; the committee and its staff interviewed more than a thousand "experts," in Sutton's words, "traveling a quarter of a million miles to do so—all within the United States."

Their report, when it emerged, was a great success; unanimously accepted by the Foundation's trustees, it became "a kind of sacred text, scrutinized for many years by those charged with planning or justifying the Foundation's programs." The committee, much concerned with questions of human dignity, personal and political freedom and rights, social responsibility and the duty of service, dwelled a great deal on the "crisis" of the day, which, in their view, required a choice to be made between democracy and authoritarianism. The Foundation was advised to concentrate its attention in five areas, none more important than programs looking to the establishment of peace. This was the objective with the highest priority. Other proposals, having to do with the strengthening of democracy, and the improvement of the nation's economy and education, seemed specifically addressed to the problems of the United States. A very important segment of the report, which called for "improved scientific

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knowledge of individual behavior and human relations," was the basis for what would become, in Sutton's words, "the ill-fated behavioral science program" of the Foundation. Though this program was cast in universal terms, it seemed to call mostly for research on American subjects. If the Foundation, in time, became more internationally involved, that involvement cannot be ascribed to the Gaither Committee recommendations. It derived from quite other influences.

The Foundation never expected to achieve its purposes by a direct attack on specific social problems; rather, it saw its mission principally in the promotion of learning that would then be made widely available and used. The funds at the disposal of the Foundation were very substantial; no other foundation in the country had comparable economic resources.

In 1950, when Paul Hoffman accepted the trustees' invitation to become the Foundation's president, he was given far-reaching authority. Permitted to move the Foundation's headquarters from New York to Pasadena, California—a point he insisted on for family reasons—he never wholly fulfilled the promise of those who had worked for his appointment. The trustees became seriously disaffected when Hoffman proceeded to name associate directors without first consulting them; the choice of Robert Maynard Hutchins was a particularly sore point for some. Still, the Foundation moved forward, developing a significant agenda, with many items relating to international (and intercultural) relations. As the "cold war" intensified, the problems of preserving the peace became increasingly urgent. Hoffman, sensitive to these problems, but also intensely ambitious, according to one of his associates, "wanted to run the world from the Ford Foundation." He looked for intellectual guidance to those who knew the international scene, principally George Kennan and Milton Katz. Meanwhile, other major efforts were launched, particularly in the sphere of education. This rapid expansion of activity, as documented by Sutton, while impressive, never wholly satisfied the Foundation's board. By late 1952, it was clear that Hoffman's relations with his trustees were deteriorating rapidly; there were substantial differences about policy but also about personnel. A "resignation" was worked out, and Rowan Gaither was elected as Hoffman's successor.

The story of the Gaither administration, which lasted for just under four years, as told by Sutton, emphasizes why the Foundation

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was never able to free itself of political pressures, why, however much it yearned to be objective, technocratic, and neutral, it achieved none of these purposes. This was a difficult time in the life of the nation; the divisions over the dangers posed by subversion, disloyalty, and Communism—made concrete in McCarthyism—created enormous pressures. No institution, aspiring to do what the Ford Foundation had set itself to do, could fail to be affected by these conflicting political currents. It is in no way surprising that politics intruded, nor that the programs reflected so much the opinions of a small group of men. Their quarrels and differences tell a great deal about the ideological climate of the times.

Kathleen McCarthy, writing also about the Ford Foundation, is less concerned with its internal politics, more interested in how it came to define its cultural support policies. What was the "intellectual baggage" of those who were deputed to develop such programs? While other American foundations, before World War II, sometimes initiated and supported programs that could be interpreted as aiming at international cultural development, such a purpose was very rarely explicit. Even with Ford, after 1950, such programs were never very large in money terms. They are interesting and important precisely because they so perfectly express certain of the political values of the day. What began as a Cold War cultural effort—a "quest for the hearts and minds of men"—came, in time, to reflect somewhat less grandiose aims; with it came new respect for what some now called "cultural relativism." Acknowledging that foreign cultures differed markedly, that respect ought to be shown them for their intrinsic and particular qualities, the more universal and rhetorical purposes of an earlier day very gradually diminished. During the Cold War, support of foreign intellectuals expressed itself largely as a wish to instruct them in the unique qualities of American society and culture. It was taken for granted that sympathy for the United States would be created by such policies. The idea that the free flow of ideas across frontiers would contribute to the preservation of peace seemed compelling in the 1950s; it was somewhat less taken for granted a decade later.

In the earlier period, Ford Foundation support of publications, foreign and domestic, seemed a reasonable way to instruct foreign nationals, to make them familiar with ideas they might not otherwise know. Increased world understanding was the rationale that legiti-

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mized all such publication efforts. India was the first country abroad in which the Foundation made a significant cultural investment. These efforts, intended to help a struggling infant democracy threatened by internal conflicts, including that created by Communist agitation, particularly in the south, in states like Kerala, seemed to be justified on many grounds, both political and intellectual. Not all of the Foundation's cultural programs, however, were conceived as weapons principally in the fight against Communism; other purposes were also contemplated, including what some defined as a "revitalization of traditional indigenous values." The fact that these values might furnish an additional safeguard against Marxism was never wholly discounted in the Cold War years. The creation of the Congress of Cultural Freedom—an association of leading intellectuals throughout the world who were hostile to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes—owed a great deal to Ford subventions. There were, however, other supporters for such ventures—including the CIA—but this became obvious only later.

Supporting religion, interpreting it as part of the spiritual revival in certain of the developing countries, as in Burma, seemed another legitimate Ford "cultural" activity. The federal government, prevented from helping with such projects, was prepared to leave them to private foundations. By the 1960s, however, such programs no longer held much appeal for those directing the Ford Foundation. Neither Henry Heald nor McGeorge Bundy believed in the benefits of international cultural support in the way that Paul Hoffman and Rowan Gaither had. The funding of all such projects, particularly outside the United States, became much more selective. It was not at all clear what a private foundation could (or should) do in so ill-defined a sphere. As funds for international cultural projects became less common in the foundations, the support coming from the federal government took on a new importance. Such subvention, needless to say, was always influenced by political considerations.

As the Ford Foundation struggled to create a new rationale for its foreign cultural programs, a "prescription for 'nation building' . . . focused on the development of universities to train growing ranks of indigenous managerial elites within developing countries" gained great appeal. The arts and the humanities, precisely because they seemed fairly peripheral to such efforts, lost some standing. With a new emphasis on international economic development, cultural pro-

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grams became legitimate only to the extent that they helped "the balanced development of universities and schools." Many small grants, made in isolation, with very little encouragement from the principal Foundation officers in New York, and often poorly administered in the field, did not collectively create a new rationale for cultural giving. Failures were common. The *New York Times* revelations in 1966 about the Congress of Cultural Freedom's CIA support led to a drastic reorganization of that institution, but the new body never quite achieved the renown of its predecessor.

Beginning in 1967, Ford Foundation field representatives began to insist that cultural programs could indeed contribute to the development process and ought to be seriously considered. A new skepticism about America's policies abroad—exacerbated by the experiences of the Vietnam War—made many earlier economic and political development paradigms, with their implicit liberal bias, seem suddenly inadequate and old-fashioned. The traditional universal remedies, concocted largely in the United States, were clearly insufficient. National differences had to be taken into account. So, a new orthodoxy was allowed for; it emphasized racial, ethnic, and religious differences. Many of the new ideas were vague, even contradictory, but they gained a certain support in the Foundation. "Cultural development" became the new ideal, an intellectual and political mission substantially different from the one that had dominated during the Cold War years. The new objectives, to "preserve regional cultural infrastructures" and strengthen archeological and historical skills, while also training national and international managerial elites, seemed to make good sense. Conservation, of historic and other monuments, became a prime objective. Grants were still small; there was a perpetual hope that Ford Foundation "seed money" might, in time, lead to local contributions as well. Scholars were supported; traditional craftsmen were encouraged, and there seemed to be no contradiction in doing both.

The programs, mostly in Asia, did not always realize the objectives set for them. But the Ford Foundation remained as one of the very few private institutions committed to supporting such efforts. The problem that existed from the beginning was never wholly resolved: to discover a rationale for what the Foundation should do in the cultural field. It was never easy; the Ford Foundation experimented; others scarcely even considered making the effort. As the federal

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government's own appropriations for "cultural" programs grew, it became increasingly unclear what a private foundation could offer. Foreign cultural projects seemed to make sense when they were linked to technical programs, particularly when they involved training of managers. Other possibilities were never very seriously pursued.

If the first articles in this *Daedalus* issue deal with certain major American foundations, particularly in their formative years, Alan Pifer's contribution is of a different kind. His concern is with the changing nature of voluntarism in America, and how those changes relate both to philanthropy and politics. Knowing that of the $66 billion now given annually for charitable purposes, only 5.4 percent is donated by foundations, with an equal amount given by corporations, Pifer's interest is principally in the gifts made by ordinary men and women, most of whom cannot by any definition be thought rich. If religion and religious institutions receive almost half these gifts, with health and hospitals receiving another 14 percent, and education, schools, and universities receiving an almost equal amount, there are still significant sums left for private social service support, the arts, the humanities, and other such purposes. Indeed, a good part of the funds given to religious institutions are in fact intended for social welfare activities. While the monetary contributions are impressive, so also, according to Pifer, are the donations in time, in volunteering services of one kind or another. In 1985, statistics suggest that 89 million Americans contributed some sort of unpaid service to a voluntary organization. A few institutions—the largest—were in a position to recruit over two million volunteers; several others were able to command the services of close to a million. Even if the 89 million participation figure is somewhat exaggerated, there is no contesting the fact of the continued vitality of certain segments of the voluntary sector.

If, in addition, thought is given to the institutions that benefit from charitable gifts, that are able to do things they would not otherwise undertake, the importance of private associations in America, first described by Tocqueville, is seen as almost inseparable from the idea of democracy. Many of the country's most important activities are made possible by private benefactions and by individual voluntary participation. If, in recent decades, the tax-exempt status awarded philanthropic and voluntary organizations has been crucial to them,

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Pifer knows that the struggle to maintain that status, and indeed to expand it, has not been easy. Abuses have undoubtedly occurred; questions have been raised about whether tax exemption is legitimate for activities that clearly have public policy implications, which some see as covertly political, and this has affected public opinion.

Today, the independent sector is required to live in a political environment substantially different from what existed even as recently as a century ago. Indeed, while many of the voluntary institutions came into existence only in the last twenty-five years, coincident with the burgeoning of the American welfare state, the extraordinary growth of governmental spending, contrary to popular belief, has done little to diminish the importance of the nongovernmental sector. According to Pifer, it has made it neither redundant nor anachronistic. Instead, he emphasizes the broad partnership that has been established between the two; in his view, to the nation's advantage. His question, however, is whether that partnership is not now at serious risk, whether indeed some such private/public cooperation will be able to perpetuate itself into the twenty-first century. Sharply reduced federal spending, at least in the awarding of specific grants to private organizations, since 1982, has already had adverse effects that are not being compensated for. While the President urges the private sector to do more, to take on additional social service tasks, the federal government is not much inclined to make funds available to private institutions to help with such purposes. There has been, according to Pifer, a very serious falling-off in federal help to the poor. Numerous private institutions, denied public support on levels that were once common, have sought support privately, with individuals and corporations; they have not always been successful. With reduced budgets, they are unable to provide the services they once gave. This, the author says, is particularly evident in the diminished support of programs designed to help children.

Also, with "privatization," the deliberate effort of government to stimulate proprietary human service delivery systems to replace those once made available by the government or by the voluntary sector, there have been additional challenges to old-style public service institutions. These new proprietary systems, while undoubtedly popular with some, offering services that are greatly valued and esteemed, make little provision for the more vulnerable segments of the population, those who lack the financial resources to pay for such

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services. It does not appear that these changes, with their vast implications for society, and particularly for the disadvantaged, have greatly troubled the nation's conscience. The plight of the unfortunate does not appear to be *the* preoccupying political issue of our day. The poor, increasingly seen as causing their own distress, as being in some sense to blame for it, do not today constitute a major political force. Indeed, the fact that almost a quarter of America's population exists in poverty or near-poverty has not led to a fundamental national debate on whether social welfare is a collective responsibility or a private matter, best left to the individual, the family, or private charity. Whether a free market in social services can indeed provide adequate protection to vast parts of the population is all too rarely considered. Until recently, it was assumed that private charity and private enterprise were not enough to do the job; now, it is not at all clear that this is the prevailing public view.

While some of today's sentiment may prove to be temporary, a reaction largely to certain excesses of the welfare state and an expression of disillusion with many federal programs, this is by no means obvious. As the public benefits to the poor have been reduced, the outcry has been minimal. Will the same be true when and if middle-class benefits are touched? Is it possible that we have now reached a moment of pause, when further major reductions will not be attempted? Or, is it even conceivable that we will see a political swing that will again make an affirmative social role for government possible? Meanwhile, philanthropies are being urged today to return to their traditional role, to be the major providers of charity. Other more ambitious purposes are little countenanced. Some, genuinely pleased that recent efforts at the stimulation of social action and the shaping of public opinion to support such purposes are now questioned, see philanthropy as returning to its proper role. Pifer recognizes a hazard in all such thinking, in trying to make the private voluntary sector little more than a charity base. Too much would be lost by such a regression; in any case, it is not likely to work. If there is a bright side to an otherwise dismal picture, it is that self-help groups have greatly proliferated in recent years, and this is leading to new independence in the private sector. Denied federal support, these groups are compelled to look elsewhere, to seek quite other kinds of assistance.

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Philanthropy and voluntary organization—these are contemporary terms with large resonances for many men and women today. Patronage, by comparison, seems an almost archaic term, redolent of another time, when kings, courts, aristocrats, and others chose to bestow their favor on some, from public or private purses, denying such help to others. There is not much talk today about patronage; it is a term not much used to describe contemporary private or public benefaction. Yet, the last two essays in this *Daedalus* issue are intended to make us reflect on whether the term has not been discarded too cavalierly, whether, for example, if we are serious in our concern with such matters as creativity, we do not need to think again of how individuals are supported, what rationales exist for their support, how much all this may depend on fashion, caprice, and deep-seated unacknowledged values.

The story of Winslow Homer and John Singer Sargent, as told by Patrick McCaughey, is more than a tale of a "native" who succeeds entirely on his own, without much support from others, who achieves a rare symbiosis of landscape and life, and of a "nomad," who enjoys extraordinary success early, is patronized by the rich and famous, is commissioned on both sides of the Atlantic to immortalize men and women seeking to represent themselves as the heirs of the great of another day, who moves not from artistic triumph to greater artistic achievement, but declines in power, his work becoming almost banal. "Sargent was not ruined," McCaughey explains, "by what he was asked to paint. He ruined himself; the very nature of his giftedness—the extraordinary consciousness which entered so fully into what it apprehended—showed itself highly liable and vulnerable to corruption." Sargent, in choosing to work abroad, painting those things valued by the old world, lost the opportunity to gain immortality as an artist, ignoring the opportunities offered him by painting "the straitened circumstances of his native land."

Homer, by comparison, living in and not just visiting the sites that his greatest paintings depicted, in McCaughey's words, "brought to the American pictorial imagination both the sense of the tragic in nature and of the redemptive powers of the human. His isolation—his lack of success, his very failure to win patrons, early or late—may have contributed to the grandeur of his pictorial achievement." McCaughey raises a whole series of provocative questions in considering how genius may be cosseted or ignored, why no simple

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explanation of the role of patronage can account for one painter, however famous, producing essentially ephemeral work while the other achieves a genuine posthumous immortality.

One is reminded of the words Francis Haskell used in his seminal work, *Patrons and Painters;* Haskell wrote: "Any attempt to 'explain' art in terms of patronage has been deliberately avoided." His interest, he says, has been in the relations between art and society. This, in a fundamental sense, has been the concern of this whole *Daedalus* issue, to suggest that American philanthropy, voluntarism, and patronage can be understood only in the context of a society that at particular times favored (or believed in) certain things, denying the validity or worth of others. Americans, long proud of their tradition of philanthropy, have rarely thought to probe deeply into the well-springs—material and intellectual—of their motives in being beneficent. Philanthropy, for better or worse, has remained an insufficiently examined phenomenon. It may be a subject too dangerous to touch precisely because it is so revealing of individual motives and of social preferences, but also of the role of politics in shaping what is allowed, what is countenanced.

Because this *Daedalus* issue has been dominated by a concern with the United States, it seemed appropriate to include at least one essay that deals with these matters in another period and another setting. For very obvious reasons, Britain was chosen. If the first essay in this *Daedalus* issue seeks to distinguish between charity and philanthropy in our century, the last, by Mordechai Feingold, explores the differences between philanthropy and patronage in England in the early modern period, beginning with the Reformation. The story is carried down through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Feingold's concern is to determine what motivated men to give to support the less fortunate—philanthropy by his definition—while others chose to support "high culture"—scholarship, art, science, and music. Benefactors selected very different objectives, responding to different stimuli, satisfying deep-set personal needs. The volume of these benefactions does not much interest the author; his concern is with the motives that led individuals to support what they did. Notions of religious obligation and societal expectations were certainly influential; so, also, were other values.

While some have argued that the Protestant Reformation did much to change the medieval nature of alms-giving—leading to a more

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deliberate support of secular purposes, calculated both to eliminate poverty and reform society along secular lines—Feingold questions whether any such dramatic transformation in fact took place. He believes that many of the so-called secular purposes originated long before the Reformation; also, that religious motives remained strong even after the Reformation. Englishmen in the sixteenth century, in his view, simply extended and developed ideas and practices initiated by pious Catholics in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. "The transfer of benefactions to schools and hospitals," Feingold writes, "is not conclusive proof of the birth of a secular society." Most benefactors gave because they regarded philanthropy as a Christian duty; there was a growing concern by Protestants to show themselves no less munificent than Catholics had been.

Philanthropy, particularly after the middle of the eighteenth century, became almost a craze, dominated then not so much by a concern with the poor as by an interest in demonstrating that one was doing good works. According to Feingold, "self-righteousness and man's conceit had never seen better times." It became a positive pleasure to give. In the nineteenth century, there was a renewed sentimentality about the virtues of the poor; the new ethos created yet new incentives for giving.

Philanthropy, with fear of God and societal duty as its principal motives, is, for Feingold, a very different thing from patronage. The first is represented as an expression of love, duty, and justice; patronage, by comparison, is represented as a matter of choice. With the coming of Protestantism, there was a new suspicion of riches, an exaggerated fear of anything that smacked of conspicuous display. In these circumstances, there was an almost complete severing of ties between religion and the arts. In time, this separation was somewhat attenuated both in scholarship and literature, but it remained very powerful in discouraging the support of art and music. If secular knowledge flourished, we are told, it was not because of Puritanism, but in opposition to it.

While very few worked to subvert Calvinist doctrine, and while the scientists of the period generally and truthfully insisted on their piety, this was never enough to discourage suspicion of those who were thought to be guilty of proclaiming new ideas. Many of these individuals were seen as "subversive," and denounced as such. By the seventeenth century, the godly were openly hostile to ideas that could

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be characterized as epicurean, materialist, or atheist. The new men of letters, wishing to educate those who had great wealth, believing that it could only encourage new patronage and propagate new learning, found their role as teachers, particularly of aristocratic sons, both congenial and rewarding. This they saw as their road to influence. By the eighteenth century, however, the earlier esteem for book-learning was being challenged by new interests, in science, art, and music. Travel abroad was altering British sensibility and taste, with very large consequences for both. While the private patron remained the principal support of men of letters, both deriving a certain social status from the relation, it was not one that was to prove durable.

With the coming of the industrial revolution, a new and wealthy bourgeois class emerged, prepared to support both the sciences and the arts, imagining that such support might in some small measure compensate for their inferior social position, even for their continued exclusion from politics. Science, with its large utilitarian potential, proved particularly appealing to such men. But even these individuals soon changed; once they were fully "integrated" into the establishment, they very largely abandoned science. Bankers and industrialists were soon recognized to be no less avid supporters of the arts than the old aristocracy had been. While they gave generously, they tended also to be more interfering, less inclined than the old noble patrons to allow the artist to go his own way. "Canons of taste," suited to aristocrats, did not automatically prevail for the middle class.

The court, in Britain at least, never became a major patron; tight-fisted, it rarely used its own monies to support culture. Nor was the government generally very forthcoming with public funds for the support of the arts. To benefit the few with public monies seemed wrong, and the government intervened only in very exceptional cases, when national prestige and honor seemed to be at stake. It was only in the twentieth century that state patronage of art and science in Great Britain became at all important.

This volume cannot be read as a compendium on modern philanthropy and patronage. Large issues are left virtually unexplored, rarely out of inadvertence, but only because support for the close and critical study of philanthropy and patronage is still hard to come by. Without the help of the Exxon Education Foundation, and of its recently retired president, Dr. Robert Payton, even this first excursion

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into the field by *Daedalus* would have been impossible. We are grateful for the help given.

It is important to know why the philanthropist's agenda of worthy causes is generally so restricted, why, indeed, philanthropy and patronage cannot be understood without reference to politics, to opinion, expressing the conflicting sentiments and beliefs that are contending at any moment in a particular society. Such study has much to teach about orthodoxy, bureaucracy, vanity, and guilt; also, about tradition, invention, religion, and creativity. It could even provide new philanthropic incentives for a "world awash in money," that remains today surprisingly timid in what it chooses to support.

This may seem a much too grandiose conclusion to a quite modest study; if it is at all justified, the sentiment expressed by G.M. Young, written in another dark period, 1936, may be thought appropriate. He, too, worried that too much was being made of a very slight volume. Still, he wrote, " . . . we live in an age which can afford to forgo no study by which disaster can be averted or eluded." What better rationale for thinking anew about private and public giving, whether defined as philanthropy or patronage, voluntarism or charity? There is a need today to avoid the use of language that obfuscates meaning, conceals design, and pretends to an objectivity that is specious and inhibiting. A more precise understanding of the role of politics, but also of the importance of opinion, in all such matters, can only be conducive to the creation of scholarship that is both less conventional and more illuminating.

S.R.G.

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Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz

Foundations and Ruling Class Elites

SCHOLARS HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEGUN to distinguish the special philanthropic motive that separates the creation of the first American foundations from the previous charitable activities of those who established these "foundations." It seems obvious that there must be a motivational distinction between Rockefeller's gifts to traditional missionary organizations and the creation of the General Education Board and the Rockefeller Foundation; or between Carnegie's gifts of church organs and libraries and the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. How to express the distinction, however, has proved surprisingly difficult.

The earliest accounts of foundation history, written principally by foundation officers, scarcely distinguished between the traditional charitable motives of the late nineteenth-century donors and those of the early foundation philanthropists, other than to note the obvious difference in their financial scope. These writers assumed disinterested benevolence on the part of the donors, and felt little necessity to demonstrate it. The earliest critics, on the other hand, scarcely moved beyond the "robber baron" analysis, arguing that donors acted in a politically self-interested manner, assuaging their guilt and seeking to improve their public image without giving up control of their wealth. Tax avoidance, "tainted money," and redistribution of money to elite institutions—these were the usual critical charges, couched in characteristic Progressive rhetoric.

With the opening of major foundation archives in the last fifteen years, scholars have become attracted to the study of foundations,

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and a rather one-sided debate has developed. While defenders of donor benevolence have continued to appear, the critics of donors have been more numerous, and their attacks have taken on a Gramscian sophistication. The most noted example of this scholarly conflict is perhaps the exchange between Martin Bulmer of the London School of Economics and Donald Fisher of the University of British Columbia that appeared in *Sociology*. Fisher, in an earlier article, had spelled out what Bulmer thought to be a conspiratorial theory of foundation development. Fisher's article, with its many revelations, depicted behavior by early foundation officials that supported the presumed ideological interests of their donors and provided what Fisher considered ample evidence of foundation managers' intent to restrain the development of revolutionary ideology in American social science. In his response to Bulmer's defense of foundations' policy of objectivity, Fisher articulated a Gramscian rationale that has since become the standard approach of radical foundation critics.[1]

This critical point of view has emerged simultaneously in the United States during the last decade. Some of the results have been conveniently collected by Robert F. Arnove of Indiana University (one of the many critics to emerge from among students of educational philanthropy) in his 1980 anthology, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*.[2] In his introduction, Arnove argues that the foundations have, from the start, "played the role of unofficial planning agencies for both a national American society and an increasingly interconnected world-system with the United States at its center." Following Fisher, he contends that foundations represent a

> sophisticated conservatism. . . . Intellectuals represent an important instrumentality of cultural domination as well as potential agents of revolutionary change. They may place their expertise at the service of dominant groups, working to legitimate the social order; or they can work with underclasses to enhance their understanding of everyday problems. . . . The big foundations have effectively enlisted the support of some of the most promising and talented individuals in the United States and abroad. The foundations have channeled their energies and research activities in directions they deemed important; and they have promoted modes of inquiry that circumscribe the examination of value questions and ideological issues.[3]

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As Sheila Slaughter and Edward Silva put it in their contribution to the volume,

> the foundations came to identify ideology manufacture as a major purpose underlying resource deployment, and its production was joined to the pragmatic solution of specific problems. . . . Beyond production, foundations—through professors and other professionals who claimed objectivity and value neutrality in their practice and publications—marketed ideology that justified industrial capital. Professionals were sought out to mediate the idea flow from corporate capital to public in their role as experts, representing no constituency other than science. . . .[4]

The critical attack, then, is specifically Gramscian. The principal issue, for Americans as well as for Antonio Gramsci, is the role of the intellectual in the development of culture, and the political role of culture. Gramsci's emphasis on the importance of intellectuals in cultural history has become a significant element in the transformation of contemporary Marxist theory. Marx divided the world of social relationships into structure and superstructure. In his schema, civil society—the realm of private economic relationships of production—constituted the structure of human society. The state—the political and juridical order—was superstructure; it was conceived to be subordinate to civil society. Indeed, in "The German Ideology," Part I, Marx took the position that civil society "inwardly must organize itself" as the state.[5] Civil society, then, as conceived by Marx, defines the nature of the state and the goals that it pursues.

Gramsci's contribution to Marxist theory was his development of a more finely nuanced theory of civil society and its relationship to the state; also, to ongoing class conflict. Gramsci viewed much of civil society as itself superstructural. In essence, he distinguished, within civil society, between the relations of production, which he saw as structural, and social relations, classified as superstructure. The social relations of civil society, according to Gramsci, are the cultural, ideological, and intellectual relations and forces that are embodied in such organizations and institutions as the mass media, the church, and political parties.[6] Indeed, the philanthropic foundation is an excellent example of an organization Gramsci would have conceived of as embodying the social relations of civil society.

The realm of social relations of civil society is crucial to Gramscian theory for it is here that Gramsci views the hegemony of the

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dominant class as coming to fruition. The notion of hegemony as a conceptual tool for understanding social relations was Gramsci's key insight. He rejected as inadequate the Marxian notion that the bourgeoisie maintained its dominance mainly through force or the threat of its use—in short, the coercive power of the state. Gramsci recognized that the reality of class rule was much more complex than this. The real success of a particular class's push for societal predominance occurs when it uses its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to articulate a basic world view that subordinate classes come to adopt. This world view becomes, for Gramsci, the "common sense" of the society. It is accepted as universal and natural, as something of a given, together with the unequal class rule that it legitimates. It comes to be reflected in the practices, ideologies, and institutions that comprise the dominant value system of the society. Hence, in contrast to a purely coercive conception of class rule, Gramsci, with his notion of hegemony, divines a consensual component that Marx had never recognized.[7]

For Gramsci, the hegemony of a particular class is never stable. Rather, it is subject to ongoing class struggle, as are the relations of production. The dominant class's constant push to preserve its hegemonic position is referred to by Gramsci as "passive revolution"[8]—the attempt to neutralize the revolutionary potential of the working class through reforms carried out from above to preserve the existing social order.[9] One of the chief ways in which the dominant class acts to maintain its hegemony, according to Gramsci, is by forging an elite of intellectuals drawn from the dominant class, but also from subordinate classes. As Martin Carnoy puts it,

> The dominant class attempts in its political parties to weld together the traditional intellectuals of the dominant group, where traditional intellectuals include professional intellectuals both from the dominant and subordinate groups. At the same time, the revolutionary party should try to do the same thing, only in this case it would weld together disaffected bourgeois professional intellectuals, professional (traditional) intellectuals from the proletariat, and organic proletarian intellectuals, the thinker-organizers with a conscious conception of the world that transcends their class interests.[10]

The critics of philanthropy have thus placed the debate where it belongs, analyzing the relationships of the big foundations to the social roles of their managerial elites. To identify a relationship

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between foundation managers and social elites is not necessarily, however, to specify the content of their relationship. Nor, more importantly, does it demonstrate the intention of foundation donors to create such relationships. Let us return, then, to the issue of motivation. Were the creators of foundations using their immense resources to create a "hegemonic class" of intellectuals who would support their commitment to industrial capitalism, or were they intending to do something very different?

I

Scholars have sought to identify several kinds of motives among foundation donors. At the top of the list, perhaps, is the distinction between palliative charity, and scientific research into the root causes of social ills. The first foundation philanthropists and their advisers perceived a vast transformation in the way wealth could be used to solve major social problems, a transformation produced by new scientific understanding, and the application of that understanding to virtually every field of inquiry. Medicine provided them with their first ideal model, for it was the one that could easily become a metaphor for describing all the "ills" of the "body politic."[11]

Germ theory, with its initial emphasis on single-cause relationships between specific diseases and specific microbes that could be searched out and destroyed, had generated an optimism that was not long sustained in medical research, let alone in theoretical science. Nonetheless, the persistence of this optimistic certitude in all discussions of social disorder kept both philanthropic donors and social scientists constantly on the threshold of disappointment, a recurrent malaise.

Still, one needs a somewhat larger historical frame to understand the central distinction between charity and philanthropy that generated the establishment of the general purpose philanthropic foundation. How large this frame must be is potentially a matter of some debate. Articulate supporters of modern philanthropy such as Brian O'Connell and Robert Payton begin their analyses of the historical origins of the phenomenon with the charitable obligation in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is a justifiable point of origin in the case of the commitments of certain early modern philanthropists like Rockefeller; it ought not, however, obscure the fundamental historical revolution that the Enlightenment and subsequent conceptions of

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the role of progress in human affairs have produced in that ancient tradition.

Poverty, in Judeo-Christian terms, was essentially static and unchangeable, as it was, also, in most non-Western religious traditions. There were magical interventions by gods and magicians—swords to be drawn from stones, visitations by gift-giving spirits, and the like—but, with the exception of the emergence of occasional great charismatics of lowly origin, poverty was presumed to be a permanent condition, where the advantaged were enjoined to accept some sort of supportive responsibility. The conception of Christ and His ministry are classic images of the mystical transformation of the poor. They reflect the role that the Christian church would adopt in tending the poor; they suggest the miraculous character that any real change of status would require.

The famous tale of Dick Whittington, who rose from supposed poverty to become Lord Mayor of fifteenth-century London through the aid of some talkative church bells and a cat, did not appear in any literature until the early seventeenth century when, according to the analyses of English society by historians such as Lawrence Stone, economic transformations of class were already well underway. The new myth combined the mystical elements of the old with a new conception of rational choice.

Thus, the modern idea of philanthropy rests on a recognition of progress and choice; it makes the eradication of poverty possible, not through divine intervention but through human endeavor. The transformation calls for an educational system and an educable public, together with a body of knowledge available to all. It requires attitudes toward class transcendance and transformation that are faithful to the Judeo-Christian tradition, that accept the fact that the root religions were originally religions of the poor, and that there was nothing essentially wrong or unjust about poverty itself. The centuries that separated those origins from the era of the Enlightenment were filled with moments of rebellion against any tendency of these religions to forget their sources in poverty; men and women of wealth who gave up their fortunes to immerse themselves in holy poverty were glorified. Yet, not until progress became a popular reality and a political possibility did the modern conception of social progress become a part of the intellectual tradition of charity.

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One must be careful not to exaggerate the speed at which that transformation took place, or even its completeness today. Reform-minded novelists like Charles Dickens still made it clear that impoverished victims such as Oliver Twist and David Copperfield were evicted from their proper social claims by deliberate misjudgments, by the absence of proper legal protections. The classes to which their benefactors returned them were classes into which they had originally been born. Fagin and the students he drew from the London street people were not to achieve a similar salvation. The nineteenth-century debates about the poor laws contained the same fears about the essential evil of the impoverished that one finds in American welfare debates today, however subtle and disguised the new expression may be.

That America became the place where such restrictions were less confining is clear from Benjamin Franklin's descriptions of his own upbringing. It was that tradition of self-advancement and opportunity that Andrew Carnegie had even more reason to understand than did John D. Rockefeller. When we speak of a "Horatio Alger myth of success," we are considering possibilities that may have been exceedingly rare; still, these represented a reality that was supported by general public approval, very limited legal restrictions, and large resources available for those who could find ways to use them. Critics who have remarked on the racist elements in philanthropic support for negro education in the late nineteenth century need to see this in the perspective of the larger development of philanthropy, as a way of assuring access to those resources that were intended to make opportunity available to all Americans.

Donor interest in creating forms of perpetual trust that would not be bound by specific purposes committed to at the beginning was undoubtedly important. It was taken for granted that the trust would be managed by trustees who would observe the spirit of the donor's philanthropic intent, but the donors themselves had developed a degree of practical sophistication that led them to seek a new model. Given their admiration for the scientific and technological advances they themselves had observed in the course of their business careers, they were prepared to allow for vast future changes that they and their contemporaries could not hope to predict. The general purpose foundation, devoted quite simply to the welfare of mankind, seemed a wholly appropriate way to formulate their wishes. Still, one must

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add that they were not all equally committed to the principle of general purpose.

Again, the relationship between the humanitarian commitments formulated in terms of the donors' attitude toward religion, and their perception of the enormity of their wealth, extending well beyond the normal methods of distribution from generation to generation, led them to seek alternative ways to guarantee the continuity of their lifelong commitment to philanthropic activity. The fact that such alternatives might limit the resources available to their own progeny was, in Rockefeller's case, based on his belief that each generation should provide its own conception of philanthropy; in Carnegie's case, this was an article of faith. He did not believe in passing on so large a fortune to his family; he was prepared to limit their resources, and to do so comparatively severely.

One must, of course, add to any such listing of motives those that the donors did not specifically acknowledge. The characteristic mood of the Progressive Era had been to call into question the methods by which such extraordinary fortunes had been accumulated and used. The "robber baron" critique had singled out the oil, steel, and railroad industries—the three principal sources of much of the initial philanthropic wealth. Even bequests to such public beneficiaries as art museums, symphony orchestras, and research universities could be interpreted as the use of private wealth to generate an anti-democratic elitism. Donors were acutely aware of public attack and immensely sensitive to it. Their own middle-class origins only helped to complicate the self-image their wealth had forced them to reconstruct.

This was a time also when other ways of appropriating such wealth, through new inheritance taxes or the much-debated establishment of an income tax, were considered by many to be a preferable means of allowing the public to control the benefits to which such fortunes might be put. The idea that such wealth had actually been taken from the public in some unwarranted fashion received support from those who analyzed the government's involvement in providing public land for the initial railroad development and natural resource exploration. Part of the appeal of Henry George's Single Tax was his thesis that land received its value from the way the public chose to use it, not from value inherent in the land itself. Its

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value belonged to the public, not to those who managed to appropriate it.

While the possibility of new taxes, inheritance and income, probably influenced the decision to create perpetual trusts, this cannot be conclusively demonstrated. The establishment of a federal income tax is, as far as we have been able to discover, never mentioned. Changes in the New York State inheritance tax are discussed in 1907 between the Rockefellers, father and son, since they would have forced the elder to give up all influence on the use of his money and also because scientific research institutions were not then considered objects of charity.[12] While today's historians may be inclined to regard the limited nature of such discussion as a deliberate subterfuge, it would be wise to remember that the privacy of business papers in that day was perceived as more than ample protection of the secrecy of any negotiation. If they did not write about something, it seems likely that it was not of primary concern. The imposition of such taxes was part of the intense political debate of the period; the fact that any tax was unlikely even to approach being confiscatory was taken for granted.

Much more important than the confiscatory possibility, a remote and radical threat at best, was the traditional uncertainty about the ways in which money collected by politicians would be used. Such views, deeply ingrained in the middle class, influenced their attitudes on how politics related to social welfare. Taxpayers and property owners of even modest means had been arguing about this for generations. Their sense of the distinction between public and private was very different from our own. Long accustomed to forming local watchdog agencies to superintend the spending of tax money, their attitudes toward such expenditure reflected their belief that local support for such purposes, even if it were sanctioned by taxes voted by legislatures, was far better than federal support, precisely because it could be controlled more effectively by local citizens. It would be a decided exaggeration, then, to think of the creation of foundations in terms of any modern conception of tax benefit.

Since it is so central to the issue of donors' motivations, a look back at the conditions that led to the development of the income tax may help us to speculate about the role this development, now considered so momentous, played in the late nineteenth century. The income tax enacted in 1861 as a Civil War measure expired in 1872. From 1875 to 1893, customs duties were the major source of federal income, and

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they more than covered governmental expenditures. Indeed, revenues exceeded expenditures during every one of those years. To avoid retaining this surplus in the federal treasury, the government applied it to debt reduction at such a rate that the net debt fell to $839 million, with the bonded debt falling from about $1,800 million to under $600 million during this period.

The debates generated by the surplus fueled one of the biggest political boondoggles of the era—veterans' benefits; it also led to much discussion of the monetarization of silver. The "surplus" became a political football, generating complaints about corruption that would have made sense if anyone had been prepared to spell out an alternative. With the hindsight of later economic analysis, it is all too easy to criticize an earlier generation's inexperience in coping with the politics of a new national economic system.

These problems were dramatically transformed, beginning in 1894, when the federal government began to run deficits, caused in part by a world-wide depression, of which Americans were only becoming vaguely conscious through an increased awareness of their own dependence on international markets. President Cleveland's efforts to cope with what specialists of the day perceived to be a gold crisis, together with the growing labor movement and its attendant strikes, seemed to bring the issue to a head when the income tax approved by Congress in 1894 was declared unconstitutional by a Supreme Court increasingly thought to be a conservative protector of big business.

Deficits each year from 1895 to 1899 reached a total of $89 million. That seeming crisis was alleviated, however, in the years 1900 to 1913 by a relative stability, though an uncertain one, that ended with the outbreak of war, which turned the United States into a major supplier of the Allies. The passage of a constitutional amendment in 1913 authorizing an income tax came at a time when those seeking to understand the American economy were incapable of predicting the changes it would produce, beyond their sense that they would be minimal. Despite the evidence, one can adduce from the limited information that exists that Americans were developing a national government with greatly increased obligations that outran all the traditional sources of revenue, as well as the traditional understandings of the nature of federal responsibility for the management of the economy. Even the creation of the Federal Reserve

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Board during this period was a reluctant and limited step toward the national banking system that Americans had rejected almost a century earlier.

The politics of tariff management continued to be the focus of debate throughout the period. This, rather than the raising of revenue through income taxation, was *the* political issue and continued to be so well into the New Deal, when the Tax Act of 1935 brought about compromises between the control of wealth and the cost of running a government that have marked income tax legislation ever since.

The question of the founders' intentions in creating private organizations that could engage in philanthropic activities, protected from public scrutiny and public responsibility, involves us in other ambiguities, forcing us again to guard against viewing the historical events as part of some master plan conceived by the donors. It is important to realize that the original plan for a Rockefeller trust, for example, was quite different from the corporation that finally emerged. Rockefeller and his advisers had genuinely intended to give the foundation to the public by creating a government corporation headed by a board, whose members would be subject to approval within sixty days of their selection by a majority vote of a group consisting of the President of the United States, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the presidents of Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Chicago. Any property that would otherwise be taxable by a state was not to be exempt from taxation. Congress was given the power to impose limitations on the objects of the corporation if it determined that the public interest required such limitations. The income from the corporation was not to be accumulated or added to the principal; and, after fifty years, if the corporation so decided, the principal could begin to be paid out. Finally, Congress could direct all of the fund to be distributed after one hundred years.

In rejecting the plan, Congress not only angered Rockefeller and his associates but persuaded them that it had relinquished all rights to influence the administration of the foundation. These early conceptions of the foundation differed radically from those that developed in the years that followed. The sense of the proper relation between public policy and private philanthropy is substantially different from the one that later defenders and critics of foundations

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would choose to debate. The willingness to give the federal government decisive control over foundation policy would have made unnecessary successive congressional investigations into foundation practices, or at least turned them into battles in which government exercised far greater authority than that given by its grant of tax exemption.[13]

The concern with a public presence for the Rockefeller Foundation was apparent even earlier in a communication between Jerome D. Greene, soon to be secretary of the Foundation, and Wickliffe Rose. Greene asked, "How shall the Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation keep responsive to the will and intelligence of the people through future generations?" He proposed the creation of a Public Council,

> consisting of members appointed—one from each state—on the nomination of the state university or the leading endowed university in states which have no state university. The qualification to receive this nomination should be expressly stated to the nominating authority each year, as being that of representing, better than any one else, the wisdom and good will of the community in matters affecting the general well-being.[14]

That sense of the need for some kind of public presence moved immediately into the discussion of who should serve on the boards of trustees of the various Rockefeller philanthropies. Charles W. Eliot advised Jerome Greene in 1915 that "it is very important to add to the number of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation persons of independent position, and known to the country, or at least to the State of New York, as publicists, philanthropists, or educators. The fundamental criticisms of the Socialists and Labor-leaders can be met in no other way."[15]

John D. Rockefeller, Jr., continued with that approach to selection. When the election of Lillian Wald to the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund was questioned because the fund contributed to her work, Mr. Junior replied that such a policy would exclude too many good and responsible people. "I feel that Miss Wald is very highly regarded by vast numbers of the poorer people in New York and that her election to the Board would be well received, in addition to the fact that she is a National character in so far as her interest in all kinds of work for the promotion of the well-being of the masses is concerned."[16]

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If one is to understand the genuinely accidental character of the growth of the claim to privacy among foundations, one must begin with the initial unsuccessful attempt to create a public agency, the subsequent efforts to recruit public figures whose presence on the board as managers would assure the responsibility of the institution, and the concern with public criticism as appropriate criticism that would have to be met. A significant part of the character of the modern foundation was created in a continuing battle that no one had anticipated.

What the Rockefellers perceived as public hostility to their efforts to give money to public causes never ceased to puzzle them. John D., Jr., one of the architects of the idea of the Foundation and its first manager, was deeply hurt. In April 1917, shortly after the United States entered the war, he wrote his father, saying: "I feel more and more that to increase the funds of the Foundation is not going to meet with general popular approval or be the wisest method of using our resources." Suggesting a number of alternatives, including making contributions out of principal "to allay the fear which many people have of this great fund increasing and constantly assuming larger proportions, thus increasing not only its power for good, but also its power for evil if unwisely handled,"[17] he went on to recommend the creation of a number of self-liquidating funds for particular purposes, as well as a concentration on medicine, "a field in which there can be no controversy, so that I think the possibility of criticism as regards the use of the fund or its potential dangers would be almost nothing."[18]

His father's reply suggests, perhaps, the thickness of skin that years of experience with public criticism had given him. "I think we should act with great deliberation," he wrote, "and not be influenced by the little flurry at the moment. These flurries come periodically. At the same time," he continued, "we must seek to be thoroughly well-informed of the possible tendencies of the time and shape the affairs of the Foundation and other organizations accordingly." But even he had his moments of frustration. "It is dawning on me," he sighed, "that with the disposition shown toward our well-meant endeavors in some quarters, I must very carefully consider not to give away everything to the public and fail to give to my own family and friends, where it can be wisely done."[19]

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In an industrial world, where the optimism generated by advances in science and technology was being constantly measured by a concerned observation of the consequences of these advances on the lives of workers and certain others bypassed by such advances, philanthropy by individuals who seemed the very agents of the evils they were trying to overcome was bound to be suspect. The chief criticism was that such philanthropy was a way of acknowledging guilt without being obliged to reform the system that had made these crimes possible. Donors could respond to this growing range of ideological attack on the economic and political system that had supported the accumulation of vast wealth by devoting an appropriate portion of their fortunes to developing novel ideological justifications for the existing order, combining such arguments with sophisticated palliatives disguised as objective social science. From such a perspective, medical research, education, improved housing, even public libraries, and pensions for teachers were ways of assuring a healthy and contented work force—one devoted nonetheless to serving capitalism. Had he written about the United States, Antonio Gramsci would have found in the era of the creation of the big philanthropic foundations much to confirm his theory of hegemony.

One of the problems with all such accounts of motivation is that none necessarily requires the creation of the foundations for its satisfaction. Nor does any of them really endow the foundation with the specific characteristics of the institution it has come to be. Still, there is much archival evidence to support such theories, which is not to say that the several motives are always compatible with one another. It is possible to establish a hierarchy of motives, to claim that the initial philanthropists were moved by arguments they did not always state, of which they may not have been wholly conscious, and still not touch on the essential issue of why the American foundation came to be. It may be useful to take the donors' own perception of their motives as part of the relevant evidence; they do help illuminate what Rockefeller, Sage, and Carnegie intended.

John D. Rockefeller, a devoutly religious man all his life, espoused a Baptist creed that emphasized direct and continuous communication with God, the evangelical responsibility of every individual, and the need for a self-governing community of believers. Rockefeller began his practice of tithing as soon as he earned his first pay; he continued throughout his life to support the work of those churches

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he attended, of missionary activity abroad, and of all manner of religious charities. Such gifts to scholarship as his contributions to Middle Eastern studies were intended to support research into the historical origins of Western religious belief. The adviser who was probably most responsible for suggesting a broader range of philanthropic giving, based on more scientific principles, was Frederick T. Gates, a former Baptist minister. The gift in 1890 that led to the creation of the University of Chicago was initially placed in the charge of a Baptist board for its administration. Because the creation of a major research university could well qualify as satisfying those needs we normally associate with the modern foundation—chief among them, perhaps, those of perpetuity and, to a certain degree, general purpose—it is well to recall the importance of religion as a motive for philanthropy. Still, religion itself gave no sanction for the creation of a foundation.

Educational institutions had, from the time of the Middle Ages, been the vehicle for assuring the perpetuity of religious beliefs. The establishment of major research institutions throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, had educational intentions beyond religious commitment, to foster scientific knowledge and technological advance. Rockefeller's funding of the University of Chicago was, in this sense, one of the last such actions by a noted philanthropist, not the first. Clark, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, and Stanford, to name only the more obvious, guaranteed the immortality of their donors far more effectively than an institution called the University of Chicago could, yet without necessarily perpetuating their purposes.

Margaret Olivia Sage had been concerned with the problems of the education of the young and with aid for women in need in her home town of Troy, New York, long before her marriage to Russell Sage, a man not known for his commitment to community welfare. Her husband's death and the bequest of his estate enabled Mrs. Sage to take the advice of her philanthropically minded friends to encourage more scientific and professional investigation into the issues that interested her. She was, by her own arguments, uninterested in contributing to university research, but far more concerned with the development of the social service professions. Her foundation came closer to being an old-fashioned trust devoted to a specific purpose

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than did the other two; the use of the legal form was a convenience rather than a necessity.

Yet, Mrs. Sage's conception of philanthropy served as one of the essential points of transition in the modernization of the role of women in charitable endeavors. Her advisers, and the first research managers of her foundation, included some of the women who were to become leaders in social work over the next half century: Mary Van Kleeck, Mary Richmond, Katherine Lenroot, and the Abbott sisters. Their interests, and particularly those of Van Kleeck and Richmond, were principally in developments in the field of labor relations; the need to protect women and children had first allowed federal influence on labor relations to increase. Some of them certainly understood that their charitable concern with the welfare of women and children was the first stage in a much more general concern with the conditions of labor for all workers. The idea of a "living wage" was one of their initially metaphoric creations that took on a significant reality by World War I.

Old-age security was a closely related field at a time when social workers were the connecting link between pensions for widows and mothers and the more general problem of aging and the work population. Social work also entered questions of criminology, criminal justice, demography, ethnicity, and race, and the Russell Sage Foundation provided an important continuity between the new social scientists and the traditional elite urban social reformers that went back to the statisticians of the nineteenth century.

Among the first generation of foundation philanthropists, Andrew Carnegie's organizations reveal the broadest range of institution building. When one adds to the Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh, the Carnegie Institution in Washington, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace the continuous benefactions to churches for organs, to various communities for public libraries, the prizes for heroes, and the pensions for teachers, one finds it difficult to explain the novelty he sought in his last major creation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Primarily the brain-child of his lawyer, Elihu Root, it was clearly intended to preserve his remaining money for general purposes, but whether those purposes meant simply the selective sustaining of previous philanthropic enterprises or some new and independent endeavors remained a subject of heated debate

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among the trustees for decades after his death. Indeed, the philanthropic purposes of the Carnegie Corporation of New York were determined, only after his death, by a new generation of foundation managers after a major transformation in the make-up of the board of trustees.

Religious belief played a curiously quixotic role in Carnegie's philanthropy. Although Joseph Wall, his biographer, suggests that he rejected his father's Swedenborgian faith and adopted no alternative, some of his philanthropic activities imply a religious resonance that is interesting. His commitment to science as the root of all fundamental understanding, his late interest in mysticism, his gifts of organs to churches (he believed that music was a better expression of religious belief than words), and his refusal to give pension plans to sectarian schools all suggest elements of a Swedenborgian rebellion.

Critics have suggested that at least part of the reason for creating foundations came from the donors' fear of socialist revolution. From the late 1870s on, increasing labor unrest, together with a growing awareness of urban poverty and its consequences, certainly led many who were critical of social conditions in factories and cities to predict some sort of socialist transformation. A significant segment of Progressive reform tended in this same direction. The decline of a viable socialist movement in the wake of the Russian Revolution, World War I, and the subsequent Red Scare, organized by the Justice Department, has led some historians to cite foundation funding as at least one of the sources of anti-socialist attitudes in the social science movement of the 1920s.[20]

The story itself is more interesting and more complex. Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, in an unusual joint endeavor, both supported the formation in 1910 of the National Civic Federation, an organization designed to help create better communication between labor and management. During the war, however, and particularly after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the NCF, managed by Ralph Easley, a committed Red-baiter, set about adopting some of the frenzied public relations tactics originally formulated for war propaganda by the government's Committee on Public Information. After the war, as active hostility to the Soviet Union gradually subsided, the Red Scare took on the appearance of a badly bungled adventure. The NCF still stuck to its wartime guns, attempting to establish itself as the nation's watchman. Rockefeller's advisers counseled him to

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distance himself from the NCF and its director, while avoiding the risk of an open break that might only lead Easley to turn his energies on the Foundation itself. They could discover no threat of socialist revolution in the United States; the NCF's fight was pointless and wasteful. Their recommendation was for a token gift.[21]

The Carnegie Corporation faced a similar onslaught of requests from Easley. Fearful that they too would hold off, Easley sent his request to Mrs. Carnegie as well. Her polite and genteel request to the trustees for a small gift, to honor her late husband's interest in the NCF, was acceded to. In both the Carnegie and the Rockefeller papers, there are repeated requests from Easley and a continued token support that grows ever smaller as funding for other groups increases with a final plea for what, in effect, is a charitable donation to take care of Easley in a career that is clearly in steep decline.[22]

This tale is not intended to understate the concern with the dangers of radical theory, nor can it conceal the fact that socialism was considered a dangerous ideology by men who had felt threatened even by Populist rhetoric. The Russian Revolution did not please them, to say the least. As Rockefeller wrote his lawyer, Starr Murphy, in 1919,

> I could wish that the education which some professors furnish was more conducive to the most sane and practical and possible views of life rather than drifting, as it does, in cases, toward socialism and some forms of Bolshevism. . . . It seems to me that some influences ought to be brought to bear upon the universities and colleges with reference to the textbooks which, from my standpoint at least, are calculated to lead astray and do harm rather than good.

Murphy replied:

> It seems to me quite clear that . . . the placing of limitations upon . . . academic freedom must be left to the trustees and faculties of the institutions, and that it would be extremely unwise for any donor to attempt to place limitations upon the character of the teaching which shall be given in an institution to which he contributes. It is hardly less objectionable for him to make the determination as to whether or not he will give to any particular institution dependent upon that matter. . . . I have sufficient faith in the truth to believe that in an atmosphere of freedom it will ultimately vindicate itself. . . .[23]

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Arguments for the support of what was initially intended as an institute for research in economics and economic policy, as well as in government and public administration, raised similar questions about their intellectual purpose, although the archival materials again lead to mixed conclusions. As early as 1915 the Rockefeller Foundation began to entertain the idea for such an institute. The war postponed it until the 1920s when similar organizations began to appear, funded by both the older foundations and the newer ones that emerged after the war. The National Bureau of Economic Research, the Institute for Government Research (later the Brookings Institution), the Institute for Public Administration, and the Social Science Research Council are the leading names among the creations of this period; there were others as well.[24]

American academics, who considered themselves to be to the left of the nation's banking and industrial community, had been voicing their economic criticisms as Progressives for over a decade. Committed to a reformed capitalism, they believed enlightened government could produce major change. Support for such studies of economic policy came also from conservative trustees who accepted, though only after some debate, the role of professional economists whose economic principles they did not always agree with. Foundation trustees like Morgan's Russell Leffingwell, a member of the Carnegie board after Andrew Carnegie's death, found some of the NBER's economic research decidedly distasteful; he did nothing, however, to block such research once he had voiced his complaints in the gentlemanly privacy of a board meeting, or in brief notes dictated to the president of the Foundation.[25]

A desire to defend and support capitalism did not require foundation trustees to seek to suppress socialism, even less to attempt to interfere in the research and teaching processes they were committed to funding. Increasingly, a professionalized community of academics controlled the research institutions the foundation had funded. The disputes within individual disciplines that led to the establishment of particular directions for research were based more on the power of significant leaders within the disciplines than on any intellectual direction provided by foundation managers. The latter, together with the younger trustees who began to take over foundation direction in the 1920s, were part of a generation that had clearly committed itself to the principle of academic freedom. Trustees, confronted with a

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president whose reputation among his own cohort of intellectual colleagues gave his views an independent authority, accepted judgments they might otherwise have found questionable.

The creation of the foundation manager was in some respects an accidental consequence of the unanticipated growth in foundation activity during and after the First World War. As proved to be the case in such philanthropic enterprises as the Red Cross, community chests, and the development of new community foundations, wartime fundraising suggested the possibility of vastly expanding the role of philanthropic activities, aiming them at a much larger public. Within the first foundations themselves, the death or withdrawal from activity of the original donor produced a need for continuous management; this development is paralleled in all the voluntary associations of the period, as well as in the growing number of professional associations. Academic associations and professional associations such as the City Managers' Association discovered the need for full-time secretariats that would serve the part-time and voluntary leaders who acted as temporary presidents. The professionalization of voluntarism was well underway.

In the case of the foundations, the choice of former college presidents seemed a logical step, given the role played by such men as advisers, trustees, and applicants for and managers of philanthropic funds. When Herbert Hoover named former Stanford president, Ray Lyman Wilbur, as his Secretary of the Interior, his deliberate design was to connect the fields of medical research and college management with his own plans to move the department into the field of social welfare. The managerial network of college presidents, foundation heads, and federal government administrators was given its beginning; the managerial elite that preceded the growth of modern philanthropic bureaucracy was put in place.

II

The general purpose foundation was a new form of philanthropy. Representing a range of experience in corporate management that had been fundamental in the critical economic battles of the Progressive Era, it suggested a wholly new set of philanthropic purposes. An extraordinary transformation in business organization occurred in the nineteenth century, particularly in the years immediately following the Civil War when capital resources for industrial growth far

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exceeded what had previously been available for both national and international expansion. Middle-class entrepreneurs, eager to exploit such expansion for themselves, learned to mistrust bankers and other financial managers, preferring to associate with those who combined ambition with a willingness to work hard for what they earned. In the early stages of their careers, these individuals, conscious of their dependence on bankers who were ready to trust them, leaving them alone to do what they wished to do, saw such individuals as neighbors and community members like themselves.

Rockefeller's memoirs include almost Alger-like descriptions of such people—kindly men who recognized and supported the bright and moral youths of the community. Andrew Mellon's father, Thomas, appears to have been such a man; among the merchant bankers of the era, there are a number of similar modest managers of resources who looked for solid but adventurous entrepreneurs whom they could help.[26] Frank Cowperwood's father, in Theodore Dreiser's famous trilogy, plays such a role, but for Dreiser, who wrote at the end of the era, the imaginative and dangerous energy of the son leaves the cautious father feeling both puzzled and helpless.

By the second half of the nineteenth century, banking institutions had been transformed into powerful national entities, run by men who managed money, who looked for profits in a kind of organized control and speculative financial planning that Rockefeller's generation found difficult to accept. Rockefeller and his peers considered themselves managers of men, not managers of money. They distinguished themselves from bankers by insisting that they knew far better than bankers what money was for; and they separated themselves from reckless industrial gamblers such as Jay Gould and Jim Fisk by insisting that competition required that men trust one another's honesty. Their autobiographical statements and personal correspondence repeatedly assert in terms reminiscent of Veblen that money was not intended for accumulation, but only for what they considered to be creative industrial development. They rejected speculative investment practices, preferring to invest the largest part of their capital in fixed financial instruments that were calculated to provide capital for production.[27] Looking suspiciously on the growth of the stock market and on the novel practices in stock buying that made it possible for individuals to borrow in order to buy, or, far worse, to sell what they did not own, they saw themselves as

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members of a community of men united in their common acceptance of a code of honor. Unable to understand hostile labor organizations, unwilling to accept theories of the inevitability of class conflict, their image of their own development emphasized the need for cooperation, for a clearly articulated business morality that rewarded good judgment and punished bad.[28]

John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie saw their own business origins in Cratchitt-like terms. Hardworking bookkeepers in an industrial enterprise that came finally to recognize their commitment to precision, honesty, and trustworthiness, they were rewarded with the opportunity to prove their prowess. The trustworthiness of their judgment was their basic skill; they used it, in their minds, in the service of others, whose skills they knew they needed but did not themselves possess. Neither ever understood how they could finally be publicly perceived as Scrooges; they never ceased to think of themselves as friends of labor, who knew how much they depended on honest work, on the ambition of others like themselves who might one day rise from the accounting desk to take over the heavy responsibilities of management. Their paternalism—wishing to help employees in need and to reward virtue—made opposition from organized labor seem almost conspiratorial, an affront to their generosity, of which they were inordinately proud.

In seeking to find alternatives to trade union organization of labor, believing that labor and management were not two classes in conflict, but two interdependent and necessary elements in the process of production, they justified the employment of armed guards to protect their property as a regrettable but necessary response to the threat of violence they thought to be inherent in the strike weapon. However much they deplored the actions their guards took in the protection of their property—and there is ample evidence to suggest that they did deplore the violence—they felt themselves trapped by events they had not initiated and could not control.

Both Rockefeller and Carnegie faced the problems of managerial control that had forced other entrepreneurs of their generation to accept the diversification of management, subjecting their personal judgments to a new set of critical choices. They retired relatively early from direct management of their industries, choosing to spend their later years in operating their massive financial empires from small offices in modest office buildings or from rooms set aside in their own

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living quarters. Although they delegated day-to-day management to others, they expected to be consulted on some decisions; this left them in a somewhat confused world where the boundaries between their philanthropic and business activities were never wholly distinguished. The same locations and often the same individuals were used for both. Gates, for example, was Rockefeller's chief philanthropic adviser, but Rockefeller saw nothing amiss in asking him also to manage certain of his business interests while he himself traveled around the country on various philanthropic missions. Rockefeller would dictate brief instructions to a small group of subordinates who managed his communications for him. If the chain of command among the men who were secretaries or lawyers—and, in Rockefeller's case, a public relations executive—was tortuous, the development of habits of control required each to report to him at length on activities undertaken in his behalf. He would respond with comments and directions, politely, formally, and personally, from wherever he happened to be at that moment—his home in Cleveland, or in Pocantico Hills, or on Mount Desert in the summer.

Andrew Carnegie scribbled personal notes to subordinates from his home on Fifth Avenue or cabled messages from his castle in Scotland. Since some occasionally traveled with him, and even had desks in his home office space, communication with him and with one another was close and casual. A small staff of business associates helped to communicate his needs, whether they involved business management or certain of his philanthropic interests. Henry S. Pritchett, a former president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, gradually took over those aspects of his philanthropy that had to do with education, elbowing aside business associates that Carnegie had used in his early philanthropy. "Mr. Carnegie's clerks" was the derisive term that a new generation of foundation managers used in describing these men. This "household" method of operation was, by the turn of the century, rapidly becoming a managerial anachronism, held together only by the habits of a lifetime, and the unwillingness of a generation of powerful men to change their habits.

Rockefeller and Carnegie both watched bureaucracy grow and gradually take over the operation of their business enterprises. By the end of their careers, the development of business as a national system was one of their essential contributions to American economic life. While they might regret this, knowing that it forced them to move

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their families to New York so that they might be closer to the center of their operations in the city that had become the nation's banking capital, they saw it as a way of managing the financial resources they needed to control if they were to protect themselves from a banking network they did not wholly trust. The growth of national business had also raised the specter, and indeed the growing reality, of significant government intervention. That, in turn, increased their dependence on lawyers who now played more complex roles to ensure their own influence on government, as well as to protect them from the government.

The fact that Carnegie's lawyer, Elihu Root, was a distinguished government administrator and former senator was consistent with Carnegie's sense of the appropriate relationship between business and government. Carnegie was genuinely surprised when Congress turned down his offer to provide pensions for retiring presidents of the United States. More striking, perhaps, are the letters sent in 1910 by Henry S. Pritchett to a congressman arguing against a bill to grant funds to elementary and secondary schools in agricultural communities; many saw this as simply an extension of the provisions to support higher education that Congress had already voted for state institutions. Pritchett's objection—that such aid would violate the principles of local control of children's education—was a restatement of a classic Jacksonian principle, modernized now to equate local with voluntary, and federal with governmental control.

Congress lacked a consistent approach to the new philanthropy and to the new expertise. Academics began to find their way into government bureaus; agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission came to recognize the imperative need for trained economists. Bureaus concerned with standards and statistics had something of a tradition in engaging outside "experts" as did the managers of the great geological surveys. Still, many congressmen were made uneasy when they discovered that "experts" were being hired with government money. Specific congressional legislative attempts to forbid such employment were conveniently ignored by presidents such as William Howard Taft, who needed these specialists for his committee charged with studying the executive branch of the government.

In many instances, specialists were expected to give their services voluntarily. As the experience with experts in the First World War made clear, philanthropists accustomed to hiring experts as their own

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advisers were quite willing to fund them if they were called to advise the government. Congress continued to be unhappy with such *ad hoc* arrangements, not because they were *ad hoc* but because they existed at all. Not until the New Deal were presidents given the authority to hire expert advice with government money, and, even then, many congressmen remained suspicious and reluctant.

The necessity to delegate responsibilities to surrogates and to specialists, in response to the need for expert knowledge in a changing technological environment, told the early philanthropists that their traditional methods of management and control were no longer sufficient. Both Rockefeller and Carnegie learned early in their careers to share top management with associates whose attitudes and values they shared. However ruthless they might be in their dealings with competitors, they willingly shared authority with those who could help them, at least at the top, and in the beginning. They were always generous with those whose services they needed.

Their first philanthropic structures, created a decade before the establishment of their foundations, followed this same process of selection and delegation. Rockefeller's doctors, like his choice of a president for his university in Chicago, Carnegie's technologists, like the presidents of his institutes, reflected a calculated judgment of the skills of managerial experts among men trained in the specialities they sought to advance. Their friends who collected art or funded opera companies looked for similar specialist advice; expert management was needed to continue the artistic enterprise. Much of the interest in higher education among other millionaires of this generation was based on this same sense of need. Their search was not for educated men, in the classical sense of the term, but for new managerial specialists who could be relied on to continue their endeavors. While they would have avoided such terminology—had they noted it in the European literature of the period—they were creating a system to educate a managerial elite that resembled the ambitious middle-class entrepreneurs of modest means they themselves had been at the outset of their own careers.

The philanthropists constituted a ruling class, though they considered themselves only part of that class, an embattled part. The other part, governed by politics and politicians, they considered strange, intransigent, and often accidental, an opposition whose hostility they were never able to understand or predict. Philanthropists tended to

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play as small a role in politics as they could; only in later years, with the expansion of the regulatory process, did they see the necessity of acting politically. Increasingly, they hired lawyers and others to manage such political relationships for them. Relatively uneducated themselves, they came to see the value of formal education in a technological world. The managers of the institutions they had created were a new breed as different from themselves as they had been from the irresponsible gamblers whom they had been compelled to contend with, or with the politicians whom they considered to be poor businessmen at best, charlatans at worst.

Such an argument risks begging an essential question: whether or not they saw themselves as a new American ruling class. An important distinction must be made between the foundation philanthropists and contemporaries such as J.P. Morgan, Andrew Mellon, or William Vanderbilt. The latter tended to conceive of their wealth as personal property; they lacked a religious conception of stewardship. Entrepreneurial monarchs such as Morgan, Mellon, and Vanderbilt were collectors of traditional symbols of wealth, which ultimately became part of great public collections. The contrast between such gifts and the creation of institutions designed to have a continuing influence on public policy through education, scientific research, and welfare policy may be obvious, but is still puzzling.

Thorstein Veblen grasped the problem more precisely, and perhaps more subtly, than any other American critic of wealth. In *The Higher Learning in America* he derided the "captains of intellect," the new generation of university presidents who were prepared to provide the education that the new national system required. In his later writings—such as *The Engineers and the Price System*—he appealed even more pointedly to those who had been trained to manage the system to direct it to serve the interests of what he perceived to be the larger public, rather than only those who controlled the industrial wealth.[29]

Veblen appeared to believe that he could deflect the ambition of a large generation of upwardly mobile Americans who were training in the new universities, who imagined that the careers being opened up to them would provide them with access to riches that went well beyond what they possessed. To some extent he succeeded; Veblen's impact on economics is most noteworthy, perhaps, for the loyalty and affection his impassioned pleas for moral responsibility raised, even among those students who ultimately came to question his skills

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as an economist. Wesley Clair Mitchell, for example, remained a disciple without ever becoming a follower. Rexford Tugwell considered Veblen one of the most important intellectual influences on his career. Indeed, the whole generation of New Deal lawyers could have confessed relationships with Veblen that made their seduction by Franklin Roosevelt possible. Like others in this generation of university professors, Veblen was a prophet of sorts, who kept alive the spirit of prophecy in an academic world deeply puzzled over the relations between science and reform.

Veblen and the generation of academics who provided the first philanthropists with the national intellectual system in which they could invest their resources saw themselves as supporters of American government, never as its adversaries. This is really the key to the Gramscian question: were early twentieth-century intellectuals successfully integrated by the ruling class through the work of foundations? Like the historiographic disputes over the meaning of Progressivism, the problem raises the issue of whether or not these academics were closet conservatives, dupes, or charlatans. More important, and perhaps more interesting, it raises certain fundamental questions about the application of such European theory to an American social and economic setting that seems so clearly to reflect an industrial development common to all of modern Western society.

III

American universities have played important roles in every era of reform since their founding in the nineteenth century. From the Progressive Era, through the New Deal and the Great Society, academics and their institutions have served national policymaking by providing intellectual arguments either in support of or in opposition to current public policy. Today, one could argue, both defense and criticism are institutionalized in foundations that increasingly take on the image of ideological confrontation.

At the same time, higher education in the United States, now understood to be the route to success in every profession, has often seemed to successive generations of educational critics to have little sense of the social responsibility of professionalism. The development of American higher education seemed to contain a built-in paradox. Most institutions, emerging out of collections of academies originally tended by religious groups who used the schools to effect the moral

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indoctrination of the young as well as to train them in academic fundamentals, were transformed into gateways for professional success, more often involved in grafting new ambitions onto old purposes than in fomenting a revolution against such purposes. Men like Veblen, forced to accept the responsibility of training the young for the professions of business, law, and medicine, insisted on adding to the certification for which course-work prepared the young, their own brand of ministry, preaching responsibilities that often fitted rather uncomfortably with the aims of professional education.

The creators of foundations faced a similar contradiction between the traditional purposes of educational philanthropy and the new scientific approaches, separating the functions of trustees from those of academic advisers. The first were to be practical men of affairs who knew the world of business as the donors knew it, who could be expected to make judgments from their perspective, forcing their academic advisers to explain their abstractions in terms that experienced and practical businessmen could understand. The advisers, in order to gain the power they increasingly felt they deserved, had to educate their donors and their trustees, influencing and cajoling, beguiling when necessary. The development of professional foundation staffs to mediate between trustees and donees exemplifies the unintended logic of the new philanthropy.

In one sense, the argument that American foundations were intended to support the American economic system and the political culture that surrounds it is obvious, but only if one leaves the argument there. After all, Charles Beard made much the same claim for the Constitution of 1787. Like the Constitution, the foundation has to be understood, not simply according to what might have been intended at its creation, but also in terms of what it has evolved into. It is the stages of foundation development that require further investigation: from the original management of philanthropy by donors and their appointed surrogates to the management of foundations by trustees initially selected by the donors and then by one another, delegating part of management to staff; to the later development of professional foundation management as the primary agency of control, with relations established between foundations and communities outside which the foundations themselves fund; finally, to the relation between foundations and the burgeoning

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governmental agencies that provide public services and are affected by what foundations do.

By creating the foundation as a legal entity, the donor delegated some of his authority to a larger group of people. As in any such delegation, the act itself complicates our perception of the role played by the donor. John D. Rockefeller never attended the meetings of his new foundation board, having named his son, John D., Jr., its first president. Yet, father and son communicated closely about their various philanthropic enterprises. The son, shy and uneasy in public, gave testimony at the time of the hearings of the United States Industrial Relations Commission that was both painful and embarrassing. The event turned an investigation of the so-called Ludlow Massacre at the Rockefeller mining holdings in Colorado into a scandal implicating the new Foundation when a newspaper reporter discovered that telegrams from the Rockefeller interests to Colorado had, despite young Rockefeller's disclaimers of involvement, been sent from the address shared by the Foundation.

The fact that the involvement was ultimately shown to have been real made John D., Jr.'s efforts to work out a new "constitution" for workers—incorporating a new concept of corporate cooperation between workers and managers—seem part of a more general conspiracy; it did little to persuade the public that John D., Jr., was indeed a philanthropist, as he imagined, and not a businessman. His father designed his son's career precisely on that distinction, believing that it accorded well with the younger man's sensitivities.

The philanthropic institutions that evolved under Andrew Carnegie's direction show an even more direct connection with Carnegie's industrial interests than do Rockefeller's. The Carnegie Institution in Washington, created primarily to further the sciences that most affected the development of natural resources and navigation, was committed also to more purely theoretical scientific endeavors. The Carnegie Institute, at Pittsburgh, was initially devoted to technological training. Carnegie invited a former president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to be the first president of his Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Yet, Carnegie's interest was perhaps less industrial than autobiographical, reflecting the limitations of his own career and his desire to aid future young technological enterpreneurs in their own search for success.

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Carnegie's physical and mental decline in the years immediately following the creation of his last philanthropic corporation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, left in its wake a three-way battle for control within the Board of Trustees, which consisted of the presidents of the other philanthropic corporations—academic managers selected by Carnegie—former business associates who had helped manage some of Carnegie's more traditional philanthropies, and men whom Carnegie had picked to help him in the overall control of his new and last corporation. As Carnegie himself had not clearly outlined the role of the institution, its precise definition was in abeyance until after the First World War, when Henry Pritchett and Frederick Keppel made decisions that led, ultimately, to the separation of both the other groups from the management of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, putting it on the road to becoming the independent foundation they wanted it to be.

The relationship between trustees and staff evolved differently in each of the first foundations: Russell Sage, Rockefeller, and Carnegie. Yet broad similarities existed, at least in the communities from which trustees and staff were selected. Leading figures from law, banking, and academia continued to provide the trustees for foundations, while proteges selected from the graduating classes of Eastern private colleges joined the growing staffs. The latter, usually recommended by college presidents, were part of the network from which foundation presidents were chosen; they made a practice of culling promising individuals from each graduating class. One does not have to search for an elite in all such practices; it was clearly there.

Less clear, however, is the relationship between that elite and the talent and programs it chose to fund. Part of the problem in defining that relationship stems from the fact that the organizations of academic and professional societies to promote a national intellectual elite preceded the development of these new national funding sources. Unlike the royal societies in Great Britain and the system of royal patronage that marked the development of science in Europe, the growth of professional scientific societies in the United States had, since the days of Benjamin Franklin, been a middle-class, practical phenomenon. The chief concern for Americans had been the limited intellectual resources the new society could draw on, the need, at times almost desperate, to create such resources, and the willingness, therefore, to accept all comers. Even if foundations had desired to

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remain socially restrictive, they would have been limited in that ambition by standards already established in both academic and professional associations. American philanthropists, unlike monarchs and popes, knew they were an intellectually dependent class. The establishment of academic freedom in American universities was a tacit acknowledgment of the fact that an expanding nation needed every technological skill it could buy; it was not intellectual virtue that made donors so accepting of new ideas. This is not to suggest, however, that the tension between donors and donees might not be acute at times or that it has not continued to be so; rather, it is to say that American intellectuals attained a relative independence by the turn of the century that probably originated as much in the absence of a national system of scholarly development unaccustomed to any close control of intellectual life, as it did on the insistence of American academics on their freedom. Individual college presidents or institutional trustees might oppress individual scholars, but the system, as a whole, was remarkably free of such oppression precisely because there was so little consciousness of it being a whole system, or of its relation to the development of the state.

IV

The fact that both the Rockefeller and the Carnegie Foundations appear to fulfill certain aspects of the Gramscian program must be recognized as significant. Foundations were created, in part, to give industrial society an educated class that would continue to produce generations of researchers, teachers, and managers in every field of culture and technology. The creators of foundations and their successors—trustees, staffs, advisers, and the like—have all been committed in one way or another to the American system of government. The ambiguous phrase "in one way or another" masks considerable disagreement among them—disagreement that has led congressional committees to criticize foundations generally, and internal disputes to erupt within individual foundations. These disputes, now rapidly becoming more common among the foundations themselves, not least because certain of the new ones have emerged with strong ideological commitments markedly different from those common to the earlier donations, merit attention.

Beneath all such issues, however, is the fundamental problem that ultimately limits the degree to which any of the elite theories of

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European political analysis can be profitably applied to the United States. While such theories may reveal significant aspects of the relationship between foundations and the American polity, they cannot ignore the fact that European theorists regarded political parties as the essential link between politics and intellectuals. European experience made political parties the essential instrument for a ruling class. Theorists from Mosca to Pareto, and ultimately to Gramsci, in acknowledging the process of European party development, attempted to turn it to what they perceived as effective purposes. Whether the objective was to gain power or to maintain the *status quo* made less difference to them than the correct understanding of the realities of political party organization, and its inevitable relation to social class.

Acknowledging the existence of an elite was not a problem for Europeans. The term provided a language for explaining the limits to the growth of democracy in European culture—limits that had worried Tocqueville when he reflected on the role of the *ancien régime* in France. Yet, those who framed the American Constitution in 1787 identified parties with corruption; they looked for a non-partisan system of government based on republican virtue. The emergence of parties as a permanent instrument of government came with the Jacksonian rebellion against the non-partisan elite that had governed the new nation for its first three decades.[30] From that moment, the reforming elites who sought to wrest control of the government from those they considered to be partisan, patronage-ridden, and corrupt party "regulars," viewed political parties as a danger to rational, intelligent, political management. From Henry Adams to Nelson Rockefeller, individuals who belonged to the elites were either excluded from politics, or allowed to participate only to the extent that their wealth and public appeal made them attractive to party regulars, who viewed them as candidates with resources and personalities who might be expected to win.

The connection between political parties and political elites in American life is very complex. The public's tendency to find professional politicians unattractive, to put their faith in non-political, apparently non-partisan leaders has a firm historical base. While Americans do not consider professional politicians members of an established elite, those whom they are willing to consider elite members are suspect as well, though on very different grounds.

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American conceptions of political democracy stand on an uneasy platform, shifting between a view of politics as essentially corrupt, and of elitism as also threatening to democracy.

Political parties in the United States do not serve as vehicles of intellectual and ideological control. The role that European theorists are able to assign parties in their political life simply does not apply to American political parties. Nor are American parties responsible for the managerial role American elites play in influencing the political process. The adversarial relationship between political leaders and the powerful managers of the news media compels politicians to establish various sorts of truces, keeping the two in a continuous battle for a temporary upper hand. The same is true of the relationship between political leaders and academics who seek to influence policy. Parties have seldom been able to organize groups of supporting intellectuals in this century; rarely do academics back the party itself. Generally, individual political leaders who have been able to draw a cadre of intellectuals to their service have done so for only very brief periods.

For foundations aspiring to be intellectual support institutions, the problem of establishing relations with the political structure is no less complex. As has been noted, the efforts by Rockefeller and Carnegie to create an open connection with the federal government were unceremoniously rejected. From the beginning, foundations and the federal government have had the same uneasy relationship as reform elites have traditionally had with politicians. When foundations have been used by politicians to provide them with policy analysis and programs, the use has been either tentative or manipulative—tentative, when political leaders lacked ideas for programs and asked for "task forces" to advise them; manipulative, when political leaders sought intellectual justifications for doing what they intended to do in any case. What brings the tentative and the manipulative together from time to time is the use of outside sources of advice and foundation funding to make the public believe that something is being done to cope with national problems.

The attractiveness of Gramscian analysis is obvious, as is its use for explaining the role that foundations play in American life. Yet, its limits are even more revealing, though much less satisfying to those who are committed to its application. While the creators of foundations and their early managers may have intended to establish a

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national elite that would bring about a significant degree of social and political reform without changing the nation's basic economic structure, that purpose was complicated by the other missions to which they were deeply committed, and others that they could not possibly have anticipated.

The initial philanthropists were far less certain of the reasons for transforming their charitable enterprises into modern foundations than were the advisers on whom they depended late in their careers. Lawyers, clergymen, college presidents, doctors, and academics were all part of the late nineteenth-century development of a community of experts whose capacity for guidance and manipulation of wealthy donors was in some respects extraordinary. They all shared the same religious commitments, the same sense of community order, and the same conception of economic justice. The famous scene in which William Rainey Harper asked John D. Rockefeller to join him on his knees in prayer on the floor of Harper's office is recited today in certain circles with humor and surprise. Yet, Harper had similar communication with Albion Small when Harper knew that he was dying and wished to consult with the eminent sociologist on the reality of life after death, and on the make-up of the heaven he hoped to reach. American Christianity was a common faith, creating an absolute reality that even wealth did not disturb. This same set of values united the lawyers, doctors, and academics whom they consulted. All also shared common beliefs about the character of American politics, and how politics related to their reform interests and religious values.

None of them believed that political parties and politicians were equipped to solve problems efficiently or economically. Given that belief, Rockefeller's effort to obtain a federal charter for his foundation seems almost strange. The rejection of that idea—and the ensuing attack by the Industrial Relations inquiry—set him on a course that scrupulously avoided any interaction with the federal government. Similarly, Carnegie and Pritchett, who did not initially see a firm line dividing foundation activities from government actions, came in the end to believe that their philanthropies were separate from public works, and that the two should not be confused.

Also, they saw no future in industrial benevolence or welfare capitalism, maintaining instead a commitment to the investment of capital in industrial expansion, which, they believed, would produce

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profits that could be distributed to the workers in the form of wage increases. Herbert Hoover later made the same argument, believing that investment in research was a way to enhance industrial strength, expand employment opportunities, and improve the lives of workers by encouraging them to consume, thereby maintaining the momentum of the industrial system.

The position of philanthropy, independent from both government and business, ensured that neither politics nor profits would shape the direction of intellectual growth. Such independence, however, did not mean that political or business leaders were excluded from making decisions about the philanthropic process. On the contrary, their involvement was essential, not so much as political leaders or as businessmen, but as statesmen recruited from both sectors, chosen by the self-selecting boards of trustees for their statesmanship and the experience their respective professions had given them. Again, moral judgment was the essential criterion, as it had been in the selection of business colleagues. Philanthropists trusted their own judgments and wished them to be perpetuated in their trusts.

Efforts to apply Gramsci to the American foundation create the same problems any European theory must confront when applied in an American context. The barrier that separates intellectual and economic elites from the political system is strangely two-sided. It permits a degree of communication and influence, but leaves politics in control. Both groups accept this arrangement, seeing it as the most reasonable system of protecting the interests of each. While tax exemption remains the only accepted formal link between the foundations and politics, it has been, and will certainly remain, the battlefield on which every war over foundation influence is fought.

Mutual mistrust is profound, extending back in some sense to the founding of the Republic. The old conception of republican virtue that inspired the intellectual elites who framed the Constitution of 1787 was defeated by the Jacksonian revolution that brought modern political parties into being. That the original sentiment has refused to die, that it has continued to serve as the foundation of a good deal of reform in American political life, is not changed by the fact that its periodic victories are temporary. Politics, as Tocqueville implied over a century ago, are close to being an American vice—a disturbing suggestion then, as now. This conflict inevitably complicates the application of Gramscian theory in explaining the role of

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foundations in American life and demands alternative theories, which ask some of the same questions, work with some of the same elements, but offer different conclusions.

V

If the question of donor motives remains unanswered it may be because it is the wrong question, or a good question posed in terms that no longer apply, if indeed they ever did. One may argue that the motives of Rockefeller and Carnegie were much too simple to bear the weight of so complex an analysis, particularly if one looks at personal intentions, giving serious consideration to what these men and their associates said and wrote. On the other hand, if one looks at what foundations have become in the aftermath of these original decisions, how they have developed, a far more complex and interesting problem emerges. It is possible that a Gramscian analysis is applicable to the behavior of mature foundations, though it may be ill-suited to explain the origins of these foundations. It may not explain the intentions of the donors, though it may explain a great deal that has happened since.

The first foundations were established in the absence of national alternatives for coping with major welfare issues that emerged nationwide in the wake of industrialization, the technological revolution, and the establishment of a national economy operating in an increasingly international market. Even a confiscatory income tax, assuming that such a tax was ever possible, would not have been able to cope with the opposition to federal welfare programs in Congresses still trying to manage the effective modernization of the post–Civil War South. Americans remained profoundly committed to the belief that welfare, like the charity they still confused it with, began at home. They saw state and local governments as the principal agencies of such welfare, believing they could control them. Presidents as recently as Franklin Roosevelt were forced to acknowledge that the problems of the South were real, that they stood in the way of national welfare advances. In 1940, Roosevelt was perhaps the first national leader willing to point to the South as the symbol of intractable poverty. The federal government neither would nor could take steps to produce the national society that was developing independently of its wishes or policies.

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Foundations and private philanthropy, interestingly enough, were the first to begin to cope with these problems on a national scale, giving substantial amounts of attention and money to the South, suggesting some of the directions that future reform might take, if it was intelligently organized, liberated of the burdens of American politics. Justification for such attention is argued both in the writings and in the policies of Rockefeller and Carnegie. While their efforts remained outside the structure of American politics, and even reflected an active hostility to politics and political institutions, making the application of European theories such as Gramsci's problematic, such theory is not irrelevant.

By the 1950s, the situation had begun to change. Demobilization, following World War II, rapid social change, and the Cold War, forced the government to intervene in a number of areas that had once been more or less the exclusive concern of either private philanthropy or of the individual states. Legal justification for corporate philanthropy, growing federal intervention in education and research, and the growth of government corporations to deal with health, scientific research, the humanities, and the arts all demanded new definitions of national responsibility, creating for the first time a national culture, very broadly conceived. The contemporary issues of civil rights and equal opportunity followed in the wake of these developments.

By the 1960s, poverty was acknowledged to be a national phenomenon, and not the special problem of the Southern states. Urbanization, mobility, family disruptions, and inner-city ghettos became part of a national rhetoric that made federal action more acceptable, though the language of the debate still focused primarily on racial issues and continued to do so for at least two decades. Poverty and race were thought to be indissolubly linked.

Acknowledging their public responsibilities, foundations, like the federal government, opened their boards to individuals representing wholly new groups, regularly broadcast news of their activities, and opened their archives for systematic research. In this way, foundations were doing exactly what certain of their creators had always planned. The number of foundations using administrative staffs to make their philanthropic decisions grew; so, also, did the tendency to develop philanthropy as a profession, something the first generation of philanthropists had studiously tried to avoid. With the augmented

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staff, both in foundations and in the federal government, an increasing number of people became responsible for managing cultural investment, determining what was and what was not a useful cultural enterprise.

While these transformations all result from the creation of a new kind of national culture at the turn of the century, few were intended by the creators of the first foundations, and some were diametrically opposed to their declared intentions. The establishment of a variety of institutions to manage culture, together with the emergence of a range of professions to do so, helped create a very complex ideological configuration, which is expressed by the great variety of philanthropic institutions that now vie for influence on the national scene.

Certain of these foundations may, very crudely, be called "right wing." Others support the policy research interests of powerful political leaders. Within the federal government itself, there is increased concern for the popular or democratic needs of a culture-hungry public and also for the more elite interests that characteristically supported the arts. Within the sciences, the traditional research community, with its emphasis on pure research, has to be separated off from those within that community who find government research policy properly oriented toward issues of defense and national interest. Today, we can even contemplate the rather curious spectacle of an "Endowment for Democracy."

What seems clear—in an area where little is transparent—is that between foundations and government, between foundations themselves with very different policy interests, and among groups concerned with the direction and purpose of government-funded policy programs, an intense ideological debate is going on; it is increasingly difficult to describe the elites who manage this debate. That such elites exist is incontestable, but their relations to one another, the institutions they serve, and the general public's influence with them is not equally clear.

The Gramscian analysis supports the idea that modern technological society has produced elites dependent on certain resources for the creation of culture, and that those resources are distributed in accordance with beliefs formed in the institutions that control them. One of the major responsibilities of these elites is to satisfy their constituencies as they perceive their needs and demands, whether they be those of a donor, a board of trustees, the President and

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Congress, the news media, or a public that persists in believing that it governs itself.

The relationship among these groups, their disagreements with one another, and their willingness to use political power to affect what these elites can accomplish is what distinguishes the American cultural scene from what was traditionally true in Europe. The situation was always—it may still be—different, but it is impossible to conceive of these questions in the old-fashioned way.

ENDNOTES

The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Andrew Nimmelman and Steven Wheatley.

[1]Donald Fisher, "The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony," *Sociology* 17 (1983), pp. 206–233. Martin Bulmer and Donald Fisher, "Debate," *Sociology* 18 (1984), pp. 573–587. See also Joan Roelofs, "Foundations and the Supreme Court," *Telos* 62 (Winter 1984–5), pp. 59–87.

[2]Robert F. Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad* (Boston, MA: G.K. Hall and Co., 1980).

[3]Ibid., pp. 17–18.

[4]Ibid., p. 78.

[5]Karl Marx, "The German Ideology," Part I, in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 163.

[6]See Robert Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction* (London, England: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1982), p. 26.

[7]For a good discussion of hegemony, see Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 68–77.

[8]Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, pp. 24–25.

[9]Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory*, pp. 76–77.

[10]Ibid., p. 86.

[11]Frederick T. Gates, one of John D. Rockefeller's earliest advisers, is probably the most articulate of the promoters of this kind of argument. See the Rockefeller Foundation archive documents and Frederick Taylor Gates, *Chapters in My Life* (New York: Free Press, 1977).

[12]John D., Jr., to John D., Sr., January 12, 1911 and March 27, 1911. Rockefeller Foundation Archives. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Box 26.

[13]RFDR No. 21–Jan. 21, 1914. Report of the Secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation to the Trustees. Series 900, Box 18, Folder 129. Rockefeller Archives Center (RAC), Pocantico Hills, NY.

[14]Jerome D. Greene to Wikliffe Rose, July 7, 1913. RF 3.900.21.159.PF 118-A, RAC.

[15]Charles W. Eliot to Jerome D. Greene, 20 September, 1915. RG 3 Series 903, Box 1, Folder 1, RAC.

[16]John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to Dr. George E. Vincent, May 5, 1919. RG 3 Series 903, Box 1, Folder 1, RAC.

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[17]John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to John D., Sr., April 17, 1917. Box 26, RAC.
[18]Ibid.
[19]John D., Sr., to John D., Jr., April 12, 1917, Rockefeller Family papers, RAC.
[20]James Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism* 1912–1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
[21]There is correspondence between Starr Murphy and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in the Rockefeller Family papers, RAC, and extensive exchanges in the Carnegie Corporation papers between Russell Leffingwell and Frederick Keppel.
[22]E.H. Goodwin, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Frederick D. Keppel, Carnegie Corporation, June 10, 1926. Papers of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Keppel to John C. Merriam, June 6, 1926. Elihu Root continued to support Easley and the NCF, but despite his influence he clearly lost.
[23]John D. Rockefeller, Sr., to Starr J. Murphy, November 21, 1919. Murphy to John D. Rockefeller, Sr., November 25, 1919. RG 2 Rockefeller Boards, Box 57. Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, RAC.
[24]The founding of an Institute of Economic Research was first discussed by the Rockefeller Foundation in April of 1914 at a conference that assembled a group of major economists. They agreed that such an institute not be established for the purpose of spreading propaganda but for engaging in scientific research in the field. "Quite apart from the existing disagreement of scholars even as to many fundamentals in economics, which without careful preliminary studies would make dogmatic teaching of doubtful utility, it is essential for the permanent standing of an Institute of Economic Research that it should early establish its reputation as scientific, impartial, and unprejudiced in its finding and presenting of the facts as to economic and social conditions." Report of Committee to the Rockefeller Foundation, August 4, 1914. Signed by Edwin F. Gay, Chairman, J. Laurence Lauglin, Thomas W. Page, Harry A. Wheeler, with a minority report by Victor Morawetz who wanted a more publicity-oriented program of public education.
[25]Correspondence between Russell Leffingwell and Frederick Keppel in the Carnegie Corporation Archives.
[26]John D. Rockefeller, *Random Reminiscences of Men and Events* (Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Press and Rockefeller Archive Center, 1984). Originally published in a series of articles in *World's Work* (1908–09), pp. 48–49.
[27]The gifts of both Rockefeller and Carnegie to their foundations took the form of bonds, not stocks, and the ability of foundations to manage their investments by purchasing stock was an important topic of later debate.
[28]John D. Rockefeller, *Random Reminiscences*, pp. 64–66.
[29]Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America* (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1918); *The Engineers and The Price System* (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1921).
[30]The best account of this history is given by Ralph Ketcham, *Presidents Above Party* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

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Francis X. Sutton

The Ford Foundation: The Early Years

INSTITUTIONS RESEMBLE great public figures. Their origins and youth attract curiosity that can be gratified in coherent and smooth-textured narration. Later they become like great trees with proliferating branches and foliage that blinds the sight. So it has been with the Ford Foundation. Its beginnings have been told several times, and some of the branches followed, but the canopy remains largely undescribed.

The origins of the great fortune that made the Foundation possible and the peculiar qualities of its extraordinary founder, Henry Ford, Sr., have been described many times, in praise and prejudice. The history of the Ford Motor Company is indeed like a vast entangled root system from which the trunk of the Ford Foundation emerges in clarity for a time. Norman Rockwell made a kind of American icon of the brick shop where Henry labored over the first Ford with Clara anxiously watching over him. What emerged from that shop has been described by Alan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill in three stout volumes.[1] Writing in the 1950s and 1960s when the American automotive industry was still unchallenged in its greatness, they told of the major innovations—the first assembly lines, the five-dollar-a-day wage, the Model T selling for less than $400 in 1923—of the decline and near disintegration in the Depression and the early 1940s, and of the rebirth under Henry Ford II, the managers he hired from competitors, and the whiz kids fresh from the U.S. Air Force.

The external pressures and the self-protective responses that moved Henry Ford from scorn of philanthropic endowments to the founding of the largest one in the world had begun in the second

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decade of the century. Nineteen hundred and sixteen was a critical year. At that time, the Dodge brothers decided to bring an ultimately successful suit to compel Ford to distribute profits through dividends, and Henry's response was to buy out his stockholders, making a vast industrial enterprise into a family business. It was also in 1916 that the federal government enacted the first estate tax. This tax cast a shadow over the possibility of holding together large personal fortunes and the enterprises that depended upon them. By 1924, the tax had risen to 40 percent on estates exceeding $10 million, and in 1925 a journalist named Judson C. Welliver reported an interview in which Henry Ford showed a lively awareness of the threat to continuity in management and policy of the Motor Company which this tax, and others in Michigan and elsewhere, presented.[2] While the Ford Motor Company was unparalleled in size as a private family enterprise and as such looked peculiarly vulnerable, nothing was done for some years to assure continued family control. Nevins and Hill think this may have been due to Henry's reluctance to face the prospect of death, but also to his relative immunity to the hostility which the public directed toward the fortunes of Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Mellon.

By the 1930s, however, changes in the social climate brought prudential steps. The first move was to convert the existing stock, which consisted of 172,645 shares, into two classes totaling 3,452,500 shares; 95 percent of these were class A, non-voting common stock, and 5 percent were class B, voting stock. In 1935, Franklin Roosevelt asked Congress for an inheritance tax or a steeply progressive estate tax. The Ford Motor Company, as the most prominent example of a large family-owned industry, became a center of interest in this legislation, which ultimately became the Revenue Act of 1935. It raised the tax on estates above $50 million to 70 percent but retained provision for tax exemption of bequests to charitable, religious, and educational organizations. The Ford family responded by establishing the Ford Foundation on January 15, 1936, and, in the next months, Henry and Edsel wrote wills in which they bequeathed all their class A stock to the Ford Foundation and the class B stock to family members. The Foundation thus became the potential owner of more than 90 percent of the Ford Motor Company, subject to the liability in the wills of Henry and Edsel that

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taxes on their voting stock were to be paid from the non-voting stock that went to the Foundation.

The Ford Foundation began modestly with a gift of $25,000 from Edsel Ford. He, the family lawyer, Clifford Longley, and the secretary-treasurer of the Motor Company, Burt J. Craig, were the trustees. While Henry and Edsel contributed more than $30 million to the principal of the Foundation before the end of the decade, it operated essentially in the familiar patterns of a family foundation, with the Edison Institute and the Henry Ford Hospital as the largest grantees. (There was also a series of grants to the Museum of Modern Art in New York, reflecting Edsel's interest in that institution.) A few grants were made to national organizations like the Red Cross or the YWCA, but essentially the interests remained local. When Edsel Ford died in 1943, the 1936 arrangements became clear to the general public. A famous controversy ensued over the valuation of the shares, the government placing a figure on them of $190 while Edsel Ford's widow's attorneys put them at $58. This wrangle was not yet settled when Henry Ford, Sr., died in 1947, bequeathing the remainder of his class A shares to the Foundation which, by then, was heir to about 90 percent of the Ford Motor Company assets.

What the Foundation's assets were then or would come to be worth depended upon the fortunes of the Ford Motor Company, which, according to one description, was in a state of *rigor mortis* in 1945. The central figure in the saga of its rebirth was Henry Ford II. He had become vice-president of the Motor Company in 1943 after his father's death, but his powers remained very limited until he could meet the challenge of rescuing the Company from the desperate embrace of its failing creator. The sad tale of old Henry's decline into paranoid defense of his empire, his enthrallment with a sinister accomplice, Harry Bennett, and the tense struggle of young Henry until he became president of the company in September 1945 has been told by others. But what young Henry did then and in subsequent years in rebuilding the Ford Motor Company was critical to the Ford Foundation's emergence as the greatest foundation. The problems he had to deal with in reorganizing the Ford Motor Company greatly tested his will and courage. They also provided a model that was instrumental in shaping the Ford Foundation.

E.G. Liebold, who long served Henry Ford, Sr., as his executive secretary, has told in reminiscences lodged in the Ford Motor

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Company archives about the contrasting styles of management of Henry and his son Edsel:

> Edsel felt that people ought to be given certain responsibilities in certain positions and their authority should be designated. Mr. Ford didn't go along with that line of thinking. He often said to me that if he wanted a real job done right that he would always pick the man that didn't know anything about it. The reason was that if he picked a man who didn't know anything about the job, the fellow never got far away from Mr. Ford. Mr. Ford in that way was able to control what was being done. Of course, you couldn't get Edsel to agree to that line of thinking. If Edsel wanted a thing done, he would pick a man he thought was capable of doing it.[3]

In the critical years after 1943, when young Henry was reviving the Motor Company, he followed his father's principles faithfully. Elmo Roper, the public opinion analyst, who became a trusted adviser in the postwar years, said Henry's most important adviser was his deceased father; he found Henry always groping to divine what his father would have done in the circumstances.[4] The organizational and administrative chaos in the Ford Motor Company in the war years had been a subject of national concern.[5] In 1945, young Henry set about reshaping an organization for which it had been impossible to make a clear chart. Those who observed him in these first years of his power and prominence were impressed with his modesty. He knew he could not succeed alone, and sought, with brilliant success, to attract the talent that, operating in clearly defined and delegated roles, once again rebuilt the company.

When this arduous work allowed him time to attend to the Foundation, Henry Ford proceeded similarly. Until 1945, the trustees of the Foundation had consisted of Henry Ford and two employees of the company, Burt Craig and Frank Campsall.[6] But in 1945 a decisive step was taken in bringing Gordon S. Rentschler onto the board. Rentschler, well-known to both Henry's father and grandfather as the head of a manufacturing business in Miami, Ohio, also became chairman of the National Citibank of New York and had a discriminating acquaintance with national leaders. He was a life trustee of MIT and it was through this connection that MIT's president, Karl Compton, came on the Foundation board in 1946. Compton knew existing foundations well, not only as a supplicant, but also as a member of the Rockefeller Foundation board on which

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he had served since 1941. Compton initiated the long Cambridge association with the Foundation board, which was reinforced in 1948 when Donald K. David, dean of the Harvard Business School, became a member. David later enjoyed considerable power in the Foundation, having established especially close relations with Henry Ford. Henry's brother, Benson Ford, joined the board in 1947; James B. Webber, a Detroit businessman and a relative of the Fords, came on in 1948. Because, in these years, some believed that the links between the Ford Motor Company and the Foundation board should be strengthened, David and Webber were appointed to the Motor Company board in 1950.[7] David's close relations with Henry Ford and the Motor Company led many of his fellow Foundation trustees in later years to assume that he had first served on the Motor Company board; the facts were otherwise.

The broadening of the board after 1945 showed a firm resolve to convert the Ford Foundation into an institution with national, and perhaps international, concerns. By 1948 it was apparent that Henry Ford II, presumably with family backing, wanted that to happen. It would indeed have been out of keeping with the nature of the enterprise for the Ford Foundation to remain narrowly local, as other foundations, even large ones, had been. The Ford Motor Company had, for a great many years, pursued major international interests, with assembly operations started in the United Kingdom in 1911 and in France in 1913. Foreign operations and sales proliferated, and the company's Willow Run and River Rouge plants were major elements in the wartime "arsenal of democracy." The Ford fortune may in fact have been more international in its sources than any of the other great philanthropic endowments. While Detroit and Henry Ford, Sr., may be accused of a certain narrowness and provincialism, Henry Ford II followed his father in reaching out toward a wider world.

In the late 1940s, the Ford Foundation was only *potentially* rich. As Don David recalled many years later in his oral history, he joined the board at a time when the Foundation was heavily in debt. In 1947 it had secured a loan of $31 million from National Citibank as a lien on stock left to the Foundation by Edsel Ford. When the board met on October 13, 1947, at the Links Club in New York, the minutes speak of extensive discussion of future policies, while recording "the sentiment of the trustees that pending a substantial reduction of the Foundation's indebtedness, no major program [should] be adopted."

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A survey of the "purposes and operations of similar foundations" by Wyman P. Fiske, commissioned in 1946, was discussed at meetings in 1947, but the feeling persisted that more extensive and better advice was needed. At Karl Compton's suggestion, the board turned to Rowan Gaither, a San Francisco lawyer who had served in the Farm Credit Administration under the New Deal and had gone on to make a great reputation for his administrative services at the Radiation Laboratory at MIT during the war. Gaither had not met Ford at the time Compton proposed him. Gaither recalled that, when they did meet, "I wanted to learn whether he really intended that the Foundation should function as a great public trust and if he knew what was required to accomplish this." He asked Ford if he was ready to see a majority of the trustees be unrelated to the family or the company, and if the articles of incorporation would be amended so that the board could be self-perpetuating, making members and trustees synonymous.[8] In Gaither's recollection, Henry Ford, without such lawyer-like precisions, expressed the view that the Foundation ought not to represent the interests of a single family but the national interest. Gaither and Henry Ford got along well; in November 1948 Gaither accepted the job of organizing a study to determine what the policies and the program of the Ford Foundation should be.

Rowan Gaither, thirty-nine when he assumed this role, brought to it a specialized knowledge of private non-profit organizations, which he had acquired after 1936 when he left Washington to return to law practice in San Francisco, together with a respect for the uses of scientific research, acquired at MIT and strengthened when he served as consultant to the National Defense Research Council, and as an incorporator, general counsel, and chairman of the Rand Corporation when it moved out of the Defense establishment in 1948. He was a man of his time in his faith in the uses and potential of scientific research. As an administrator at MIT he had contributed to the great wartime efforts in electronic research; he was close to many of the physicists who participated in the Manhattan Project. The achievements of the physical scientists of that day spread the hope that social scientists might soon enjoy equivalent triumphs in meeting the challenges of human affairs. The Rand Corporation was seen as a strong expression of that hope.

When Dwight MacDonald wrote the series of *New Yorker* articles that became in 1956 *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the*

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Millions,[9] Gaither, by that time the Foundation's president, was represented as being "almost wholly unknown to the public, having for years specialized in running research and philanthropic organizations in a reassuringly unobtrusive way."[10] MacDonald saw Gaither as a man hard to pick out in a crowd but heard him described as "a genius at putting together a functioning team." The team that Gaither assembled to study what the Ford Foundation should become, consisted of a small committee and staff. The committee, made up entirely of men with academic backgrounds, consisted of Thomas Carroll, professor of business administration at Harvard and Syracuse; Peter Odegard, a political scientist from Berkeley; Donald Marquis, a Michigan psychologist; Charles Lauritsen, professor of physics at Cal Tech; Francis T. Spaulding, president of the University of the State of New York and former dean of education at Harvard; and T. Duckett Jones, from the School of Medicine at Harvard. In early 1949, William C. DeVane from Yale was added to represent the humanities. No one of these men was primarily a businessman, political leader, government officer, publisher, or journalist. Odegard and Spaulding had some Washington experience, but there was no one with major international experience.

The committee, however, was not expected to rely on its own wisdom or its own perceptions of what was needed for the public welfare. Henry Ford had instructed Gaither that he wanted to know what the people of the United States thought the Foundation should use its resources for; he knew of no better way to do this than to go out and ask for their views.[11] The committee followed this charge faithfully; its members and staff interviewed more than a thousand "experts," traveling a quarter of a million miles to do so—all within the United States. Only one member of the committee other than Gaither left a personal account of this effort: Donald Marquis, in a 1972 oral history, recalled that Henry Ford carefully avoided telling the committee what it should emphasize. The question of the balance between national and international objectives was left to the committee. He did, however, express the view that the arts might have a somewhat lower priority than other subjects, that the Foundation should avoid concentrating in fields already adequately supported by others. When pressed, he suggested that the committee consider a $20 million annual budget; otherwise, matters were left open. Such latitude, Marquis thought, was almost excessive; the committee "got

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nowhere" in their initial six months of work, and Gaither eventually had to turn to his staff to write the report.

The staff that Gaither assembled consisted principally of his San Francisco law colleague, Dyke Brown; a former journalist, William McPeak; a specialist in public administration, Don Price, who had been assistant to the chairman of the Hoover Commission; and Paul Bixler, the librarian at Antioch College. The energy and aggressiveness of Tom Carroll soon made him, for all practical purposes, a member of the staff as well as a member of the study committee. He and the others, with the single exception of Bixler, were to become Gaither's first team, working long beyond the preparation of the initial report.

The report, completed in November 1949, was an immediate success. Unanimously accepted by the Foundation's trustees, it became the basis of the public report on the Foundation's program, issued in September 1950. The full study committee report, published in a handsome format in October 1950, brought considerable praise from the press across the country.[12] While there was some grumbling about gobbledygook, with Dwight MacDonald later commenting that it was written in a contemporary dead language—"a work of awesome earnestness, composed in the most stately foundationese, where meaning, such as it is, decently drapes itself in Latin-rooted polysyllables . . ."[13]—the document became a kind of sacred text, scrutinized for many years by those charged with planning or justifying the Foundation's programs.

The report had four parts. It began by examining the meaning of human welfare. The Foundation's declared purpose was to "advance human welfare," which was seen as virtually synonymous with democratic ideals. While adequate physical standards of living were recognized as the basic condition of human welfare, given the economic ascendancy of the United States at the time, the committee showed itself to be more concerned with human dignity, personal freedom and rights, political freedom and rights, social responsibility, and the duty of service. The report saw democracy "on challenge in the world today"; it argued that "man now stands uncertain and confused at a critical point in world history," required to choose between two courses, one democratic—the choice of peoples in free countries "and perhaps the hope of tens of millions who are now citizens of totalitarian states"—the other authoritarian, the antithesis

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of democracy, "wherein freedom and justice do not exist and human rights and truth are wholly subordinated to the state."[14] The two great needs, essential to human welfare, were: 1) the establishment of permanent peace; 2) the achievement of strength, stability, and vitality in the United States, in its institutions, and in its people, in accordance with democratic principles. Five program areas were laid out:

I) the establishment of peace,
II) the strengthening of democracy,
III) the strengthening of the economy,
IV) education in a democratic society, and
V) improved scientific knowledge of individual behavior and human relations.

The establishment of peace, first in the list, was the area that brought the most enthusiastic public response. Greenleaf's study of the contemporary press led him to say that "that aspect of the report which seized the popular imagination almost to the exclusion of other features was the image of the Foundation as an agency which promised to make meaningful contributions to world peace and the establishment of a universal reign of law and justice." The Foundation was thus in declaration and perception essentially committed to international purposes. But most of the study committee report was not international in character. While much of the writing is cast in the universalistic terms Americans have known and loved, the references in the discussion of democracy, economy, and education are almost entirely to the United States. Under Area III, "the strengthening of the economy," the declaration called at the outset for the Foundation to support activities for "the improvement of the standard of living and the economic status of peoples throughout the world," but this grand declaration was discussed nowhere in the pages that followed. Area V, which became the ill-fated behavioral science program, was also set in universal terms but without specific reference to international cooperation, which indeed developed little under this program. Marquis confirms in his oral history that the international part of the Foundation's program grew beyond what the committee envisaged. "The development of poor countries was not a major concern to us. I think it was just that we weren't aware of it. We were, many of us, fairly provincial." There was no serious discussion of the balance between national and international interests and no anticipation of

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how great the Foundation's involvement with a country like India would become.[15]

The final chapter of the report, entitled "The Administration of the Program," was drafted largely by Don Price. Writing after a study had been made of how other foundations functioned, Price recalls that the experience of the Rockefeller Foundation was particularly influential in his thinking. Rockefeller, then dealing with a flow of grant applications that was seriously taxing the capacities of its staff, considered adding staff, but this solution was unattractive to trustees who were already feeling they had lost control of the program to the staff. While Price heard complaints in many quarters about "bureaucratization" at Rockefeller, he laid out a plan for the Ford Foundation in which substantial powers and initiative were delegated to the staff. In Price's plan the Ford Foundation was not to be an organization in which the trustees made judgments about particular applications and projects: "Nothing would more certainly destroy the effectiveness of a foundation." The trustees, while controlling the main lines of policy, were to give the president and officers "considerable freedom in developing the program," deliberately keeping their own hands off the conduct of projects to which they had voted funds. The day-to-day business of the Foundation was to be the responsibility of hired hands; but they were not to be the mere executants of the trustees' wills. The president himself was to be a member of the board; his principal officers were to be people of breadth and stature sufficient to qualify them to be board members themselves. How big the Foundation staff might become was not suggested; clearly, the Foundation was to be a largish organization, not one that prided itself in managing with very few employees, as seems to be the current fashion.

With this, however, there was a balancing concern to give scope to the trustees in directing the Foundation's programs. The scale of the Foundation was clearly too large for it to operate its own programs. It would have to proceed by grants, mostly in the social sciences, but also in the humanities and in medicine. If the grants were large enough to warrant careful attention being given by the trustees they would have to go to sizable existing institutions or, in some instances, to new institutions especially set up by the Foundation. Need for the latter seemed likely; prescriptions were carefully drawn up, guiding how and when such grants would be made. Price, impressed with the

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merits of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, which had to expend all its funds within a limited time, proposed that any new institution the Foundation set up be given freedom to make its choices without interference from the Foundation staff or board. It ought to have a sizable initial grant and ought not to return to the Foundation to ask for more; it ought to go out of existence when its grant was expended. Herein lay the idea behind the funds established in 1951 and 1952—the Fund for the Advancement of Education, the Fund for Adult Education, the Fund for the Republic, and the East European Fund. While the triumphs and troubles of these funds are not particularly germane to the history of the Foundation's international activities, the problems of Foundation governance for which they were conceived have persisted throughout the Foundation's history, at times creating crises in which the international programs shared. The view that the Ford Foundation was too large to be governed as a single institution, that it ought to be split up or made into a loose confederation of subsidiaries, has regularly recurred. Problems of balance of power, of dividing control between staff and trustees, were to persist in various forms.

The final chapter of the study report made *knowledge* and *education* the central business of the Foundation. If the problems of mankind were to be solved, the Foundation would have to concern itself with:

1) the advancement of knowledge by research,
2) the practical application of knowledge, and
3) the dissemination of knowledge by education and the development of personnel.[15]

The Foundation could not hope to achieve its purposes by a direct attack on social problems; the expectation, very much in the spirit of the times, was that better knowledge, effectively applied, would improve both public policy and practice; the infusion of a professional spirit and technical competence was required if social problems were to be dealt with.

While the published report made no explicit statement about the relations of the Foundation to the Ford family and the Motor Company, it was clear that, under the leadership of Henry Ford II, the Foundation would move toward independence as Gaither had been assured it would in his very first conversation on the subject. When, in 1947, the number of trustees was increased to six, and in

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1950 to seven, Charles E. Wilson of General Electric and John Cowles of the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* came on, giving new emphasis to the national character of the board. Henry Ford believed that he should no longer be president of the Foundation; indeed, that neither he nor any other member of the Ford family ought to be chairman of the board. The study committee, while agreeing with the first point, differed on the second; Henry continued to serve as chairman until 1956.[17]

It was also apparent from the beginning of Gaither's work that the Ford family was prepared to see the Foundation become, at some time, financially separate from the Ford Motor Company. Henry Ford did not believe it prudent or desirable for the Foundation to be closely linked to the needs and fortunes of a particular enterprise; and this diversification, which was to become a prime concern of the trustees in the 1950s, had been envisaged from the initial planning for the Foundation as a major institution.[18]

The Ford Foundation was indeed immense. The actual value of the class A Ford Motor Company stock that made up its corpus was subject to continuing dispute and revaluation, but it was clear that the revival of the Motor Company was sharply increasing its income. There were no dividends in 1947, and the sums received in 1948 and 1949 were $15.4 and $13.9 million respectively. In 1950 they rose to $68.0, and rested at $51.0 million in 1951.[19] The shares held by the Foundation, originally valued at $105, were reduced to $58 in 1943, as noted above. The stock in Edsel Ford's estate was subsequently valued by the U.S. Treasury at $90 for estate tax purposes, and, later, that in Henry Ford, Sr.'s estate at $135. In January 1951, the Foundation's trustees approved valuation of all the stock it held at $135, resulting in a total, after paying the taxes and liquidity loans, of slightly over $417 million—a figure still unrealistically low given the dividends the Foundation was then receiving.

Such an endowment was unprecedented: the Rockefeller Foundation's endowment was then publicly reported at $122 million, and the Carnegie Corporation's at $170 million;[20] the endowment of Harvard University in 1950 was $191 million; Yale controlled $125 million, and Texas $102 million—the three largest university endowments. The income from the Foundation's endowment was also immense by the standards of the time. Thus, for example, the expenditures of all the public libraries in the ninety-two largest U.S.

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cities in 1948 totaled a little over $45 million;[21] the central regular budget of the United Nations in 1950 was $43.7 million; UNESCO's was $7.8 million; and the total of all the specialized agencies of the U.N. was $28.0 million.[22] The new Foundation not only possessed vast funds; it was under pressure from the U.S. Treasury to show that it was a genuine philanthropic organization by spending promptly the millions of dollars of its income.

THE HOFFMAN ERA

In 1949 the trustees of the Foundation, having attended to such matters as liquidating the debt to Citibank and renewing a $200 grant to the Old Newsboys' Good Fellow Fund, were mainly concerned with planning for the future and by 1950 were seriously considering four candidates for the presidency. Their first choice was Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) since 1946; Stanton turned them down. Had he accepted, the Foundation would undoubtedly have developed differently, probably with less turbulence at the top and less involvement in international programs. Failing with Stanton, the trustees turned to Paul Hoffman, who was nearing the end of a spectacularly successful term as administrator of the Marshall Plan. Despite Hoffman's initial resistance, Henry Ford persisted, putting into Hoffman's hands a copy of the study committee report, which Hoffman later said he found "the most brilliant study of philanthropy produced on the American scene."[23] By September 1950, when Hoffman resigned as administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the trustees had met his conditions and, at a September 6 meeting at the Links Club, agreed to appoint him as president. On November 6 Henry Ford resigned as president, and Hoffman was elected and made a member-trustee.

Paul Hoffman had the charms of a successful salesman and an exceptional reach of mind.[24] His persuasiveness, which had made him president of the Studebaker Corporation by 1935, was evident to all who met him. He was confident that if he could get "belly to belly" with a man he could persuade him to do what he thought right. Proud of his capacity to get good people to work with him, he was, as the advertising executive James Webb Young has said, remarkably successful in encouraging people to write for him.[25]

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Hoffman's 1947 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had convinced Senator Vandenberg to argue for Hoffman's appointment to be administrator of the Marshall Plan.[26] Hoffman had already had extensive experience in Washington as a member of the Business Advisory Council, and he had shown leadership in organizing the Committee for Economic Development during the war years. The Marshall Plan allowed him to devote himself, both at home and abroad, to the service of an international cause. Its success in establishing cooperation among the European countries demonstrated, to Hoffman and others, that international problems could yield to the kind of constructive effort and optimism that he liked to apply to other problems. Like many Americans of his time, he looked optimistically to the United Nations as the safeguard against war.

The two principal conditions under which Hoffman accepted the presidency of the Ford Foundation were that the headquarters be in Pasadena, California, and that he be allowed freedom to make independent, bold initiatives in the Foundation's program. His insistence on Pasadena, the source of some dispute from the start, was ultimately used to rationalize the break that occurred in 1953. The study committee had advised that the Foundation's headquarters be in the New York area, perhaps to assure a shift away from Detroit, supporting this preference with eminently sensible arguments. Hoffman had lived near Los Angeles since 1915 and pleaded his wife's ill health in support of his desire to return there. The study committee had also argued against the Foundation's operating its own programs, and Hoffman seized on this idea, envisaging the central leadership of the Foundation as a small high-level group, devoting itself to program and policy, while delegating operational and administrative responsibility to others. He conceded that a New York office would be needed, but essentially to receive proposals and administer grants and projects decided upon in Pasadena. By November 15, 1950, Hoffman had hired Bernard Gladieux, an experienced senior federal administrator, to set up this office and serve as his assistant.[27] The Foundation's New York office was established before the Pasadena office, the latter coming into being when Hoffman and the associate directors he quickly assembled settled there in January 1951.

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Hoffman persisted in his desire for a strong, free hand in running the Foundation. Both in his conversation with Henry Ford, as he reported it to the press, and in testimony before the Cox Committee in the U.S. Congress in 1952, Hoffman emphasized his concern that Ford and his fellow trustees not be alarmed by his bold initiatives. He evoked the memory of Henry Ford, Sr.'s Peace Ship, declaring that he expected that the Foundation would launch many ships that might never come to port.[28] Henry Ford expressed no dismay at the prospect of Hoffman's acting independently and later, at the Cox Committee hearings, spoke eloquently in support of the need for foundations to do so. The trustees, however, seem to have been less prepared for the freedom Hoffman gave himself to name associate directors without consulting them. His first choices were Robert Maynard Hutchins and Chester Davis. Davis, then president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, had been head of the Agriculture Assistance Administration under the New Deal, and his appointment, at least initially, caused no unrest. But Robert Maynard Hutchins's certainly did. As president of the University of Chicago, he had been an *enfant terrible* of American higher education, arousing cordial admiration and equally heart-felt dislike. He was detested by the only university president then on the Ford Foundation board, Karl Compton. Hutchins has recalled that Henry Ford II and Donald David initially showed no displeasure at his appointment, but it soon appeared.[29]

Hoffman's choice of Hutchins may have been upsetting, but it was not surprising. Hoffman had been a member of the board of the University of Chicago since 1937 and said that, while he often differed with Hutchins during this time, he had usually been wrong to do so.[30] His one year of college education (from 1908 to 1909) had been at the University of Chicago, and, like some other businessmen, he found Hutchins's unorthodoxies attractive and congenial. Hutchins had a certain talent for responding to the ambivalences many American businessmen felt about academia; his impatience with jargon, pretensions, and respected orthodoxies came with a reverence for great books, clear principles, and practical experience that appealed to many. He and Hoffman were indeed similar in their self-confidence, individualism, and impatience.

Hoffman, Hutchins, and Davis met on January 3, 1951, in Room 319 of the Huntington Hotel in Pasadena to begin a series of

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discussions that Hutchins remembered as his most fulfilling experience at the Foundation. On January 4, Chester Davis began to compose notes, later continued by lesser hands, which preserve some of the exhilaration, the bold sallies, and the grand conjectures of these early meetings. Hoffman proclaimed that a first program should be ready by April, and they undertook the project with enthusiasm.

The study committee report and a series of conference memoranda, prepared by Gaither and his colleagues for the new program planners, provided the natural starting place. The summary memorandum stated several "basic assumptions," beginning with the proposition that "the avoidance of total war and the establishment of the bases for permanent peace is the great task confronting the world." The three other basic assumptions all focused on the great threat of total war, its unpredictable duration, and the need for the free world to strengthen "institutions and processes upon which freedom and permanent progress toward democratic goals depends."[31]

At his first board meeting as president, on January 29, 1951, at the Links Club in New York, Hoffman laid out some initial program proposals that followed closely the language and recommendations of the study committee report. Under program Area I, the establishment of peace, the report declared that the Foundation "should support activities that promise significant contributions to world peace and the establishment of a world order of law and justice." It went on to specify that these activities should be directed toward:

a) the mitigation of tensions which now threaten world peace,

b) the development among the peoples of the world of the understanding and conditions essential to permanent peace,

c) the improvement and strengthening of the United Nations and its associated international agencies, and

d) the improvement of the structure and procedures by which the United States Government, and private groups in the United States participate in world affairs.

The committee argued that national conduct should not be based solely on fear of Communism, reaction to totalitarian tactics, or the immediate exigencies of avoiding war. Such a national posture they saw as defensive and negative and might lead us to "grow like the thing we fight." It is remarkable that the Soviet Union is not mentioned in the study committee report, although the January

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conference memorandum on Area I states at the outset, "the main danger of war stems from tension between the East, led by the Soviet Union, and the West, led by the United States."

Hoffman's first proposal to the trustees on January 29 was that $500,000 to $1,000,000 a year be approved in principle for a program to study the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, to be devised by George Kennan. The January memorandum, which gave tremendous emphasis to Soviet–U.S. relations, was based on certain assumptions about Soviet conduct, potential agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and possible unilateral actions by either powers—topics around which suggested projects were arranged. Instead of following that organization, Hoffman reverted to Point b in the study committee's recommendations and proposed a program in *the exchange of persons,* giving prime attention to existing organizations that might manage the program. The Institute of International Education had already submitted a proposal for $9 million over five years, but it had not yet been assessed.

The study committee's recommendation that the Foundation address its efforts to improving and strengthening the United Nations appealed to Hoffman, and he made two proposals. First, he suggested involving the intellectual resources of the country in "the organization of peace." He and his colleagues knew of no existing center for continuing study of either the U.N.'s operation or world law, and the applications they were receiving were not impressive. Hoffman told the trustees that he planned to engage Milton Katz, the Harvard law professor who had succeeded Harriman as the ECA representative in Europe, for this task.[32] He also proposed a "hard-boiled" appraisal of UNESCO, to be made by William Rand, the retiring president of Monsanto.

The first indications of the Foundation's engagement with international studies was evident in the next of Hoffman's proposals—a project to create a center for the study of intercultural relations. The language used in support of this recommendation reflects Hoffman's and Hutchins's style:

> The concentration of American interest upon the west overlooks the fact that there are millions of people in the east who do not want to be enslaved by Soviet Russia. By constantly talking about the west, we run the risk of

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alienating these millions. There is no doubt that the traditions of the east and west are different. There is also no doubt that every effort must be made to unite the free world.

Although there are institutes for the study of Russia in the United States, and although many students from the East have come to the United States, no university has a center dedicated to understanding the ideas of the Far East and Near East, to discovering the common elements in the eastern and western traditions and to arranging for intellectual exchange between the east and the west.[33]

The study group's concern for improving American participation in world affairs only found expression at this stage in a report that the officers were investigating possibilities of better training for Point IV service. But it was added that "other projects in the field of foreign assistance are being examined."

From these modest beginnings, international programs developed rapidly in 1951. As in the shaping of any large purpose, there was a struggle against chaos; will and leadership were essential to overcome uncertainties and complexities. The study committee had deliberately set its recommendations in general terms, and specific details had to be settled quickly. Hoffman was determined to take swift concrete action directed at ambitious aims. There was a broad range of possible ways in which private means might be employed to serve the committee's overriding priority, the preservation of peace. The study committee's concern that actions to preserve the peace would have to be short-term reflected a mood of crisis in Washington. In that year, the CIA advised the President that war was improbable in the next sixty days but that, beyond that, no one could say what would happen.[34] The mood prevailed both in the United States and in Europe, with a French minister predicting that the Russians would be in Paris by the summer of 1949 and with Winston Churchill's 1950 assertion that, but for the atomic bomb, the Russians would be at the English Channel.[35] In early 1951, in the midst of the Korean War, Hoffman and his colleagues were seeking both short-term actions and measures to ensure the longer-term preservation of peace. Whether for the long- or short-term aims, several profoundly different approaches could be taken. How much attention should be given to military and strategic questions, to the type of work that the Foundation was already assisting at Rand through a 1948 loan of $100,000 and a guarantee of $300,000, which had enabled the Rand

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Corporation to get started?[36] How much faith should be put in the United Nations, or the improvement of understanding between peoples? How critical was the situation in Europe or the contest for the "minds of men" in Asia? In all of these matters, what was appropriate and feasible action for a private foundation?

Hoffman was ambitious; in the words of one of his early associates, he "wanted to run the world from the Ford Foundation."[37] Establishing a program that would be acceptable to the trustees, that reflected more than his own personal judgment and authority, required the help of collaborators. In Hutchins and in Chester Davis, he found ready support for his inclination to put faith in the United Nations, to improve international understanding, and to attack poverty and deprivation as a means of "winning the peace," but neither of these men was an authority on international affairs. Hoffman therefore took steps to bring George Kennan and Milton Katz into his general staff at Pasadena.

George Kennan was on leave from the State Department in 1951, establishing the connection with the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, to which he devoted much of his subsequent career. He was seeking a better basis for shaping U.S. foreign policy, and Hoffman recommended in April 1951 that the Foundation support him in such a project at the Institute. But Hoffman wanted more from Kennan. He wanted Kennan to be a regular staff member of the Foundation, to give advice in general, and to build programs on relations with the Soviet Union and on the preservation of the peace. Most of Kennan's views appealed to Hoffman. His revulsion for reducing international relations to military and strategic relations reflected Hoffman's approach. On the other hand, certain of his opinions ran counter to Hoffman's own beliefs. Dyke Brown, who was busy toward the end of 1951 drawing up a statement on the Foundation's Area I projects, wrote of the views Kennan expressed in the Foundation's councils:

> George Kennan's view, as I understand it, is that the Foundation should not support cold war activities (e.g., to counter communism or U.S.S.R.). He would concentrate on long range activities (e.g., U.S. self-improvement, promotion of free inquiry and expression throughout the rest of the world), recognizing that such activities would often have incidental value to the U.S. in the cold war. In his opinion the Foundation should not support cold war activities as such for two reasons: (a) it is not appropriate to the character of

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the Foundation to do so, and (b) the Foundation could not have any immediate effect on the world crisis or the U.S.S.R.[38]

Such views were agreeable to Hoffman, but Kennan had also expressed skepticism about the possibility of preserving peace either by reducing poverty, ignorance, and disease or by strengthening world organization and the United Nations. Brown summarized Kennan's position as follows:

> Poverty, ignorance and disease are not important causes of war, and the present large areas of poverty in the world do not create a danger to peace today. Nor does economic misery lead, as popularly supposed, to communism (Portugal, for example, the poorest and most ignorant country in Europe, has the lowest incidence of communism; Czechoslovakia, with Europe's highest standards of living and education [sic], had the highest percentage of communists prior to its fall.) Communism is more apt to come from a marked disturbance in existing patterns of living—even from an abrupt rise in living standards. Nor is basic education in itself a good thing; it can create trouble and dangers.
>
> The main causes of war are to be found in the internal relationships within a country—in the dilemmas of authority and struggles for power within a nation. Kennan is very doubtful about the United Nations, in its present or a strengthened form, or about any future, "supra-national" world organization. He is also doubtful about "collective security" based on a coalition of powers. The assumption underlying all such groupings is that the powers can act together to prevent aggression and maintain peace. Peace, however, is merely the maintenance of the status quo; this may benefit some, but rigidly enforced, it will thwart the process of change which is inherent in the lives of nations. In any event, "collective security" assumes a problem is solved if nations will act together to prevent aggression. But the problem which caused the aggression remains, and merely repelling the aggression does nothing to solve the problem. Moreover, the degree of political intimacy required for continuing joint action by a large group of powers does not exist today.[39]

Kennan's doubt about the contributions development might make to peace did not deter Hoffman, and there were numerous other sources of discouragement for his efforts to strengthen the United Nations. Despite their differences, Kennan became heavily engaged in one particular Foundation project, the East European Fund, though his involvement was curtailed when, in late 1951, President Truman appointed him to his ill-fated ambassadorship in Moscow.

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Milton Katz shared Kennan's doubts about the contributions development activities could make to world peace. He joined the Pasadena group a little later, being named associate director on Hoffman's recommendation at the July 30-31, 1951, meeting of the board. Katz has recalled conversations at this time in which he argued with Hoffman that it was not the poorly educated and underdeveloped countries that had brought on the last war, but Japan and Germany—two advanced countries. Katz's responsibilities in NATO during his time as ambassador-at-large and U.S. representative in Europe for the Marshall Plan, made him more inclined to engage in defense and strategic matters than Hoffman was. On the other hand, he disagreed with a private foundation's entering such "tension points" as Berlin or Trieste, and his reaction to the grant arranged by Hoffman and Henry Ford to the Freie Universität of Berlin was lukewarm.[40] Katz appeared to some in the Pasadena group as a hawkish figure, but he did not move the Foundation perceptibly away from Hoffman's dovish efforts. He proved to be a cautious and skeptical officer, more given to refining the quality and design of projects and programs than to taking strong initiatives himself.

Though the problem of ensuring peace had unquestioned priority, the group in Pasadena enthusiastically took up much of the rest of the agenda the study committee had proposed. Hutchins took swift action in education, organizing two large subsidiaries before the April 1951 board meeting: the Fund for the Advancement of Education and the Fund for Adult Education. He and Hoffman had already persuaded Clarence Faust to come down from Stanford to head the Fund for the Advancement of Education, and Faust had persuaded Alvin Eurich, then president of the State University of New York, to join him as vice-president of the Fund. Faust had spent many years in Chicago, first as a graduate student, subsequently as dean of the college and of the graduate library school. He liked Hutchins's ideas and, unlike some others, enjoyed working with him. He found Pasadena exhilarating:

> The great thing was that I sensed as I was in Pasadena with that original group a kind of excitement and a kind of hope that I've never encountered elsewhere. Paul Hoffman was a natural salesman and a naturally hopeful, optimistic fellow and just full of the idea that this was going to be the greatest thing in the world, that American philanthropy was finally going to be riding very high and be very important in American affairs . . . the sky

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was the limit as far as our aims were concerned and as far as our ideas of expenditure went. . . .[41]

Some initially believed that Faust's responsibilities would be worldwide, Hutchins arguing that the Foundation ought to have a united policy on education, which would not be possible if the overseas activities developed independently. But Hoffman demurred, arguing that education within the United States would fully occupy the Fund, and after a few tentative objections the Fund did restrict itself to the United States.[42] The Fund for Adult Education was headed by C. Scott Fletcher, who had worked with Hoffman both at Studebaker Corporation and as his principal staff member in the Committee for Economic Development. Although the Fund for Adult Education also confined its projects to the United States, it was deeply concerned with educating Americans about world affairs through educational television and other methods.

Faust and Fletcher were among several regular participants in staff discussions of the Foundation program at Pasadena: Joseph McDaniel was embarking on his long Foundation career, first as assistant to Hoffman and subsequently as secretary of the Foundation. He had worked with Hoffman in ECA and came to the Foundation from the business school at Northwestern. Rowan Gaither, based at his law firm in San Francisco during this period, visited Pasadena with increasing frequency, accompanied by his associate, Dyke Brown. Although Hutchins and Davis had originally thought that they shared an understanding with Hoffman that he would not add further associate directors, Hoffman surprised them by announcing that he had invited Gaither to be an associate director on a part-time basis. Hoffman was apparently motivated by his realization that he had to take "seriously" Area V, the behavioral sciences, a subject for which he had little understanding or sympathy. He thought Gaither the only person who understood what was intended for Area V and that he should therefore be brought aboard.[43]

Several others entered and left the Pasadena discussions. James Webb Young, a retired J. Walter Thompson advertising executive, was brought in at the very beginning to give advice about publicity on television, and communications more generally. Young, an old friend of both Hoffman and Hutchins, had been a professor of advertising

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at the University of Chicago, though he had never been to high school. He initiated the Foundation's first efforts to raise the level of commercial television through the TV–Radio Workshop and the Omnibus series that emerged from it. Considering himself an "internationalist," he was an early contributor to discussions on how Europeans could be given a better understanding of American capitalism.[44] W.H. "Ping" Ferry also brought his cool pungency into these councils. An associate of Earl Newsom, he had been responsible for the Ford "account" with Newsom's public relations firm since 1945. He knew Henry Ford very well, and his imaginative, idealistic approach made him acutely interested in the developments at Pasadena. With Newsom and another colleague, he had condensed the study committee report for the trustees' 1950 statement, and he was soon contributing his own ideas on peace, among other subjects, to the Pasadena councils.[45] Both Hoffman and Hutchins liked Ferry's style and ideas, and Hoffman asked Ferry several times to become an associate director. Hoffman also extended an open invitation to the economist, Richard Bissell, who had been assistant administrator at ECA, to join the Pasadena group, but Bissell remained committed throughout 1951 in Washington and at MIT and did not enter into Foundation program planning until 1952. Hutchins's old Chicago ally, the pansophist Mortimer Adler, was also brought in and contributed his thoughts on peace, particularly in the planning of a May 1951 seminar.

The New York office had been designed to hew wood and draw water for the Pasadena headquarters, and Bernard Gladieux accepted that role. The staff he acquired were, however, soon regularly flying to the West Coast. John Howard was hired by Gladieux as his first and, for a time, only staffer on international concerns, and Stanley Gordon, who later pursued a long career in the Foundation's international affairs programs, then handled domestic matters. Howard had begun his career as a successful physical chemist, but, stirred by social problems, shifted to law, moving from Harvard to Chicago to take his law degree. After war service in Washington, he worked with the Marshall Plan in Greece, but was not conspicuous enough to be thought of by Hoffman for the Foundation. With characteristic modesty, he acknowledged that he needed a job, applied to Gladieux, and was hired. His talents were quickly put to use; he accompanied Hoffman's party on the first great overseas

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expedition in the summer of 1951 and engaged his energies in program planning for the whole of Area I.

At successive board meetings in 1951, Hoffman presented recommendations that led to the development of international programs at a speed matched only by the education programs under Hutchins's bold leadership. The recommendations were both for concrete projects and for strategies. Great public attention to the Foundation throughout 1950 and 1951 stimulated a flood of proposals, and the study committee made efforts in 1950 to select matters that would deserve special attention and action when Hoffman and his staff were prepared to deal with them. Both Hoffman and Hutchins were anxious not merely to respond; they had their own ideas, but they also encountered proposals that appealed to them, and they took up certain of the ideas of those they trusted. Yet, there was a touch of diffidence in the presentation for the April 10, 1951, board meeting: "The program and projects which are now presented for consideration and actions do not represent the ideal distribution of effort and balance. They represent only the first step in program development." Program I, the international program, was then presented under nine headings. The United Nations came first in the list, but Hoffman spoke only of plans for a senior staff appointment and "a tough minded, objective appraisal of the United Nations, UNESCO, and its other affiliated organizations." A small grant of $22,000 for the Academy of International Law at the Hague, supported by Philip Jessup, was recommended and approved. The next two subjects, American foreign policy and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, were the domain of George Kennan. Kennan's employment as a staff member of the Foundation and the contract for supporting his foreign policy project at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton were recommended. The board was also told of the establishment in March of the Free Russia Fund, Inc., and a grant of $200,000 for it was recommended. This fund, later renamed the East European Fund in deference to the concerns of Ukrainians, was to become a major grantee with support totaling $3,791,500. It was established out of concern that refugees from the Soviet Union were finding adjustment to the United States difficult, and, in some notable cases, individuals were asking to be returned to the Soviet Union. The demands made by this organization absorbed a part of Kennan's time at the Foundation before his appointment as ambassador to the

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Soviet Union.[46] Despite its many important and useful accomplishments, the Fund was obviously only a limited and specialized part of any strategy for dealing with relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The concern to increase knowledge of foreign areas, which was to blossom into more than $300 million of commitments for international studies, inspired in April 1951 a grant of $35,000 to Stanford for planning a Center for Asian Studies and reviewing the state of such studies. The officers were persuaded of the inadequacy of American resources and of the need for private endeavors to go beyond the "conscientious effort" of government. Intention to pursue such endeavors was strongly stated. The Stanford proposal had been discussed by Dyke Brown with Carl Spaeth, dean of the Law School and coordinator of the group of Stanford faculty and Hoover Institute staff who composed it, and Spaeth brought to it his broad international experience, mostly in Latin America and in the State Department. The 171-page proposal was printed as a book by the Stanford University Press—an unusually elaborate form for a proposal. Dyke Brown estimated that the size of the proposal was not out of proportion to the potential cost of the project, which might range from $800,000 to $1 million each year for five years.[47] A Center for Asian Studies was proposed, but it was not to be exclusively Stanford's, nor exclusively concerned with research. Spaeth and his colleagues recommended widespread public education and the training of specialists, and emphasized that knowledge, to be useful, had to be applied. Hence they proposed to bring together some of the "tragically few" Asian experts from all around the country, including government officials, educators, and newspapermen. The first task they envisaged was a survey of personnel resources and projects in studies of Asia, and the Foundation funded this undertaking at a cost that ultimately exceeded $23,000. The survey was put together with remarkable speed; the report, about as long as the original proposal, was sent to the Foundation in early July 1951, again handsomely printed by the Stanford University Press.

The Foundation did not need the Stanford proposal and report to be concerned about Asia, but both vividly and forcefully addressed the concerns of the time. Stanford did not get a great national center of Asian studies, but the Foundation quickly made the first of its many commitments to Asian and Middle Eastern studies (the latter

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area being embraced in both the original proposal and the survey). Spaeth himself was brought into the Foundation at the beginning of 1952 as director of the Division of Overseas Activities, which was formed in Pasadena. The first Foreign Area Training Fellowships were funded for Asia and the Middle East at the beginning of 1952, and shortly thereafter a distinguished board on Overseas Training and Research (OTR) was established. Gordon Gray, then president of North Carolina, John Dickey, president of Dartmouth, John Gardner, then vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation, and Edwin R. Murrow were members of this board, which the Stanford proposal had envisaged, calling it a "national advisory council"; it was to continue surveying training and research needs, evaluating the adequacy of facilities, and proposing means to strengthen them under its own research director, Cleon Swayzee, who before long became a regular Foundation staffer. The Foundation's habit of delegating important functions to separate "funds" might have inspired the board to go beyond advisory functions, but it never did. By the time Hoffman summarized the progress of the Foundation's programs at the end of September 1952, only $1.5 million had been appropriated for overseas training and research, but a major strand of the Foundation's international programs had been planned, and they developed, unperturbed by the upheaval of the winter, into a vast panoply of international studies.

Hoffman's review of progress until the end of September 1952 marked two years after the trustees had originally set forth the program and purposes of the Foundation in their September 27, 1950, report. It reviewed what had happened in the twenty-two-month period since January 1951, when Hoffman and his associates had taken control. By late 1952, the plans for programs set forth in January and April 1951 had evolved significantly. Three large categories were used to describe the program in Area I, "the establishment of peace." These were:

(a) the mitigation of tensions,
(b) the increase of understanding among peoples, and
(c) the strengthening of the United Nations.

The mitigation of tensions received $20,527,500—a lion's share or approximately 73 percent of the total Area I commitments of $28,237,380. Of the $20,527,500, the largest share, $12,755,000, was allocated to "the relief of tension in underdeveloped areas."

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Although overseas development (OD) was not yet part of the program presented to the board in April 1951, by the end of that year, it had become the Foundation's largest international program, establishing a lead it was to keep throughout the Foundation's history. A detailed discussion of the rapid evolution of ideas in the late spring of 1951, the visit of Hoffman and his party to the Near East, India, and Pakistan in August 1951, and the appropriation of more than $6 million in an October 1951 trustees' meeting to follow on recommendations from this trip is beyond the bounds of this essay. However, by October 1952, the Foundation had a resident representative organizing ambitious programs in India and Pakistan, and a regional representative for the Near East had recently arrived in Beirut. A survey mission had been to Burma and Indonesia and had recommended programs in those countries, and resident representatives were to take up their posts in the first half of 1953. In October 1951, Hoffman thought he had the trustees' agreement to the commitment of up to one-third of the Foundation's resources to support foreign projects and was busily planning explorations in many parts of the world. Overseas development needed continuing support; it could not be picked up one year and abandoned the next. In fact there was rising doubt and disquiet among the trustees, making it far from certain at the end of 1952 whether these overseas activities would ever become a permanent part of the Foundation's programs. They had grown quickly, and part of the trustees' anxiety stemmed from their inability to predict how much larger these activities might become or how long the Foundation might have to be engaged in them.

In other parts of the Area I program the situation was quite different. Despite the priority given to relations with the Soviet Union, only three projects totaling $340,000 were drawn up by September 30, 1952: Kennan's foreign policy project, by then left without its leader; a study of universal disarmament under the direction of a distinguished lawyer, Grenville Clark; and the early stages of a study of the conditions of peace, under the leadership of John J. McCloy. A great deal of time at Pasadena during 1951 had been devoted to discussing the conditions of peace. A May seminar on peace prompted a series of memoranda from various hands throughout the remainder of that year, and at the first board meeting in Pasadena—a four-day session in February 1952—Grenville Clark,

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accompanied by his associate Robert H. Reno, discussed his disarmament project, promising a book within a year. Clark recommended that the Ford Foundation give major help by establishing an international organization for world disarmament for which it might have to provide between $16 and $20 million over several years. Hoffman had told Ford in July 1951 that, following the May seminar, the Foundation officers had worked out a guide to their programs in the service of peace, which included "the support of universal disarmament under effective international controls."[48] But he was not prepared in 1952 to back the development of an organization that would focus solely on disarmament. At the February 1952 meeting, he secured a broader appropriation of $200,000 for starting "an organization to carry out plans and projects related to conditions of peace." Shortly after the board meeting, Hutchins urged Hoffman to consider a more ambitious plan that might cost the Foundation $40 million over four years,[49] but, by July, ambitions had shrunk, and the trustees agreed to modify the project so that it would be conducted by the Foundation itself, primary attention being given to exploring what contributions the Foundation could make. John J. McCloy, who was nearing the end of his service as U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, had been in regular and active contact with Hoffman on several projects, and Hoffman sought to engage him as fully as possible in the work of the Ford Foundation. In September 1952, McCloy agreed to undertake what came to be known in the Foundation as the "conditions of peace" project—the direct ancestor of the international affairs program (IA). He brought with him Shepard Stone who had been his Public Affairs Officer in Germany and was to become the principal staffer in the Foundation's international affairs program. McCloy made his first oral presentation to the board in October 1952 and prepared a ten-page memorandum on the project for Hoffman and Katz by December 18, 1952. Early in the following year, McCloy became chairman of the Chase National Bank and shortly thereafter became a trustee of the Ford Foundation, later serving as chairman of the board from 1958 until his retirement in 1966. The story of the conditions of peace project and its evolution into the international affairs program of the Ford Foundation deserves more extended treatment than this paper allows.

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The "relief of tension in Europe" was a prominent category in Hoffman's September 30, 1952, report, with commitments totaling $7,432,500. The largest of these were allocated to the refugee problems left by World War II. Including the East European Fund, they amounted to $5,636,000. The largest grant of $2.9 million was made to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to find a solution to the refugee problem in Central Europe. Other grants were focused on Germany, the most substantial of these being for $1,309,500 to provide buildings for the Freie Universität of Berlin. This grant followed Hoffman and Henry Ford II's visit to Berlin, and Ford later told Dwight MacDonald that he had felt particularly enthusiastic about the grant because he had seen the need and how it might be remedied. Substantial as these efforts were, they did not determine any lasting European program for the Foundation. While the Foundation has regularly responded to refugee situations, it has usually done so in the spirit common to other organizations and to national policies, namely, to regard refugee problems as discrete crisis situations. It was not until the late 1970s, stimulated by the Indochinese boat people, that the Foundation made refugees the subject of regular programmatic attention. The presence of McCloy and Stone assured some continuing attention to Germany, and there was evidence of interest in European integration. But by the end of the Hoffman era there remained hardly a strand of policy and program related to Europe. Indeed, Katz was opposed to the idea that the Foundation should have a European program at all.

The aim to "increase . . . understanding among peoples" had by October 1952 inspired a long list of projects, totaling $7,449,880 and falling into five categories:

(a) exchange of persons,
(b) overseas training and research,
(c) Intercultural Publications, Inc.,
(d) other projects, and
(e) the nature of a free society.

The diverse array of exchange activities demanded the full attention of Melvin Fox, first as a consultant and then as a regular staff member. The Institute of International Education (IIE) had received more than $2 million, some for its own organizational needs and some for handling the first of the enormous range of projects it would undertake over the years for the Foundation. Grants were also made

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for the 4-H Clubs' international farm youth exchange program, for the YMCA's services to foreign students in the U.S., and for academic exchanges between the United States and Germany. The diverse character and purposes of such international exchanges soon raised doubts about the maintenance of exchange as a program or an organizational category. John Howard emphasized that exchanges were an instrument, not a purpose in themselves. While major Foundation support was to continue throughout its history, its members soon felt the need to focus exchanges around other program objectives.

It was characteristic of Hoffman and Hutchins that "overseas training and research" should be listed as contributing to the increase of understanding among peoples rather than as a measure for strengthening the United States' capacity to deal with the wide world. One might have thought that Hoffman would have related this undertaking to the fourth special goal laid out in the trustees' report for Area I, namely, "the improvement of the structure and procedures by which the U.S. government, and private groups in the United States participate in world affairs," but his only report under this heading was of "considerable thought" by the officers. The strong commitment to intercultural relations, which Hoffman and Hutchins had expressed in the first trustees' meeting on January 29, 1951, colored their attitude to the support of international studies in the United States and led to the establishment of Intercultural Publications. Hutchins designed this venture with James Laughlin, who was already engaged in activities that were to make him a major figure in serious literary publication in the United States. A literary and intellectual journal, *Perspectives U.S.A.*, was established to show American culture to the world, and a series of country perspectives were assembled, published as supplements to *The Atlantic Monthly*, to increase American awareness of other cultures and to show American interest in them.[50] A wide-ranging project on intercultural relations, led by Professor Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago, also reflected Hutchins's and Hoffman's faith in the importance of that subject. The Redfield project was one in the longish list of "other projects," supporting the American Friends' Service Committee, the International Press Institute, the Worldwide Broadcasting Foundation, and others. The idea that free societies encouraged international understanding and thus served the peace led the Foun-

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dation into two other ventures in this early era: an American round table was sponsored by the Advertising Council; and Russell Davenport persuaded the Foundation to provide $96,000 for his Institute for Creative Research.

Faithfully following the categories in the trustees' report, Hoffman gave separate accounts of the two projects designed for the "strengthening of the United Nations." One was a grant for the National Citizens' Committee for United Nations Day. The other, of $200,000 to Harvard University, was the beginning of a prolonged response to a 1952 United Nations resolution on tax administration, and while it was primarily a Harvard project, it represented one of the more lasting and successful attempts that the Foundation has made to cooperate with the United Nations. By the end of 1952, nothing had come of the intention to take a "hard look" at UNESCO, and there had been other frustrations in developing a UN program, which were to continue for many years, and troubled Hoffman's relations with the trustees.

THE END OF THE HOFFMAN ERA

It seems likely that Hoffman's review of progress in October 1952 hewed to the categories of the trustees' report in an effort to show that he and Hutchins had not cavalierly disregarded it, establishing instead whatever program they wanted for the Foundation. There had been friction between Hoffman and the trustees from the start. Hoffman thought he had cleared the appointment of Hutchins by informal discussion with Henry Ford and other trustees. He went ahead and made the appointment before he had formal board approval, an action that deeply distressed Karl Compton. Compton and David were immediately concerned that Hoffman might not adhere to the study committee's and the trustees' reports, and sought insurance by recommending that he propose Gaither as a part-time associate director to the board. However, when he originally took on the task of directing his study to determine what the Foundation's policies and program should be, Gaither had laid down the condition that neither he nor members of the committee should become officers of the Foundation, and he was very reluctant to break this commitment, saying he wanted to devote his full attention to his law practice in San Francisco. Hoffman pressed Gaither to take the appointment,

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arguing that he was needed to develop Area V, which Hoffman did not understand and Hutchins regarded as "utter nonsense."[51] It was Compton who finally persuaded Gaither to accept. He told Gaither that he was greatly concerned "over Hutchins' influence on Hoffman" and predicted that the Foundation's program would be characterized by Hutchins' pet ideas and would not carry out the report which was based on the study. Compton said he had been prepared to resign as trustee when Hutchins was appointed but had been dissuaded by Henry Ford and Gaither. Hoffman was well aware that there was serious trouble over Hutchins's appointment. He and the general counsel he was bringing to the Foundation, Maurice (Tex) Moore, visited Gaither before the January 1951 trustees' meeting to discuss their concern that Hutchins might be rejected at that meeting. Compton decided not to fight the issue, but disquiet continued. At the July 30 trustees' meeting, a letter David had addressed to Hoffman on "certain questions of policy" was discussed, and the matter was brought up again at the October 4 meeting on "trustees' responsibilities in program, administration and investments."[52] At the October 4 meeting, Compton announced his resignation, alleging too many other responsibilities. Milton Katz recalls so much tension and hostility at this October 4 meeting, and at the dinner following it, that he told his wife, "This is not a viable situation." Some tried to avoid trouble by urging more consultation between Hoffman and the board and with Henry Ford in particular. Faust, who showed considerable skill in cultivating the strong board that was assembled for the Fund for the Advancement of Education, found that Hoffman was not disposed to try to "educate the board," a task he considered "sort of indecent." Ping Ferry's urgings were similarly ineffectual.

How much Hoffman's international program contributed to his deteriorating relationship with the board is difficult to assess. There certainly were rude clashes. Hutchins recalled one over the United Nations: "You come in with a recommendation for the support of the United Nations which you've dug up with the greatest difficulty and months of work, and a board member of the Foundation will say, 'Well, I think the U.S. ought not to be in the U.N. I think we ought to get rid of the U.N., ought to get it out of this country.' "[53] On another occasion, toward the end of his era, when Hoffman was presenting recommendations for Indonesia, Henry Ford burst forth, "My God, where is this place Indonesia that you're talking about?

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And why in God's name should we be interested in it anyway?" Paul Hoffman apparently "just shrivelled," and it may have been on this occasion that he made his "famous statement" that "he was not going to devote his life to educating this young ignoramus." Ford's outburst appeared to be a boutade expressing irritation rather than plain ignorance, but there certainly were difficulties between Hoffman and Ford arising from their differing views on international matters. There was also rising disquiet over what "Chester Davis was doing overseas" (as Ping Ferry expressed it), but personal antipathies and a struggle for power between Ford and Hoffman appear to have done more to damage relations than their differing views on international matters.

Whether because hopes of what he could achieve through the Ford Foundation were fading or because other interests provided greater stimuli, the energy and enthusiasm that Hoffman put into the early months at Pasadena quickly dissipated. Faust thought Hoffman "soured" on the Foundation rather early, and Ferry was dismayed that he could not get Hoffman to "pay attention" to the Foundation. By late 1951 Hoffman was making frequent visits to Europe to talk with Dwight Eisenhower. He became ever more absorbed in the effort to win the 1952 Republican nomination for Eisenhower, and in March 1952 he was given a leave from the Foundation to devote his full energies to the political campaign, returning to the Foundation only in July 1952. Henry Ford, James Webber, and Charles E. Wilson directed the Foundation's affairs at Pasadena during part of Hoffman's leave. Ford was not pleased with the situation there, but he certainly had no aspirations to run the Foundation himself. "I want to make cars," he told Ferry, and in one moment of disaffection suggested that Ferry take his place on the board. Relations did not improve after Hoffman's return from the Eisenhower campaign, and at a dinner at the Links Club in New York after the October board meeting in 1952, Ford told Hoffman he would have to leave. Badly shaken, Hoffman protested that he would not be fired. By February 1953, the terms and the date of his "resignation" were worked out, and after the February 4 meeting, Henry Ford II told the press that Hoffman was resigning and that the Ford Foundation would be consolidated in New York.[54] At Hoffman's final meeting as president in February 1953 at Pasadena, Rowan Gaither was elected to succeed him as president, director, and member-trustee, as of March 1.

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Hoffman directed the Ford Foundation for only twenty-six months—or twenty-two months taking into account his leave of absence. In that time, he had set an international course that the Foundation was to follow to the present. His influence on domestic issues in the Foundation's development was substantial but much less decisive and lasting. The $15 million that launched the Fund for the Republic on its lively and turbulent career was voted at the very end of his tenure but otherwise Area II, "the strengthening of free institutions," was very little developed when he left. Similarly, Area III, "strengthening the economy," was left to his successors, and Area V, "the behavioral sciences," had fallen to Rowan Gaither from the start. Hoffman's concern with civil rights, television, and other mass communications was to persist in the Foundation's domestic interests and their prominence in the Foundation probably stems from the initial impetus Hoffman gave them. Education was vigorously developed by the time he left and has never ceased to be an important concern, but its beginnings lay mostly in Hutchins's ideas and initiatives.

It was through his efforts to establish the conditions of peace that Hoffman left his greatest mark on the Foundation. At perhaps no other time in American history were conditions as propitious for major international interests. No one of the great foundations since then has approached the depth and variety of Ford's international activities. The reasons why the Johnson, MacArthur, Mellon, and Hughes Foundations have gone their different ways are multiple, but no time since the early fifties has had the peculiar mixture of optimistic self-confidence in American strengths, and anxieties about the international scene that this country then had. Given the study group report, hardly any leader of the Ford Foundation could have ignored international matters, but they certainly need not have assumed the central position Paul Hoffman afforded them in the early years. He was not alone in his fascination with the problems of underdeveloped countries, but, as we have seen, judgement differed greatly as to how important a role development could play in reaching the overriding aim of establishing the conditions of peace. Even if other leadership had considered the progress of underdeveloped countries a central concern, it could have been expressed in many ways other than the ones Hoffman inspired. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, showed a quite different method based on

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more focused application of scientific knowledge and competence. Hoffman's more flexible approach, dealing with political leaders and responding to the range of development problems that they chose to emphasize, fitted with the problem orientation the study committee had decided upon for the Foundation. The projects in Asia and the Near East in 1951 constituted concrete "action" under highly decentralized management by overseas representatives. It was natural to Hoffman and to a board composed largely of business executives to seek such concrete actions, to invest more trust in them than in research or other investigation, which might eventually influence action. Henry Ford's readiness to trust a staff and to delegate authority certainly supported Hoffman's ventures, but the striking pattern of authority and initiative of overseas representatives that emerged in Ford's program bore the mark of Hoffman's individual style. He was a man of vision and inspiration, better at starting things than seeing them through; he was always anxious to engage others to worry about details and prided himself on his ability to do so. There are many who thought him a bad administrator who "didn't pay attention," but, whatever his personal strengths and weaknesses, Hoffman's readiness to leave the particulars and organization of projects to others gave Ford's overseas development programs a notably decentralized pattern. "Satraps," the overseas representatives have often been called, and with good cause. The overseas development programs are Hoffman's great heritage in the Ford Foundation, and it is consistent with this that he subsequently devoted his energies to building the United Nations Development Program.

The international training and research program was also well under way in Hoffman's time. It had his warm support, but it was long, slow work, less suited to his temperament. Other international matters had received less attention; if cold warring was shunned, the question of what do do about U.S.–Soviet relations remained. During the first months of his engagement with the project, McCloy had not proven to be optimistic about what a private foundation could do for the conditions of peace, and the project was slow to develop. The UN proved frustrating, and the commitment to promoting understanding among peoples by exchanges and education suffered from tenuous results. Yet, in all these various efforts Hoffman left a legacy of aspirations to high purpose. He refused to resign himself to the severe limitations of a private foundation, and those who remembered the

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first exciting months at Pasadena—or believed in the legends that grew around them—felt an obligation to serve great aims.

THE NEW TEAM

Hutchins could never resist a quip. He later said that his and Hoffman's regime came to its downfall because they tried to make the founders emeritus too fast. After withdrawing power from a nationally prominent figure like Hoffman, the trustees were not inclined to seek out another. The alternative was to elevate one of the associate directors, and Gaither was the obvious choice. In the view of one of the trustees, Hutchins was impossible, Katz "too much the lawyer," and Davis too old. Despite his initial reluctance, Gaither had become heavily involved in the Foundation's work and was ready to accept the presidency in February 1953, although he did not cut his ties with his law firm until later that year.[55]

Gaither faced a formidable set of tasks. He had to reorganize the Foundation to the satisfaction of the trustees, consolidate its offices in New York, and cope with politicians and publicists who were regularly criticizing the Foundation and its works. Needing reliable help, he brought along Dyke Brown from his law firm as associate director. In September he introduced two other members of the study committee staff as associate directors, and Tom Carroll agreed to direct Area III for a period of fifteen months. (The titles of director and associate director were dropped in May 1954, and the officers were then labelled president and vice-presidents.) The Foundation thus came under the direction of Gaither and his study committee staff with the addition of Joseph McDaniel, who survived the upheaval and continued as secretary of the Foundation until his retirement in 1967.

In February Gaither promised the trustees that the Foundation would be consolidated in New York City as soon as possible. The Foundation had about 200 staff members at the time, many of whom moved from Pasadena to New York.[55] Hutchins stayed in Pasadena with nothing to do until severance arrangements were made in early 1954. Chester Davis moved to New York but was given no assignment and resigned in July. Spaeth returned to Stanford in September and Katz to Harvard in January 1954, leaving the way clear for the new team.

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In the course of 1953, Gaither assigned responsibility for the five program areas to the new officers: Price was given Area I, the international program; Brown, Area II, public affairs; and Carroll, Area III, economic development and administration. Area IV, education, was initially the joint responsibility of Dyke Brown and William McPeak, later devolving on McPeak alone, who was also accountable for Area V, the behavioral sciences. Responsibility for international matters lay principally in Area I, but spread also into Areas II and III. Dyke Brown had been deeply involved in planning and drafting program papers on Area I, and such subjects as international legal studies continued to be shared between Areas I and II. Carroll was disposed to see his interests in economic development under Area III as worldwide. McPeak alone did not have international responsibilities, except insofar as the behavioral sciences needed to be promoted internationally and in their early ties with the field of international communications at MIT. He was even thought by some of his colleagues to lack sympathy with the Foundation's international program—a matter of some regret, for McPeak is almost universally regarded as the outstanding officer of the Foundation's early history.[57]

The main burden of developing the international program under Gaither fell to Don Price, who did not want the job. Price liked to recall that he and McPeak were old Tennessee newspapermen, but Price soon left Nashville for a Rhodes scholarship at Oxford and subsequently spent fifteen years on various Washington assignments and on the staff of the Public Administration Clearing House, of which he was associate director from 1946 to 1953. He represented a great generation of Americans who sought to elevate the quality of American government and administration from the local through the national levels. He had high intellectual standards and a corresponding regard for professional competence. Regarding his own expertise as being in American government, he was somewhat dismayed when Rowan Gaither asked him to take responsibility for the international programs; Europe might not be stretching too far, but the burgeoning programs in Asia and the Middle East went beyond what he felt he could claim to know about. Yet it was about precisely these programs that Gaither knew the trustees were concerned. Gaither needed someone to take charge of the situation and he insisted that Price should be the man. Price's first task was to rescue the overseas

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development programs from the trustees' threat to close them down, which he successfully avoided by putting to use his experience in organization and budgeting.

Upon his election to president in February 1953, Gaither made a commitment to review the programs and organization of the Foundation. The programs were to be reexamined in subsequent trustees' meetings, with Area I first, at a May 13-14 board meeting. The discussion, based on a lengthy paper, was pursued at the June 30, 1953, meeting when a planning budget of $30 million for 1954 was approved, of which Area I's budget amounted to $12 million. The papers for the May and June meeting reviewed the "major parts of the war–peace problem" and worried that there was an imbalance in the development of the program thus far. Work on overseas development and research and training was under way, and the papers addressed themselves particularly to "those parts of the war–peace problem which have thus far absorbed only a small portion of the Foundation's resources." Five parts of this problem were identified:

1) weaknesses in U.S. foreign relations,
2) weaknesses in international organization for resolving conflicts,
3) policies and aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union,
4) weaknesses in Western Europe and Japan, and
5) the problem of underdeveloped areas.

The text contained more questions than assertions and most of the concrete recommendations concerned already developed subjects. Two million dollars were appropriated for India, and $900,000 for fellowship programs on Asia and the Near East, the Soviet and Slavic areas, and Africa. A modest appropriation of $215,000 was made for the administration of exchange of persons programs along with a final appropriation for the East European Fund of $470,000. To reassure the trustees that the new leadership was not indefinitely committed to the programs started in the Hoffman era, it was recommended that there be no commitments in overseas development extending beyond December 31, 1956, nor in research and training beyond December 31, 1957. These programs were to be evaluated in 1955 and 1956 respectively, to see if they should indeed be continued.

The relevance of the existing programs to the various parts of the war–peace problem was pointed out, but evident gaps and a lack of balance led Gaither to express the need to explore more subjects than

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the Foundation was likely to support. In the course of 1953 and 1954 a staff was assembled under Don Price to manage existing programs and to develop new ones. At the beginning of 1953, Shepard Stone, a consultant on the conditions of peace project, became a regular staff member and assumed responsibility for international affairs. (His patron, McCloy, was elected to the board at the May meeting along with Frederick Lewis Allen and James Brownlee.) Stone engaged Stanley Gordon and another Washington veteran, Howard Johnson, for his staff; a December 31, 1953, organization chart shows an entry for international affairs, though it hardly represented an organized program by this time. With the departure of Spaeth and Moyer, John Howard was made director of the Division of Overseas Activities, which had been organized at Pasadena.

Not long after the Foundation had been consolidated in New York, Price's disquiet over the combination of supporting overseas development programs—"backstopping" them, as it was called—with the training and research programs in the U.S. became evident. He felt the training and research programs were being submerged by the operational pressures of overseas development, and concern had also arisen over the independence of the scholarly work overseas that the Foundation was supporting. Price therefore split the old division into two offices in June 1954, persuading a reluctant John Howard to head the international training and research office, and bringing Kenneth Iverson back from Beirut to head the overseas development office. This reorganization helped clarify responsibilities for certain subjects that had floated uncertainly among competing staff; international relations research in universities was assigned to the new ITR office rather than to IA, and ITR staff assumed responsibility for the international legal studies program, which had hitherto been the joint concern of Areas I and II. As Price remarked in a confidential memorandum in 1956 when he was still wrestling with jurisdictional problems, the "Areas" laid out in the Study Committee Report did not easily translate into organizational divisions, and the struggle to sort out who should assume responsibility for what was prolonged.[58]

The ITR and OD offices had established full agendas. Many of the important questions that were defined as part of the "war–peace problem" fell to the international affairs office, but the international affairs program was slow to develop, with only modest commitments before 1956. The reasons for this were in part the intrinsic difficulty

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of finding constructive contributions that a private foundation might make to such matters as the United Nations or relations with the Soviet Union. It also stemmed from organizational difficulties in dealing with Europe and other regions. Katz's view that the Foundation ought not to have a European program at all was taken up by others and was particularly vigorously argued by Thomas Carroll, the officer responsible for Area III.

It had always been recognized that economic matters were important to peace, and that the international economy was important to the strength of the United States. Chester Davis was interested in these questions and contributed some of the first memoranda in the Foundation's records, but Hoffman looked instead to Richard Bissell whom he hoped to engage as a regular member of the Foundation staff when he left his acting directorship of ECA at the end of 1951.[59] In 1951 and throughout the first half of 1952, Bissell visited Pasadena regularly and devoted his lively mind and fluent typewriter to discussions of the "conditions of peace" and of what kind of economics program the Ford Foundation might undertake. His long, thoughtful memoranda reveal persistent doubts about the capacity of a private foundation to have important impact on national and world affairs, and he decided by the summer of 1952 to turn down Hoffman's open offer to direct the Area III program, choosing instead to maintain both his base in Washington and his association with MIT. He proposed a research grant on the conditions of peace, which was approved at the July 1952 trustees' meeting, along with four economics projects he had prepared. Little more was achieved in the next year and a half until Thomas Carroll was brought in as director of the division of economic development and administration in October 1953.[60]

Bissell, like Hoffman, had been lured by bigger game than major philanthropy. Carroll, on the other hand, a former dean at North Carolina, plunged with vigor into developing a program in economics and business administration. He quickly formed an advisory committee under the chairmanship of Robert Calkins, the head of Brookings, which included an array of leading economists as well as deans and professors of business administration. This committee proposed a program on economic development and administration in a fifty-two-page document, which rejected "action programs" and put a strong emphasis on research. Bissell considered that the interest

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in economic development was reaching "almost faddish proportions," though he had been instrumental in making major grants to MIT for research. Carroll had chosen the label "economic development and administration" (EDA) to echo the prestigious Committee on Economic Development, not because of any fascination with the developing countries. He did, however, develop the interest, initiated by Bissell, in the burgeoning field of economic development, and brought in as his principal staff aide Lloyd Reynolds from Yale, who was to devote a large part of his subsequent career to the subject. Carroll's specialty was business administration, not economics, but he attached himself strongly to the growing community of prestigious professional economists. Only professional economists were considered able to advance the subject of economic development and Carroll insisted that it was his program in the Foundation that should attend to their needs. As a result, a curious division grew up between the practice of overseas development, and study and research on the process of economic development. Several years later, Carroll reacted with indignation at the presumption of the overseas staff who hired the distinguished economist Walter Heller for a Jordan planning project without consulting him. Both for projects directly related to economic development and for general support of the advancement of economics in the United States and abroad, many millions of dollars in Foundation commitments were subsequently made that were never treated as part of the Foundation's international activities and have not found their way into the summary statistics of these activities.[61]

The overseas development program proceeded without much concern over its bureaucratic isolation from what might have been considered its natural intellectual base, though Price in his thoughtful way had regrets over the division. Carroll's universal claim on economics and business administration had certain consequences for OD, but much more serious effects on ITR and IA. Indeed, Price's 1956 memorandum was stimulated by Carroll's proposal for a major international economic policy program that would be the responsibility of his office and would have removed a large body of material from the control of the ITR and IA staff. This and other of Carroll's ambitions had particularly detrimental effects on the development of the international affairs program, with its strong focus on Europe.

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The Foundation never found it easy to decide how to deal with Europe. India or Indonesia might be given over to plenipotentiaries, with the New York staff readily conceding that they did not know much about such distant parts. A greater sense of familiarity and the real or supposed similarity of the United States and Europe, combined with respect for the intellectual resources of Europe, have persistently supported the view that any undertakings in Europe ought to involve professional staff concerned with like subjects in the United States. Various solutions to this organizational question have been tried at different times. Carroll's EDA program soon began supporting the International Economics Association, the Belgian Productivity Center, Perroux's Institute of Applied Economics in France, and it was bringing European trade unionists to a Harvard training program. There were obvious jurisdictional questions. How much should the great interest in European economic recovery and the progress of European integration be the responsibility of Stone's international affairs program and how much the concern of Carroll's EDA program? Price wrestled with this particular organizational question, discussing it with his colleagues and drafting memoranda on it for Gaither.[62] He and Carroll were living together at the time and got along well, but the issue was clearly one that only Gaither could resolve and he failed to take decisive action. The issue dragged on unresolved until 1956 when the international affairs office was finally given a clear mandate by the new president, Henry Heald, and reached a level of commitments surpassing the Hoffman era.

Gaither's inability to resolve the issue over the handling of Europe reflected the weakness and indecision that characterized his presidency. Whether because of the unsuitability of his talents to the chief executive role or because of the illness that caused his early death in 1961, Gaither was not a strong president. He tried to establish a system of collective leadership through his vice-presidents and the secretary, assembled as a Program Committee, but failed to make decisive interventions when it needed them. There was a man stronger than Gaither at the Ford Foundation during these years. This was Donald K. David, who had become vice-chairman of the board and chairman of the executive committee in the 1953 reorganization when he took up an office in the Foundation that he was to occupy for several days a week until 1966. David had been an influential trustee and he successfully used his subsequent member-

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ship on the Ford Motor Company board to strengthen his relationship with Henry Ford. According to those familiar with the situation, he could have had the presidency of the Foundation in 1953, and one of his fellow trustees believed he only turned away from it because of the hope he might become president of Harvard, succeeding James Bryant Conant. David, in his oral history, said, "I was put in there to see how we might become better and more favorably known." Tirades against the Ford Foundation from Fulton Lewis, Jr., Westbrook Pegler, and other less strident defenders of American values disturbed the trustees and they also had to cope with two congressional investigations—the Cox Committee in 1952 and the Reece Committee in 1954. Although the Foundation emerged unscathed and indeed with enhanced credit from the Cox Committee hearings—where Henry Ford, Hoffman, and Hutchins made very effective appearances—and the Reece Committee collapsed in discredit, anxieties over the Foundation's image and repute were slow to subside. The actions of the Fund for the Republic after 1953 under Hutchins's and Hoffman's leadership became a source of such disquiet that an effort was made to persuade the Fund's leadership to close it.[63] Waldemar Nielson, then assistant to Rowan Gaither, thought most of the board were thrown into panic.[64] The famous program of grants to universities, colleges, and hospitals across the country, totaling more than $500 million in 1956, was inspired not by Gaither but David; it was aimed directly at making the Foundation "better and more favorably known." This great burst of largess was all to domestic grantees, thus tipping the balance in total Foundation commitments away from international concerns.

The assaults on the foundations in the McCarthy era were directed more at the allegedly subversive consequences for the domestic scene of support to education, the social sciences, and liberal institutions than at international activities. In preparing himself for an expected appearance before the Reece Committee in 1954, Rowan Gaither rehearsed a series of likely questions about the international activities of the Foundation, including the vague charge that it promoted "internationalism." He also responded to the Committee's query about the amounts of the Foundation's funds and the percentage of total outlays that had been spent outside the boundaries of the United States. A conscientious review of the grants until 1954 showed that about $34,919,000 had been "spent abroad" since 1951, or about 19

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percent of the total commitments, which amounted to $179,455,000. None of the heads of the major foundations was able to testify before this Reece Committee, but Gaither's prepared statement was published with a description of the international activities, supported by the argument that they served the interests of the American people.[65]

The feverish national concern over subversion, disloyalty, Communism, and milder threats to the American way of life that afflicted the country in the early fifties, affected the Ford Foundation but did not reduce its international activities. Indeed, it may have had the paradoxical effect of increasing them. However fanciful the charges brought against the social sciences in the Reece Committee hearings, they contributed to the Foundation trustees' discomfort with the behavioral science program and to its eventual abandonment in 1957.[66] The Foundation's slowness to respond to the rise of civil rights concerns in the 1950s and to the plight of blacks and other disadvantaged groups at home may have stemmed from its caution in engaging in controversial domestic matters at a time when it felt ill-understood and attacked by conservatives. There were those who later thought that it was easier for the Foundation in its early years to concern itself with the poor and disadvantaged in distant places than with those within the United States. It is certainly true that once the 1953 crisis over the overseas development program had passed, the trustees viewed it with increasing enthusiasm. Price has recalled: "I was always trying to hold my budget down and [the trustees] were saying you must do more."[67] The international training and research program gave considerable support to social science, in the guise of strengthening America's ability to meet its international responsibilities, and it escaped the criticisms that doomed the behavioral science program. Foundation officers could also rely on strong support in Washington for the international activities of the Foundation. There was much less hesitation over developing close relationships with government than was to appear in later years, although the CIA was kept at a prudent distance. Both officers and staff clearly enjoyed the sense that they were serving important national interests through Ford's international programs. W. McNeil Lowry, whom McPeak introduced to the Foundation as his assistant in September 1953, thought the board behaved like cabinet ministers in a government and that they liked developing the exciting international role of the Foundation better than supporting behavioral science.[68] Henry

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Heald later added, "the trustees always enjoyed their overseas activities, sometimes perhaps too much."[69] The international programs also had the consoling virtue that the Foundation faced very little criticism over them;[70] any criticism of the Foundation has typically concerned its domestic activities.

The Gaither administration was, in the view of Frosty Hill, vice-president for overseas development after 1955, "more an administration by technocrats than a New Deal."[71] Of the new team only McPeak gained a reputation for executive courage.[72] Under such circumstances the way might have been clear for the trustees to exert considerable influence on the substance of the international programs, perhaps inspired by strong figures, such as Donald David, John Cowles, and Frank Abrams, the chief executive of Standard of New Jersey who had come on the board in 1952. In fact, it is not easy to detect substantive influence from the board in those years. Cowles and Abrams, stirred by their wives, took a lively interest in population studies from an early time. Waldemar Nielsen, exploring the subject in 1952, reported to the trustees in response to a query of Abrams in February 1953. Raymond Moyer, whom Hoffman had brought to his Pasadena staff on overseas development, discussed population with the board in the May 1953 review of the international programs, and the minutes record agreement that a research program on population should be formulated. Several of the trustees deny that there was resistance to population programs in the board in these years; Carl Spaeth recalls raising the subject before the board with trepidation, under pressure from the Foundation's representative in India, Douglas Ensminger, and being relieved to get a sympathetic response. The board felt constrained by Henry Ford's Roman Catholic marriage; it did not press the staff for action, and whether through doubts or timidity, little was done until the end of the decade beyond supporting the Population Council.

Israel was another region to which the board devoted attention from an early time. In April 1952 the Foundation had been asked to buy State of Israel bonds; the directors did not support this proposal, and the board rejected it. When the 1952 Middle East mission proposed grants in Egypt, Chester Davis brought them to the board, where one of the trustees expressed alarm over their effect on the sale of Ford Motor cars in the United States.[73] The board thought that programs in the Arab Middle East should be balanced by a program

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in Israel, and Louis Novins, assistant to the president of Paramount Pictures, was hired as a consultant to make a "quiet investigation in that country." Novins concluded that no operational projects would be worthwhile with the limited funds Ford could supply. He concentrated on research projects that would aid development and had prepared several in early 1953 with the idea of handling them through the Israel Foundation's Trustees, an organization that would be funded by the Foundation but managed by Israelis. This device proved to be one of the more successful examples of the Hoffman era policy of establishing funds that would be responsible for specific actions. It was for many years the exclusive channel through which the Foundation funded projects in Israel and, as such, a way of fending off the importunings of Israel's supporters in this country. The first grant in 1953 was for $410,000; it was followed by several others, which reached their peak in the 1960s.[74] Total commitments to Israel amounted to only $7,120,345 through 1981, and at least one Israeli denounced such sums as "peanuts." The Israel Foundation's trustees conducted their business to the satisfaction of the Foundation, and, while there was some criticism within Israel, there was little within the United States over the imbalance in the Foundation's Near Eastern interests. In 1952, the trustees elected Judge Charles Wyzanski to the board; Wyzanski was persuaded that he was elected because he was Jewish and had a name that did not sound Waspish. Wyzanski's wife Gisela (née Warburg) had a heroic record in helping Jews escape Hitler; she was a doughty Zionist. Wyzanski, however, became known on the board more as an advocate of Harvard and scholarly excellence than as a representative of either Jewish or Israeli interests. He spoke eloquently in support of the overseas development programs of the Foundation, which he visited regularly. There was little trouble over balancing Israeli and Arab interests until the treatment of the Jews in Egypt in the wake of the 1967 War and the Saudi scrutiny of visas for evidence of religion in the 1970s aroused concern.

It may seem paradoxical that the influence of trustees on the substance of programs actually grew when Henry Heald, a strong president, took over from Rowan Gaither in 1956. By then, the three main branches of Ford's international activities—overseas development, international training and research, and international affairs—

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were well differentiated. A new set of problems came to preoccupy those who had responsibility for the Foundation's affairs.

ENDNOTES

[1]Alan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, *Ford: The Time, the Man, the Company, 1863–1905* (New York: Scribners, 1954), pp. xvi and 688; *Ford: Expansion and Challenge, 1905–1933* (New York: Scribners, 1957), pp. xviii and 714; *Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933–1962* (New York: Scribners, 1962), pp. xviii and 508.

[2]An extended quotation from Welliver's report is included in William Greenleaf, *From these Beginnings* (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1964), pp. 182–183. The chapter in Nevins and Hill on the origins of the Foundation is in the third volume, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933–1962*, Chapter 17, pp. 406–426.

[3]Anne Jardim, *The First Henry Ford: A Study in Personality and Business Leadership* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 227–228.

[4]William Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation: The Formative Years," unpublished study, Chapter 1, p. 24, Ford Foundation Archives (FFA).

[5]See Nevins and Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933–1962*, p. 264, for an account of an effort of Charles E. Wilson ("electric Charlie"), then on the War Production Board and later to be a Foundation trustee, to remove Henry Ford, Sr., from the presidency of the Ford Motor Company, which he had assumed after Edsel's death.

[6]Both of these latter are regarded by Nevins and Hill as having been Bennett's men in the dark years.

[7]The link was recommended by Rowan Gaither to enable the Foundation to monitor policies of the Motor Company pending diversification. See endnote 18, below.

[8]Gaither's memorandum in Greenleaf's unpublished study, "The Ford Foundation: The Formative Years," p. 5, FFA.

[9]Dwight MacDonald, *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions* (New York: Reynal and Co., 1956), p. 186.

[10]Ibid., p. 8.

[11]Ibid., p. 138; Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation."

[12]H. Rowan Gaither, ed., *Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program* (Detroit, MI: Ford Foundation), p. 139. The date November 1949 is given on the title page, but Henry Ford II's preface is dated October 1950. Greenleaf's unpublished history, "The Ford Foundation," gives an extensive sampling of the press commentary.

[13]MacDonald, *The Ford Foundation*, pp. 138–139.

[14]Gaither, ed., *Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program*, pp. 21, 47.

[15] Donald Marquis, Oral History, p. 6, FFA.

[16]*Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program*, p. 104.

[17]Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation," Chapter 2, p. 7.

[18]When Hoffman agreed to take the presidency in October 1950, a paper was prepared for him, entitled, "Agenda for Conference with President of the Ford Foundation Including Summary of Foundation Activities on Study Recommendations." Copies are available in Hoffman's papers in the Ford Foundation

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Archives and in the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, MO. On pages 10-11 of this paper, one reads: "It is the decided policy of the Foundation, concurred in by the Ford Family, that the Foundation should liquidate its holdings of Ford Motor Company Stock at the earliest date consistent with the maximum financial realization. While no formal record exists of this decision, the Ford Motor Company in the spring of 1948 engaged the services of Harriman, Ripley and Co., investment bankers, to advise how and when this decision might be implemented. . . ." See also Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation," Chapter 1, p. 27, and Chapter 2, p. 8.

[19]These and subsequent figures are taken from the *Historical and Financial Report, January 15, 1936, date of inception, to September 30, 1954*. This large and abundantly detailed report is kept in the Comptroller's office of the Foundation.

[20]*World Almanac, 1950* (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association Inc.), p. 64. The figure is evidently from Rockefeller's "principal fund"; its assets that year were stated at $158 and $227 million at market value. Rockefeller Foundation Report, 1950, pp. 306–7.

[21]Ibid., p. 544. For the figures on university endowments, see p. 568.

[22]Mahdi Elmandjra, *The United Nations System: An Analysis* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 228.

[23]Testimony before the Cox Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, November 1952, quoted by Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation," Chapter 2, p. 24.

[24]Most of the following account of Hoffman is based on documents in the Ford Foundation Archives, interviews, and oral histories. He was rather secretive about his personal affairs and neither had the disposition nor took the time during his Foundation years to commit much to paper. There were until recently no Hoffman files as such in the Ford Foundation Archives, but a considerable body of material has been procured from the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, MO. Hoffman made many speeches and talked to the press regularly, and Greenleaf was able to glean considerable material from his study of the press at the time. The oral histories of W.H. Ferry, Bernard Gladieux, Donald David, Robert Hutchins, John Howard, and Clarence Faust, in the Ford Foundation Archives, have been particularly useful on this period. These and other oral histories were taken in the early 1970s and are conveniently transcribed.

[25]James Webb Young, Oral History, p. 1, FFA.

[26]Vandenberg's initiative in the choice of Hoffman is described in Hadley Arkes, *Bureaucracy: The Marshall Plan and the National Interest* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 100.

[27]Hoffman did not trouble to tell Bert J. Craig, who was still in charge of the Detroit office, what he was doing. The Detroit office had financial responsibilities, but these quickly diminished. Gladieux, Oral History, p. 53, FFA, and personal conversation.

[28]See Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation," Chapter 2, p. 27, where there are direct quotations from the third interview of Ford and Hoffman in late October, 1950. He gives references to the Cox Committee testimony, November 24, 1952, pp. 228–229, U.S. House of Representatives, and the *Pasadena Star News,* June 2, 1951.

[29]Robert Maynard Hutchins, Oral History, p. 2, FFA.

[30]Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation," Chapter 2, pp. 30–31.

[31]Gaither to Hoffman, January 2, 1951, p. 1. A nine-page memorandum setting forth more detailed assumptions about the international scene and proposing an

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array of projects followed. Copies of these and other papers relevant to the development of program or "area" 1 are appended to Brown to Hoffman, December 14, 1951, "Development of Area 1 Statement," ITR files, box 1, FFA.

[32]John Howard recalls that Philip Jessup was also considered by Hoffman for this task, a choice that might have had quite different consequences. See Oral History, p. 49, FFA.

[33]Trustee Dockett, January 1951, p. 7, FFA. Capitalization as in original.

[34]Richard J. Barnet, *The Alliance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 128.

[35]Ibid., pp. 55, 130.

[36]Actions summarized in Trustee Dockett, July 15–16, 1952, when the loan, which had been increased to $1 million, was converted to a grant.

[37]Milton Katz, conversation; cf. note 40, below.

[38]Brown to Hoffman, December 14, 1951, "Development of Area 1 Statement," p. 10.

[39]Ibid., p. 11.

[40]Milton Katz, Oral History, pp. 13–14, FFA. This section is also based in part on an extended conversation with Katz, May 21, 1984.

[41]Clarence Faust, Oral History, p. 6, FFA. Faust's 1972 oral history contains 202 pages of interesting material though rather little on international matters. A history of the Fund for the Advancement of Education is available in Paul Woodring, *Investment in Innovation* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. xiv and 323.

[42]See the staff meeting reports, McDaniel files, box 2043, FFA. Victor Butterfield was reporting to Faust on a proposal for liberal education in the Arab world.

[43]Faust, Oral History, pp. 9–10 and Davis's notes on the January 4–5, 1951, staff meetings.

[44]See Young's oral history and the January 4–5 staff meeting minutes, where he was arguing that European capitalism was different from our "revolutionary capitalism" and that we must make a frontal attack on Communism and show the advantages of the American system.

[45]W.H. Ferry's oral history, is of absorbing interest, and a paper of his own peace is preserved in the 1951 staff meeting minutes, FFA.

[46]George Kennan, Oral History, pp. 7ff, FFA.

[47]Telegram, Dyke Brown to Gaither, April 5, 1951, in grant file 51-35.

[48]Hoffman's report to the trustees of the Ford Foundation, Trustee Dockett, July 13, 1951.

[49]Hutchins to Hoffman, February 11, 1952, in file 52–85.

[50]See the paper by Kathleen McCarthy for a more extensive account of this undertaking.

[51]See Gaither's "Comments on Bill Greenleaf's Manuscript," January 23, 1959, in Gaither's papers, box 11, folder 34, FFA. The account given here draws on the oral histories of Katz, Gladieux, Ferry, David, and Hutchins, and on conversations with Katz, Gladieux, and others.

[52]Minutes of the July 30 and October 4, 1951, trustees' meetings, FFA.

[53]Hutchins's oral history, p. 11.

[54]See MacDonald, *The Ford Foundation,* pp. 146ff, for the only substantial published account of Hoffman's removal. This account is based in part on a conversation with Judge Wyzanski who was present at the Links Club meeting.

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[55]Minutes of the September 16, 1953, meeting report on the cancellation of an agreement with Cooley, Crowley, and Gaither to have Gaither serve as president "at the mutual pleasure of himself and the trustees."

[56]Minutes of the June 30, 1953, trustees' meeting where the numbers of personnel are given as 201 on March 1 and 197 on July 1, of whom 114 and 109 respectively were "operating personnel." Conversations with some of these personnel report that the sudden "bombshell" of Hoffman's resignation had produced anxiety and some resentment in the Pasadena staff when he told them that he had "been taken care of," but had nothing to say about the future of the staff.

[57]The universally high regard for McPeak is very striking. It extended from the trustees through his senior colleagues down through the staff of the Foundation, and it was shared by those who differed with him on policy or said they did not like him personally.

[58]A copy of this memorandum, dated May 17, 1956, and addressed to the Program Committee, is appended to Price's oral history.

[59]For an extensive account of Bissell's relations with the Foundation, See James B. Cochrane, *Industrialism and Industrial Man in Retrospect* (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1979), pp. 30–50.

[60]While Cochrane (p. 34) found a budget for Bissell's consultations from a Washington office in 1952, there is no record now of his having been formally a consultant. In *Who's Who,* Bissell says he was a staff member of the Ford Foundation from 1952 to 1954 after which he went to the CIA, becoming deputy director of plans between 1959 and 1962. Cochrane also remarks on page 46 that the Foundation sought financial and project reports from Bissell and MIT without success, on program action 53–214.

[61]The statistics used in the study are largely ones assembled during the Bundy-Bell era for actions that fell under the responsibility of the international division of that era. Some of the actions previously made under Carroll's EDA Program were credited to the international side in a great sorting that went on in 1966 and 1967, but the bulk of EDA actions and many actions subsequently undertaken under the education and research division of the Bundy era have not yet been brought into the international accounting.

[62]See the memos attached to Price's oral history.

[63]Judge Charles Wyzanski, conversation.

[64]Waldemar Nielson, Oral History, p. 11, FFA.

[65]Gaither's statement was dated July 16, 1954. See report #00196. The letter on funds spent abroad was dated September 17, 1954. This letter and rehearsed questions on internationalism are preserved in Don Price's files on the Reece Committee hearings, now at the Ford Foundation.

[66]Trustees' oral histories, particularly David's, show hostility or dissatisfaction with the behavioral science program. The trustees' rejection of a proposal to subsidize a new encyclopedia of the social sciences followed the Reece Committee's assault on the original encyclopedia and was seen by at least one trustee (Wyzanski) as a turning point against the behavioral sciences.

[67]Price, Oral History, p. 48.

[68]W. McNeil Lowry, Oral History, p. 53.

[69]Henry Heald, Oral History, p. 110.

[70]See Porter McKeever and Lawrence Gould's oral histories on this point.

[71]McPeak, Oral History, p. 18.

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[72]Porter McKeever, Oral History, pp. 10–11, where he calls McPeak "one of the great men of American philanthropy."
[73]Ferry, Oral History, pp. 40–44.
[74]Novin's original proposals of projects are in report #00196. For information about his mission, see the Staff Meeting Minutes #68, December 17, 1952, p. 2, McDaniel files, box 2043; see also the monthly letter to trustees, December 31, 1952, p. 5, and the weekly report to the president, December 19, 1952, and grant file #53-53.

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Kathleen D. McCarthy

From Cold War to Cultural Development: The International Cultural Activities of the Ford Foundation, 1950–1980

DESPITE A STRONG COMMITMENT to funding American cultural activities, the Ford Foundation approached the task of foreign cultural development with misgivings and at a hesitant pace. In part, this reluctance reflected the inherent biases of foundation work. Formed during the Progressive Era, the modern American foundation enshrined the period's reverence for science and technical expertise. According to the Progressive dictum, philanthropy needed to strike at the root causes of social problems, test solutions, turn the best over to government, and then move on to fresh fields—ideas poorly suited to either the arts or the humanities. Unlike campaigns to combat malaria or to increase crop yields, cultural programs often eluded quantifiable measurement and rarely afforded a substantive cure.

Nor did they readily lend themselves to public policymaking, or to development paradigms focused on social, political, and economic returns. Yet when the Ford Foundation appeared on the international funding scene shortly after the Second World War, a viable political rationale for cultural support had begun to emerge. During the 1950s, Ford's international arts and humanities grants were cast in ideological terms, weapons in the Cold War quest for the hearts and minds of men. As Cold Warrior sentiments waned in the 1960s, changing concepts of development kindled interest in new kinds of cultural work in the Third World; there was a transition from the

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liberal universalism of the immediate postwar years to a reverence for cultural relativism, which reflected America's chastened international role. Yet, even at the height of their popularity, all such cultural projects received only a small part of Ford's overseas expenditures. Approximately $10 million were spent between 1950 and 1980, in comparison to the $300 million allocated for international studies, or the $200 million for foreign agricultural projects. Given the traditional technical biases of American foundations, the significance of these grants lies not in their size, but in the fact that they were made, that the Foundation chose to venture into such uncharted waters.[1]

I

The Ford Foundation's earliest cultural grants bore the mark of the Cold War. When the Foundation began making international grants in 1950, much of Europe still lay in ruins. The Second World War had had a devastating effect on the European intellectual community: many universities were badly damaged, and scores of leading intellectuals had perished, giving rise to more pessimistic strains among many of the intelligentsia who had survived. American observers feared that Marxism and Communism would exert a growing appeal among these disaffected intellectuals, posing a serious challenge to Western European democratic rule. Set against the backdrop of increasing Soviet involvement in the Middle East, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the victory of Mao in China, the task of luring European intellectuals away from Communism assumed new urgency.

The architects of the newly expanded Foundation placed a high priority on the pursuit of peace, and cultural policy was seen as one of the possible means of strengthening international equilibrium. The Gaither report, upon which Ford's rise from a locally oriented grantmaker to a national and international donor was based, recommended funding for work on foreign ". . . languages, literatures, arts, music and philosophies, [since] . . . . Our hopes for peace rest upon the deep understanding which will come from such knowledge, and not in the erection of Maginot lines, however formidable."[2]

Cultural support seemed well suited to the task of reaching foreign intellectuals and increasing their understanding of the United States. Many Europeans regarded America as a nation steeped in material-

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ism, lacking those "civilized" qualities that Europeans still associated with the Old World. Foundation spokesmen such as former University of Chicago president, Robert Maynard Hutchins, viewed intellectual exchange as an antidote to such stereotypical views, for, as he explained, " . . . people of one country or race hate those of another because they do not know what they are really like. . . . Cultural exchange can do much to dispel these misconceptions. . . ."[3]

Fresh from a successful term as adminstrator of the Marshall Plan, the Foundation's first president, Paul Hoffman, shared Hutchins's faith in the power of ideas. Both were committed to the notions that increased communication would further international understanding and peace, and that individuals of all nationalities could resolve their differences if ideas were allowed to flow freely over international frontiers. Hoffman's prescription for "waging peace on the information front" therefore included a program of worldwide intellectual exchange, and the Foundation's resources allowed some of his ideas to be realized through grants to institutions abroad.[4]

Hoffman's faith in nongovernmental cultural diplomacy was deeply rooted in the American past. Before the Second World War and the creation of propaganda bureaus in the Department of State, responsibility for cultural exchange had often been assumed by private organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), which sought to reduce international conflicts through the scientific study of war. Later, the Rockefeller Foundation attempted to introduce modern medical techniques in China through its support of the Peking Union Medical College. Indeed, after 1934, the Rockefeller Foundation's humanities division adopted the promotion of intercultural understanding as its primary goal, fostering area studies, exchanges, translation and writing programs, and the development of foreign cultural research centers.[5]

Although governmental responsibility for cultural exchange expanded after the Second World War, many believed that private support still had a variety of advantages. Since, during the 1950s, the State Department was ". . . subjected to so much domestic political interference that it can no longer present a rounded picture of American culture," Hutchins felt that private initiative could play an influential role, particularly "in the hands of a privately endowed organization. . . [where] it can cease to be propaganda and become a

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disinterested means of building understanding and friendship among the nations of the world."[6]

Foundations had a variety of resources from which to choose, from publications and scholarly exchanges to art exhibits and the performing arts. The support of literary exchanges seemed to be a particularly promising means of increasing international understanding, since intellectuals contributed substantially to ". . . the political life of most foreign countries." The Foundation therefore promoted several publishing ventures during the 1950s, including Franklin Books, which enabled indigenous publishing houses in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to produce and distribute high quality translations of American works, and the Chekhov Publishing House, which brought proscribed Russian works and translations of Western classics to Russian readers throughout the free world.[7]

The Intercultural Publications (IPI) program was more ambitious. It was launched with an initial grant of $500,000 in 1952, by Hutchins's protege, James Laughlin, the publisher of *New Directions* and a noted champion of the avant-garde. Laughlin proposed to publish a journal in English, French, Italian, and German, containing examples of the foremost contemporary American writing and art, for distribution to the European intellectual community. Laughlin emphasized that his aim in publishing the journal was not ". . . so much to *defeat* the leftist intellectuals in dialectical combat as to *lure* them away from their positions by aesthetic and rational persuasion. In other words: culture as the meeting ground, as the viable channel for future understanding and rapprochement."[8]

Guest editors such as Lionel Trilling, Jacques Barzun, Malcolm Cowley, and R.P. Blackmur were appointed for each issue, in order to avoid the possibility of a single artistic or literary clique's dominating editorial policy. A series of "country perspectives" was subsequently added to the format, to introduce American readers to the culture of such newly independent states as India, Indonesia, and Burma. Laughlin insisted on reciprocity in these efforts, to ensure that foreign readers would ". . . not feel we were simply trying to ram our culture down their throats." Backed by a distinguished board, including Alfred A. Knopf and Henry J. Heinz II, IPI quickly developed from a modest publishing venture into a privatelysponsored mechanism for worldwide cultural exchange.[9]

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Laughlin's proposal appealed to the Foundation's trustees as a practical means of furthering their desire to promote international peace. The 1951 annual report expressed the officers' conviction that "... the exchange of ideas, and possibly also of artistic and literary productions, [is] one of the most promising methods of fostering the development of world understanding and a sense of moral and cultural community among the peoples of the world." Based on the belief that the arts "... effectively further the idea of world community," IPI was designed to help reduce international tensions and misunderstanding and to "promote peace by increasing respect for America's non-materialist[ic] achievements among intellectuals abroad."[10]

These interests were shared by an impressive array of American intellectuals. Malcolm Cowley found the idea "useful and exciting," particularly since European impressions of American life tended to be shaped by "... movies, hard-boiled detective stories, comic books and magazines in which there is more advertising than text." Oscar Handlin, professor of history at Harvard, commented that "... the potentialities of such a project seem ... almost unlimited," and were particularly well suited to enabling small groups of foreign opinionmakers to interpret the American ethos to their fellow countrymen. Handlin's colleague, Perry Miller, also endorsed the idea, but emphasized that "... *no* propaganda for the American way should be included; that omission will, in itself, become the most important element of propaganda, in the best sense." A canvass of State Department personnel revealed similar support: "They are all terribly enthusiastic about *Perspectives U.S.A.*," Laughlin commented, "and have promised to do everything they can to help us with it," including distributing free copies to USIS libraries overseas.[11]

These early successes stimulated the rapid expansion of IPI's international programs. By 1953, its budget included items for translations, art exhibits, and library development. Particular attention was paid to India, the first country in which Ford had engaged in overseas activities and an area of extraordinary strategic importance. As the principle example of a newly independent democracy in Asia, India provided a ready target for Communist agitation, particularly in poverty-ridden southern states such as Kerala, where Communist Party candidates scored a series of successes in local elections shortly after independence.

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The Cold War was waged on the cultural front as well as in the ballot box, as Communist publishers flooded the country with inexpensive books. Laughlin was sent to India in response to requests from local publishers who were alarmed by "... the activities of the Indian Communist Party ... and the inability of pro-democratic groups to finance or organize a book program that would adequately present the point of view of the Free World to India and Pakistan." Inspired by "a particularly acute political situation: the threat of Communist domination in India," a "Books for India" program was initiated in close coordination with "... the State Department's anti-Communist program" in 1953, to "... acquaint Indian readers with the basic traditions of democracy in the West. ..."[12]

IPI's program in India led to the establishment of the Southern Languages Book Trust in 1955. Indian groups had solicited the Foundation's assistance in publishing Western books as early as 1952. Although these initial requests were couched in anti-Communist terms, it was also felt that such a program "... should not only translate Western books but also intensify the revitalization of traditional indigenous values—a potential spiritual and intellectual force which may prove an even stronger barrier to the acceptance of Communism by Hindus and Moslems than imported Western ideals." The Southern Languages Book Trust therefore adopted a twofold mission: inexpensive Western and Indian texts were to be made widely available to audiences in Tamil, Telagu, Kannada, and Malayalam, and Indian booksellers were to be taught to market their publications more effectively. Funded with a $500,000 grant in 1955, the Trust proved to be one of the Foundation's most successful early international cultural programs: by 1968 more than 500 Indian and foreign titles had been published, an estimated 2.5 million of these copies had been sold, and funding of the Trust's operations had been almost entirely assumed by Indian donors.[13]

The Southern Languages Book Trust reflected the Foundation's desire to help restrain Communist cultural progress by increasing the availability of Western and indigenous literature; similar motives prompted its support of the All India Art Show, which allowed the work of some of America's leading modern painters to be exhibited in New Delhi. In 1952, the All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society of New Delhi announced its Second International Contemporary Art Exhibition, inviting all the embassies to submit representative

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national works. The Americans were initially unable to participate; shortly before, Republican Congressman George Dondero had launched a McCarthyite campaign against the vagaries of modern art, attacking modernists such as Wassily Kandinsky and Arshile Gorky for their rejection of representational depictions and for their alleged subversive activities. Such congressional hostility effectively curbed the State Department's involvement in cultural activities—particularly those in the visual arts—adding yet another strain of ideological harassment to an already embattled institution. Unable to comply with the Society's request himself, the American ambassador, Chester Bowles, contacted Ford, with the result that twenty paintings were selected by the American Federation of Arts and sent to India under a small grant, including works by Arshile Gorky, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Jackson Pollock, and Ben Shahn. The exhibit was widely attended and well reviewed, and the American paintings won enthusiastic approval.

The distinguishing features of the intercultural program—its Cold War orientation and its willingness to undertake projects from which the government felt compelled to refrain—are reflected in a number of other programs supported by the Foundation during these years. Ford's quest to help strengthen the ideological alternatives to totalitarianism ranged widely, from preaching the virtues of American civilization to supporting indigenous ideologies. Funding was given to the Philharmonica Hungarica, an orchestra of refugee musicians who fled Hungary in the wake of the 1956 revolution, providing "... a potent political symbol favorable to the free world." Similarly, support for the strongly anti-Communist Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was first initiated in 1957. Founded seven years earlier, CCF had assembled a "... veritable Who's Who of mid-twentieth century intellectual and cultural life..." dedicated to combating Communism and intellectual repression throughout the world: Arnold Toynbee, Isaiah Berlin, Benedetto Croce, John Dewey, Ignazio Silone, and John Kenneth Galbraith were among those who joined in the crusade "... to fight as *free men* against the Communist and fascist tyrannies...." Ford was even prepared to consider projects to strengthen religious ideologies when they complemented its political goals.[14]

Don Price, a member of the Foundation's staff, explained, "everywhere the newly independent countries seem to be putting great

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emphasis on a revival of their religion as a means of strengthening their cultural independence and their national patriotism . . . ." Thus, "the religious traditions in Asia may be a bulwark against Communism. . . ." This possibility seemed particularly relevant in nations such as Burma. In 1952, when Ford representatives first visited there, official relationships between the two governments were strained. U.S. aid had been proffered, but it carried too many political strings. Nonetheless, the country was in great need of aid. Postwar recovery was slow, Burma's sudden rise to independence had left it with numerous administrative needs, and rural unrest, much of it Communist inspired, was pervasive. As poverty, corruption, and violence grew more acute, the Ford team warned that Burma might succumb ". . . if not to external forces, then to some brand of internal totalitarianism." Believing that "Burma's greatest need is order, stability and unity," the survey team chose to recommend an unusual course.[15]

Shortly before the arrival of the Ford team in 1952, Burma's Prime Minister, U Nu, had been instrumental in launching a national religious revival at the Piyadawtha conference, with the aim of restoring the country's values, and sense of national unity as a means of resisting Communist insurgency. He also offered to host the Sixth World Buddhist Synod in Rangoon, to provide a focus for national religious sentiment and to establish Burma's spiritual leadership among Buddhist nations throughout Southeast Asia. Despite its weakened economy, the Burmese government committed over a million dollars to the project, seeking a similar amount elsewhere. American government representatives were unable to help, fearing that Congress would censure support of a religious program. As in the case of the Indian art exhibit, the government enlisted Ford's assistance.

The government spokesmen who solicited the Foundation's support emphasized the importance of demonstrating American sensitivity to indigenous spiritual values, since ". . . the popular belief that Americans were guided solely by or worked solely for the material benefit of themselves or others was one of the strongest weapons in the hands of Communist propagandists in Southeast Asia." From Ford's perspective, the project's greatest value lay in the fact that it would ". . . open the door to further fruitful cooperative relations between the Foundation and Burma, since this is the major project on which the Burmese government desires the Foundation's help."

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Approved in 1953, Ford's $250,000 grant provided assistance for construction of the conference meeting hall, which was to serve as an Institute for the Advanced Study of Pali (the language of ancient Buddhist scriptures) after the Synod ended.[16]

The grant was atypical in several respects: it was used for construction costs; it bore little relationship to Ford's general emphasis on economic development and administrative training; and it was given primarily for religious purposes. Nor were the funds designed to accelerate the nation's modernization efforts. Yet, these considerations were incidental to the decision to make the grant; as Ford's field representative explained, Buddhism ". . . is inherently in opposition to the tenets of Communism." As such, the grant fitted a familiar pattern, with Ford undertaking a project that the U.S. government was unable to fund. The grant's ideological implications also complied perfectly with the Foundation's own Cold War goals. Cast in this light, even the most unusual cultural project could be regarded as having a legitimate place in the overseas program.[17]

The most enduring of the Foundation's contributions during these years may have been the Southern Languages Book Trust, which was eventually turned over to local support. Ford was also fairly successful in helping to promote the "slow media" of intellectual discourse in an era when the government was prevented from doing so by Congressional dissent. Other initiatives were less successful. Despite a promising beginning, the Congress for Cultural Freedom later became embroiled in controversy that ultimately did much to discredit American scholarly activity abroad. Even U Nu's effort to unite his country in Buddhism was criticized for diverting scarce national resources for religious purposes. By 1962, the Burmese army had seized power, disposed of the constitution, instituted a Socialist regime, and ousted Ford.

During the 1960s, the role accorded foreign cultural projects became more tenuous. Ironically, during the decade when Americans finally accepted cultural patronage as a legitimate realm of public responsibility at home, the opportunities for foreign assistance diminished.

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II

In the 1960s, Ford's aid to international cultural activities declined, and the few grants that were given were made without a well-articulated policy in mind. Although several field representatives continued to advocate aid for cultural disciplines, their efforts were discouraged by policymakers in New York, since Henry Heald and McGeorge Bundy were far less convinced of the benefits of international cultural efforts than their predecessors, Hoffman and Gaither had been. Hampered by the lack of a clear rationale and by this resistance from New York, the cultural grants of the 1960s were few in number and often limited in their results.

As the status accorded international cultural projects fell, the Foundation's domestic Humanities and Arts program flourished, accounting for almost $266 million in grants by the end of the 1960s. Federal outlays were also growing. When the Ford Foundation began its international activities in the 1950s, the government's cultural exchange programs were still in their infancy. Created in response to Axis propaganda assaults in Latin America, these early government programs faced the task of winning the right to continue their operations after the war ended. Hampered by limited funding and by congressional hostility, State Department personnel often turned to private donors such as Ford to undertake projects that exceeded their mandate.

By the 1960s, however, USIA had achieved a permanent position within the federal budget, and appropriations soared: between 1950 and 1963, its resources grew almost five-fold. As governmental support for cultural activities increased, Ford's diminished. Apart from the continued support for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, only seventeen cultural grants were listed by the Foundation's International Division for the years 1960–1969, totaling a mere $2.2 million, in contrast to the $3.9 million donated in the previous decade. During the same period, $86 million was allocated for agricultural work; $42 million for management training; and $161 million for educational activities overseas.

Indeed, culturally-minded field representatives often complained that the Foundation was "... for education and against culture." Ford's prescription for "nation building" during these years focused on the development of universities to train growing ranks of indige-

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nous managerial elites within developing countries. Because the emphasis was on economic planning, public administration, and strengthening national governments, the arts and humanities achieved only marginal significance in these programs—a trend often reinforced by the wishes of recipient governments, whose primary concern was to foster economic progress.[18]

The political climate also changed, as adherents of Communism began to present a less united front. The first cracks appeared with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. By 1958, the Sino-Soviet alliance began to weaken, and was formally severed by the Moscow Declaration two years later. The Cuban missile crisis marked another watershed; when the Kremlin backed down from Kennedy's calculated brinkmanship, the two nations quietly entered an era of tacit détente.

With the decline of the Cold War and the growing emphasis on international economic development, cultural grantmaking lost much of its rationale, and few new goals were forthcoming. As a 1964 memo on "Cultural Grants" firmly stated: "No separate programs of cultural grants paralleling Overseas Development programs . . . are to be undertaken. . . ." Arts and humanities grants were ". . . to be related to the balanced development of universities and schools, rather than be expressions of interest in those subjects only," and as such, "further support to specialized activities and institutions in the arts . . . is not contemplated." As a result, the record of the decade is primarily one of small grants made in isolation from the Foundation's other programs; often poorly managed by grantees, they were also hampered by political vicissitudes and the lack of sustained interest in New York.[19]

One such grant was given to house the national archives in Guinea. The Foundation began to consider the prospect of aid to francophone African states shortly after Sekou Touré gained independence for Guinea from the French in 1958. The French had hastily left, taking their materiel, their aid, and their administrative skills with them, and Touré set himself up as one of Africa's leading opponents of colonialism, establishing a socialist state under his own highly erratic personal rule. These developments were watched uneasily by the Foundation's staff, who noted that ". . . the new French African states show tendencies which may make them into the prime African exponents of totalitarian approaches to the problems of develop-

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ment." The prospect that Touré's brief association with Communist China might prove attractive to other African states was further cause for alarm. As a nongovernmental body, Ford seemed to be ideally positioned to act quickly in this politically sensitive area.[20]

A principal advocate of the need to define the African "personality," Touré was particularly interested in building a respected African culture. Although a preliminary Foundation visit produced no funding possibilities, subsequent investigations revealed that the national archive was in a deplorable state. Housed in a dilapidated building that had originally served as a prison, the nation's records were exposed to the ravages of insects, humidity, and rain. The project of rehousing them was attractive to Ford because it would provide an opening for further involvement, and serve as tangible evidence of American goodwill. The director's irascibility and his Marxist leanings raised some doubts among the Foundation staff members who were considering the grant, but the desire to resist what one State Department official termed the ". . . tendency by the West to sit back and watch Guinea 'go Communist' " ultimately prevailed, and a $37,000 donation was approved in 1961.[21]

Few could have predicted how rapidly and profoundly the political situation would deteriorate. The director was deported shortly after the grant was made, and the archives turned over to less qualified political appointees, while visa restrictions made it impossible for Ford to monitor the situation. Later accounts reveal that the Foundation was approached by the Guinean ambassador with plans to divert the funds, using them to support the publication of Touré's two-volume history of his Parti Démocratique de Guinée. "Sad, this history," mused one observer when the grant was closed. "It was right to have had faith then—to have tried to work with the radical wing of African states, and in particular with Guinea, which then had an ideological importance that has now faded." Subsequent evaluations underscored the grant's isolation from Ford's other activities, both geographically (it was the Foundation's first and only donation in Guinea) and in focus (given for a building project ". . . with apparently little concern for internal program consistency"). Questions were also raised about the value of working in such an unstable political climate, leaving some to ponder ". . . under what conditions of inaccessibility and hostility (ideological or otherwise) are we still justified in making a small grant or two in areas of importance."[22]

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One of the Foundation's largest cultural grantees, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, also foundered on political issues during these years. By the 1960s, the CCF had shifted its focus from pursuing specifically anti-Communist objectives to a more general defense of intellectual freedom, supplying funds to PEN, publishing a welter of respected periodicals, hosting seminars around the world, and monitoring censorship and cultural oppression. Ford had continued to fund it on the basis of these activities, providing seven million dollars by the early 1960s. Despite a respectable record, the Congress's reputation was irretrievably sullied by a *New York Times* exposé in 1966, which linked it to CIA support. Although Ford continued to fund it under a new name (the International Association for Cultural Freedom) and a new director well into the 1970s, the organization never fully recovered its former stature and was eventually dissolved.

As part of the reorganization, IACF spokesmen solicited support for some of its periodicals, to provide operating funds until other sources of revenue could be found. The Foundation agreed to provide support for the Latin American journal, *Mundo Nuevo*, for three years beginning in 1966, to assist in transferring its operations from Paris to a Latin American base and in increasing subscriptions. Only the editorial offices were ultimately transferred. In an attempt to broaden its appeal, the new editor added political commentary to the journal's regular fare, only to have an issue on the Brazilian military confiscated by Brazilian authorities. The strategy also failed to win new subscribers, since the journal was still tainted by CIA support. As one Foundation officer explained, "... we have generally been reluctant to subsidize publications, especially in the absence of firm prospects that the publication will achieve financial self-sufficiency within a reasonably short period. As you might suspect, this reluctance is hardened by our disappointment with the results of our grant to *Mundo Nuevo*." The journal ceased publication shortly thereafter, amid bitter recriminations by some of its staff.[23]

Other grants, such as the allocation for a University of Ghana theater program directed by Efua Sutherland, or an ethnomusicology project at the University of Ibadan, went awry when the directors changed course under the stimulus of more intriguing opportunities and political pressures. None of these grants was given as part of a systematic cultural strategy; indeed, many were donated in spite of the Foundation's policies. Lacking a clear rationale, or a legitimate

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place in the Foundation's larger development programming, they were given in a scattered fashion, in response to piecemeal opportunities. As such, they constituted mixed successes at best, hampered by political shifts, personnel problems, and organizational flaws. A more comprehensive approach, formulated cooperatively between New York and the field representatives, was needed if more lasting results were to be achieved.

III

The first sign of Ford's renewed interest in cultural programs came in 1967, when officers in the field were polled for opinions about their programs and future goals as part of a Foundation-wide program review. The resulting report acknowledged that, although a limited number of cultural ventures had previously been undertaken "... with limited success ... there is considerable agreement among the representatives that they would like to do more in this field."[24]

Moreover, the representatives almost unanimously endorsed the notion that cultural endeavors could make a contribution to the development process. Although hardly the centerpiece of the 1967 conference in Beirut, the question of cultural support received consideration for two reasons: first, internal backing for such activities was growing among many Foundation staff members; and, perhaps more important, the political climate had changed.

In the 1950s, the nation's security had seemed to many to be inextricably linked to preserving democratic regimes overseas. During the 1960s, Americans learned a bitter lesson about the costs and limitations of this self-appointed role. While the Vietnam War and revelations about covert CIA activities did much to tarnish the country's image overseas, riots, racism, and student unrest helped to shatter the liberal consensus at home. As the intellectual community drew away from anti-Communist crusades, many people began to question the country's foreign policies, equating them with Third World dependency, the "illusion of American omnipotence," and imperialistic designs.[25]

The growing wave of skepticism spread to other areas as well. By the late 1960s, many observers questioned the efficacy of current development paradigms and the liberal assumptions upon which they were based. The expectation that Third World modernization cam-

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paigns would parallel Europe's rapid recovery under the Marshall Plan had proven illusory. Many of the poor in underdeveloped countries stayed poor as the anticipated gains failed to "trickle down" to those in need, generating increased disillusionment.

"The signs of this darkened mood" were everywhere. Critics argued that many modernization programs had challenged indigenous values, unsettled traditional societies, and offered only limited gains in return. American policymakers were criticized for driving "a bulldozer of money and technology through the complications and perversities of the societies" they sought to aid. Plans for modernization that failed to allow for national differences were dismissed as "simplistic," "facile," and doomed to fail. The chastened mood of the late 1960s underscored the belief that "the globe is much too complex, crowded and refractory a place to be brought under control of any power or system, [or] to be understood by any simplistic world ideology . . . wherever it might be patented." In the process, the liberal cosmopolitanism of the immediate postwar years came to be superceded by a growing sensitivity to cultural relativism.[26]

Caught between the "will to be modern" and the "need to exist and have a name," many countries seemed "at once hell-bent toward modernity and morally outraged by its manifestations." "Cultural development" appeared to be an appropriate anodyne, which might provide unifying symbols in nations divided by racial, religious, and ethnic differences, and might help each country to find its own voice, imagery, and national identity. In the words of the pan-Africanist writer, Frantz Fanon, cultural activities afforded a means of "discovering beyond the misery of today, beyond self-contempt, resignation and abjuration, some very beautiful and splendid era whose existence rehabilitates us both in regard to ourselves and . . . others."[27]

These ideas won support within the Ford Foundation precisely because they were vague enough to accommodate a variety of aspirations and choices. On one level, cultural development was seen as a means of tailoring general development aims to local capacities, of mitigating the negative effects of modernization, and of enabling developing nations to ". . . cope constructively with rapid change in ways that leave individuals whole and societies relatively peaceful." The field representative in India, Douglas Ensminger, believed it could ". . . help national leaders awaken to an understanding of the social, cultural and political aspects of nation-building." As such, it

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might counter the anomie so often associated with social change, by offering enduring touchstones in a rapidly changing world. It also seemed to afford a humane solution to the question of ". . . what the quality of life is likely to be for the majority of the rural population . . . when even under the best circumstances their annual income will be less than $200. . . ."[28]

Conservation activities could enable local scholars and technicians to protect cultural legacies from the contamination of outside influences and help to winnow them from colonial overlays. Preserved and reconstituted along genuinely indigenous lines, these ". . . intellectual and cultural infrastructures . . ." could serve as rallying points for national loyalties and pride. In the words of one Foundation staff member, ". . . we should try to understand and encourage those elements in a country which promise to give it a positive sense of national worth and identity. . . ." The Gradgrindian conception of untempered economic development had paid little attention to the values of the past, which developing nations were expected to shed as they progressed toward modern status. The concept of cultural development challenged such notions: Janus-faced, it looked to the past to explain the present and to mitigate the anguish of peoples caught in the transition between traditional verities and modern technological change.[29]

The Ford Foundation seemed ideally suited for such work. Few others were prepared to fund cultural development, none could match the Foundation's resources or the flexibility accorded by its nongovernmental status, and few could adapt as easily to work in politically sensitive areas. Cultural development provided a new set of goals to replace the cultural mission of the Cold War years.

As support for international cultural development mounted, the Foundation's expenditures on its domestic program diminished. When W. McNeil Lowry retired in 1974, the Humanities and Arts Division's budget fell precipitously, from $20 million to a little over $5 million the following year. Ensminger had often cast a jealous eye at Lowry's cultural allocations, arguing that "if cultural programs are important to the U.S. they should be accepted as being of equal importance to India." As federal support began to eclipse Ford's domestic cultural expenditures, arguments for foreign activities received a more sympathetic hearing.[30]

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Yet, although the 1967 Beirut meeting opened the door to serious consideration of a more comprehensive international program in the arts, the formidable task of designing such a program was barely addressed, and there was little consensus about what such activities should entail.

Under the guidance of cultural proponents such as Douglas Ensminger, the Asia and Pacific program took the lead in exploring possible projects, conducting a series of surveys and discussions with Asian scholars, government officials, and cultural leaders. Although the net was widely cast, the results were surprisingly uniform, stressing the need to preserve the cultural treasures of the past. Suddenly, "... the past was no longer seen as a mere obstacle to modernization, but as a source of dignity and worth, to be explored and constructed in the present and carried forward proudly in the national future." Moreover, by concentrating on the "hardware of history," observers predicted that the Foundation could aid the cause of culture while remaining aloof from political pitfalls and artistic rivalries.[31]

The cultural development programs initiated in India in 1969 and in Southeast Asia the following year focused on four main concerns: 1) the need to halt the loss and destruction of irreplaceable cultural materials, 2) to enhance the role of culture in strengthening national identities, 3) to tap the educational potential of museums and traditional performing arts, and 4) to increase possible economic benefits from tourism. Following the surveys' recommendations, the program focused on preserving regional cultural infrastructures and strengthening archeological, historical, and museological skills.

Two types of grants resulted from the South and Southeast Asian programs: those given to bolster national infrastructures and technical skills, and those given to develop outreach activities, thus broadening audiences and increasing the base of public and private support. Of the two, the technical projects ultimately proved more successful, casting cultural ventures in the traditional mold of foundation efforts to train national and international managerial elites.

Particular emphasis was placed on the need to "return Asian archeology to Asians" and to strengthen conservation skills. Training grants, aimed at realizing these goals, offered new career opportunities. By the 1970s, World Bank loan agreements required that preliminary archeological surveys be made of major development

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sites, while projects such as the restoration of Borobodur in Indonesia provided a range of new jobs for qualified researchers. Yet, despite growing interest in the problem, the region's training resources were clearly inadequate: Indonesia had only two archeologists with Ph.D.s, while over 1,000 candidates applied for 35 graduate positions in Gadjah Mada University's new Department of Archeology. In response, Ford created a fellowship program for Southeast Asian archeologists at the University of Pennsylvania's University Museum, improved the training capabilities at the National Museum in the Philippines and Indonesia's National Institute of Archeology, assisted the archeology department at Gadjah Mada, and funded additional training activities under the auspices of the Asian Cultural Council. Grants were also given to individual archeologists, and to museological and historical conservation programs throughout South and Southeast Asia.

Increasing local support and building new cultural coalitions proved more difficult. The idea of using grants to generate local donations had a particularly American ring to it, since U.S. foundations have traditionally sought to turn successful projects over to public sponsorship instead of supplying ongoing operating support. Transferring this idea to foreign grantees often proved a formidable task in the face of competing educational and social demands and limited tax incentives. Nonetheless, the Foundation sought to develop local sources of support to ensure the program's survival after its funding was withdrawn.

To this end, the Foundation gave a grant to the Press Foundation of Asia (PFA), for an experimental program to train Southeast Asian journalists in cultural reporting. Participants were to be instructed in the political, social, and cultural significance of the region's historic and artistic treasures, in the hope that they might help to increase public understanding—and support—of conservation efforts. Since a grant had previously been given to PFA to strengthen development reporting, the proposed cultural grant seemed a logical progression. Funding was provided for a two-month traveling seminar featuring lectures, site visits, and writing assignments. Special training was to be given in art history, after which the participants themselves would be given the opportunity to observe museum and archeological work.

A subsequent evaluation of the grant revealed some of the frustrations inherent in attempts to generate interest in a new field. Since

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many of the journalists selected had neither the academic background nor the intellectual commitment necessary to pursue this line of reporting, they soon drifted into different fields, and the association's commitment quickly waned. Although the idea had initially seemed quite sound, the PFA was clearly not the appropriate mechanism for cultural education. The Foundation had tried to mold an existing institution to fit an imported idea, and failed.

In some instances, new organizations were created to carry out the Foundation's aims and aid in the task of selection. Grants funneled through these institutions tended to be small, and given for a variety of purposes, from local artistic performances to efforts to preserve traditional theatrical, musical, dance, and visual art forms. The Council for Living Traditions (CLT) provides an example: founded in 1974 by a group of Filipino humanists with encouragement, advice, and funding from Ford, it sought to identify the country's most urgent cultural needs; to set research priorities; to increase public awareness of the value of cultural resources; and to provide training opportunities and incentives for scholars and craftsmen. In keeping with Ford's emphasis on self-support, funding for the Council's activities was to be transferred to local donors as the work progressed.

Although several projects were completed under the Council's auspices, local backing failed to materialize. In order to avoid governmental interference, the group had intentionally kept a low profile, which hampered efforts to generate popular support. Added to this were managerial problems: although begun with a fair amount of enthusiasm, the Council suffered from attrition, and those who remained gradually lost interest. By 1981, the members "were frank in their appraisal that the CLT should now gracefully phase itself out having fulfilled its mandate to the best of its ability given the institutional limitations it suffers." The Council's demise, and that of its Indonesian counterpart, the Traditional Arts Committee, exemplified the difficulty of creating cultural advocacy groups abroad.[32]

Subsequent evaluations of the Foundation's first decade of international cultural development efforts noted that many of the program's goals were still poorly defined. According to one staff member, ". . . stating that preservation is our purpose was hardly helpful in deciding how to decide what to preserve." Funding levels presented another prickly set of issues. Clearly, Ford's outlays were modest in proportion to the problems they sought to redress. Some representa-

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tives claimed that the grants were too small to make a genuine impact, calling them "peanuts." Although Ford's commitment to cultural programs had grown, funding levels for these activities remained well below those of other programs.[33]

Government support was often equally inadequate, as was the response of the international donor community. Few countries were as culture conscious as India, with its well-developed archeological survey inherited from the British Raj, its sophisticated institutional resources, its growing private cultural support exemplified by the public-spirited Tata clan, and its increasing governmental outlays. Cultural support in the Philippines under Marcos was erratic and highly selective, and while the Suharto regime looked upon cultural endeavors with increasing favor, most public funding continued to flow into more technically-oriented development programs. Moreover, governments in impoverished areas such as Pakistan and Bangladesh continued to maintain an icy indifference to cultural preservation, concentrating instead on the immediate concerns of economic development.

Among international donors, only UNESCO, the Asian Cultural Council (an outgrowth of the JDR 3rd Fund), and Ford consistently made funds available for cultural development, with additional contributions occasionally supplied by the Southeast Asian Museum Organization, the United Nations Development Program, and the Asia Foundation. Although the impetus for these activities was largely derived from changing attitudes toward the Third World, once they were translated into concrete programs they often failed to win the public and private backing they merited.

Nonetheless, few of the Foundation's Asian representatives questioned the basic worth of supporting cultural development, particularly since Ford was one of the few international donors with both the resources and the flexibility to undertake such a program. Efforts to save irreplaceable treasures could, it was felt, benefit both recipient nations and the rest of the world, and, despite the lack of indigenous funding, local people generally agreed that such projects were valuable and worthy of continued support. Although never considered a priority in the sense of Ford's domestic Humanities and Arts program, foreign cultural activities had achieved a degree of permanence and legitimacy within the Foundation's programs by the end of the 1970s.

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IV

The central issue in Ford's overseas cultural activities since their inception was the search for a justifiable rationale. In the 1950s, when the world was still recovering from the devastation brought about by Hitler, by Hiroshima, by the descent of the Iron Curtain, and by Mao's victory in China, cultural interchange seemed to provide a means of furthering the quest for peace. The Foundation's first international cultural projects were therefore couched in the idiom of the Cold War. Within this context, arts and humanities grants were seen as a means of forging a world community devoted to democratic aims, and of strengthening indigenous ideologies—ranging from Buddhism to the "African personality"—to serve as nationalistic buffers against imported ideologies.

As the passions of the Cold War cooled, such reasoning no longer seemed appropriate, and notions such as Hutchins's belief that ". . . war would be less likely" if people from different countries understood each other better appeared naive to many observers. Steeped in designs for international economic development, Foundation policymakers dropped cultural concerns from their list of overseas grantmaking priorities. The few arts and humanities grants made in this negative milieu failed to coordinate with Ford's broader programs in any sustained or systematic way. The Foundation's relationship to the U.S. government also changed, diminishing in importance as the government's own resources grew. By the 1970s the practice of supporting programs that government could not fund—such as the Indian art show, or the Pali project in Burma—had become less common.[34]

The more comprehensive cultural initiatives pursued after 1967 represented a negative response to purely economic and political development activities rather than a vote of confidence for cultural concerns. By the late 1960s, many of the certainties inherent in the old liberalism were gone, displaced by disillusionment with the slow pace of modernization, with the war in Vietnam, with growing domestic social unrest, and with the splintering of non-aligned nations into myriad cliques, cabals, and authoritarian regimes. By the end of the decade, it had become increasingly evident that the treatment of "all peoples as abstract pieces in the universalistic American dream" was no longer appropriate.[35]

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As the international scene grew increasingly complex, the quest for newer, more specialized definitions of community assumed fresh urgency. The notion of cultural development was appealing in this context because it could accommodate a variety of aspirations, prescriptions, and goals. Many of the resulting programs resembled the Foundation's other development campaigns to strengthen national infrastructures and technical skills. Museums, universities, and government archeological departments provided stable conduits for foundation funds; arts organizations, on the other hand, were hampered by "... their weak bargaining position in the competition for scarce public funds, the lack of a tradition of private support, and the scarcity of professionally-trained personnel." Both the quality of their activities and the breadth and lifespan of their contributions were unpredictable. Above all, work with these institutions revealed the problems inherent in translating the concept of "cultural development" into workable forms.[36]

Born as a reaction to untempered technical and economistic modernization campaigns, the notion of cultural development ultimately achieved its greatest legitimacy when linked to technical pursuits; it became acceptable because it could often be molded to such traditional foundation goals as fostering technical capacities and training managerial elites. Indeed, during the 1980s, the Foundation would tighten the bonds still further, seeking new ways to wed the cause of culture to development aims.

ENDNOTES

[1]Analysis of these grants is based on Ford's computer printout on "International Division Support for the Arts," including all donations of $25,000 or more, a few of the more interesting smaller grants, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which received only partial listing on the database. Estimates for the period prior to 1980 are drawn from Francis X. Sutton, "Foundations and Cultural Development in the Third World," in Kathleen D. McCarthy, ed., *Philanthropy and Culture: The International Foundation Perspective* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), pp. 143, 140, and *The Ford Foundation, International Division: Summary Tables FY 1981 and Comparisons with Earlier Years* (New York: The Ford Foundation, September 30, 1982). The relationship between changing development paradigms and foundation activities is suggested in Francis X. Sutton, "Rationality, Development and Scholarship," *Items* 36 (December, 1982), pp. 49–57. For a fuller description of foundations and public policymaking, see Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "The American Philanthropic

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Foundation and the Public Sphere, 1890–1930," *Minerva* 19 (Summer, 1981), pp. 236–270. The history of foundation support for domestic humanities programs is discussed in Kathleen D. McCarthy, "The Short and Simple Annals of the Poor: Foundation Funding for the Humanities, 1900–1983," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 129 (March, 1985), pp. 3–8.

[2]H. Rowan Gaither, ed., "Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program," Volume II: "Report of the Humanities Division," unpublished ms., The Ford Foundation, New York, 1949.

[3]Robert Maynard Hutchins, memo to H. Rowan Gaither and Dyke Brown, April 13, 1953, Ford Foundation Archives (hereafter cited as FFA), PA53-227.

[4]Paul G. Hoffman, *Peace Can be Won* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1951), passim.

[5]For further analysis of the role of foundations in fostering cultural diplomacy, see Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Malcolm L. Richardson, "The Humanities and International Understanding: Some Reflections on the Experience of the Rockefeller Foundation," in McCarthy, *Philanthropy and Culture,* pp. 25–41; and Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).

[6]Hutchins, memo to Gaither and Brown, April 13, 1953, FFA PA53-227.

[7]Ibid. Funding for the Chekhov Publishing House venture totaled over $615,000 by the time the program received its terminal grant in 1956.

[8]J. Laughlin, letter to Shepard Stone, May 17, 1954, p. 2, FFA PA 54-154.

[9]J. Laughlin, letter to Dyke Brown, October 11, 1952, p. 2, FFA PA52-86.

[10]Intercultural Publications, Inc., Docket Excerpt, February 23, 1953 p. 1, FFA PA53-33; Intercultural Publications, Inc., Docket Excerpt, July 15–16, 1952, p. 2, FFA PA53-227.

[11]"Comments on Proposal for *Perspectives, U.S.A.,*" Intercultural Publications, Inc., Docket Excerpt, Section "E", February 4, 1952, FFA PA52-86, pp. 1,3,6; J. Laughlin to Milton Katz, April 15, 1952, FFA PA52-86.

[12]Docket Excerpt, February 23–27, 1953, FFA PA53-33; Hutchins, Memo to Gaither and Brown, April 13, 1953, FFA PA53-227; Docket Excerpt, October, 1952, pp. 1–2 FFA PA53-33.

[13]Intercultural Publications, Inc., Docket Excerpt, February 23–27, 1953, p. 5, FFA PA53-33; "Books for India" Docket Excerpt, October 1952, p. 1, FFA PA53-33.

[14]Congress for Cultural Freedom, Free Hungarian Orchestra, Docket Excerpt, September 25, 1958, p. 3, FFA PA58-369; Craufurd Goodwin, memo to files, "Evaluation International Association for Cultural Freedom, "November 3, 1977, p. 1, FFA PA57-395; Congress for Cultural Freedom, Docket Excerpt, September 27–28, 1957, I, "Summary of Congress Activities," p. 1, FFA PA57-395.

[15]Don K. Price, "Memorandum to Mr. Gaither: Notes on a Trip Across Asia," p. 3, January 19, 1955, FFA Report #009421; Edwin G. Arnold and Dyke Brown, FFA Report #003367, "Indonesia and Burma," September 21, 1952, pp. 3, 27. However, Price was also quick to point out that indigenous religions might "also be a handicap to the Asian nations' own efforts to modernize themselves in technical and economic and administrative ways."

[16]Abbott Low Moffatt, letter to Paul Hoffman, February 4, 1952, p. 3, FFA PA53-152; Arnold and Brown, Report, p. 34.

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[17]John Scott Everton, letter to John B. Howard, January 5, 1954, p. 6, FFA PA53-152.

[18]David Heaps, "Evaluation: International Association for Cultural Freedom," memo to Francis X. Sutton, June 21, 1978, FFA PA57-395, p. 2. For an insightful analysis of the Foundation's "nation-building" activities during these years see Francis X. Sutton, *The Role of Foundations in Development* (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University, 1982).

[19]F.F. Hill, memo to Verne S. Atwater, George F. Gant, and J. Donald Kingsley, "Cultural Grants," February 13, 1964, "Education and Research—Cultural Development/Humanities and the Arts" FFA Box #10414.

[20]Francis X. Sutton, "The African Program in French Africa," November 25, 1959, FFA Report #000218, p. 4.

[21]F. Champion Ward, memo to Francis X. Sutton, "Grant to Research and Document Center, Guinea," May 29, 1961, FFA PA61-325, citing opinions of Donald Dumont of the State Department and William Atwood, the American Ambassador to Guinea.

[22]Francis X. Sutton, memo to Robert Edwards, May 19, 1975, FFA PA61-325. Curt Wolters, memo to Haldore Hanson, April 2, 1971, p. 4, FFA PA61-325; Robert H. Edwards, memo to David Bell, April 21, 1975, FFA PA61-325.

[23]James A. Gardner, memo to William D. Carmichael, June 20, 1972, p. 3, quoting letter from William D. Carmichael to the International Association for Cultural Freedom, February 1971, FFA PA68-335.

[24]Ford Foundation, "Information Paper: OD Self-Study," FFA Report #002714, December, 1966, part I, p. 9.

[25]Dennis W. Brogan, quoted in I. Robert Sinai, *In Search of the Modern World* (New York: New American Library, 1967), p. 207.

[26]Clifford Geertz, "After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in New States," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 235; Guy Hunter, *South-East Asia: Race, Culture, and Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 169; Melville J. Herskovits, *Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism* (New York: Random House, 1972), passim.

[27]Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, pp. 249, 243; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: The Grove Press, 1963), p. 210. See also, C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

[28]Alexander Heard, letter to Francis X. Sutton, January 26, 1976, p. 3; Ensminger, quoted in "OD Self-Study," (1966), p. 17; Barry D. Gaberman, memo of evaluation, January 28, 1975, FFA PA72-43, p. 5.

[29]David Bell, memo, October 29, 1974, p. 27; Francis X. Sutton, memo to David Bell, August 1, 1967, p. 3, "Education and Research: Cultural Development/Humanities and the Arts," FFA Box #10414.

[30]Douglas Ensminger, "The Sensitivity of the Ford Foundation Contributing to India's Art and Cultural Programs," in Ensminger Oral History, June 21, 1972, p. 1, unpublished ms, File B 12, FFA.

[31]David E. Bell, memo to McGeorge Bundy, October 29, 1974, p. 2, "Education and Research: Cultural Development/Humanities and the Arts," FFA Box #10414; Stanley J. O'Connor, "The Arts in Southeast Asia: An Exploration," FFA Report #003780, February, 1970, p. 9. The Asia and the Pacific program remained far in the lead. Cultural grantmaking in Latin America continued to be sporadic throughout the 1970s. A number of isolated grants were also made in Africa

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during the 1970s, including support for Chinua Achebe's Nigerian-based literary journal, *Okike*.

[32]William J. Klausner, memo to files, January 29, 1981, p. 3, FFA PA75-18.

[33]Carolyn M. Elliott, "Ford Foundation Meeting on Arts and Culture in Asia," (Bangkok, June 4, 1980), memo to Messrs. Bresnan, Geithner, Lanier, Staples, et al., June 24, 1980, p. 12.

[34]Robert M. Hutchins, memo to Rowan Gaither and Dyke Brown, April 13, 1953, FFA PA53-227.

[35]William Gordon Bowen, quoted in François Duchêne, *The Endless Crisis* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 166.

[36]Asian Cultural Council, RGA, March 26, 1981, p. 3, FFA PA81-396.

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Alan Pifer

Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Changing Times

No man of vision will seek to tie the endowment which he gives to a fixed cause. He will leave to the judgment of his trustees, as time goes on, the question of modifying or changing the nature of the trust, so as to meet the requirements of the time. Any board of trustees is likely to become indifferent or careless or to make wrong decisions. In the perpetual trust, as in all human institutions, there will be fruitful seasons and slack seasons. But as long as it exists there will come from time to time, men into its control and management who will have vision and energy and wisdom, and the perpetual foundation will have a new birth of usefulness and service.

IN THESE WORDS, Andrew Carnegie, the great Scottish-American industrialist, set forth a timeless and immutable precept for effective philanthropy. From his extensive experience in the art of giving, he understood thoroughly that if the great fortune—at the time the world's largest—he was committing to public benefit was to continue to serve constructive purposes on into the far distant future, he must build the capacity for flexibility and self-renewal into the very fabric of the institutions he created. In the final analysis, this could be accomplished, he saw, only by giving broad discretion to his

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trustees and their successors down through the years to use the funds as they thought best in the light of the needs of their times. This could not guarantee perpetual vitality, but it was the best hope for it. To be alert, therefore, not only to the requirements of its own times, but also to future needs, has always been the hallmark of responsible philanthropic trusteeship.

Well and good. Few now question the enormous achievements over the past century of Mr. Carnegie's type of philanthropy—the endowment of major cultural, medical, and intellectual institutions and the grant programs of the great foundations created by Carnegie and others, guided by the able, self-perpetuating boards he envisioned. But how are we to define philanthropy realistically in today's ethos? Certainly, there is far more to it in contemporary life than simply the generosity and good works of the super rich. Indeed, of the approximately $66 billion given annually now for charitable purposes by individual Americans—which is 82.7 percent of total giving, since only 5.4 percent is donated by foundations, 5.4 percent by corporations, and 6.5 percent in the form of bequests—the great bulk is provided by people of quite ordinary means. In fact, over half of the $66 billion is given by people whose incomes fall in the bottom three-fifths of the income scale.

How is the $80 billion of annual giving from all sources distributed? In 1985, religion received 47.2 percent of the total, health and hospitals 14.1 percent, education 13.8 percent, social service 10.7 percent, arts and humanities 6.4 percent, civic and public affairs 2.8 percent, and all others 4.9 percent. Since individual giving represents such a large proportion of the total, the distribution pattern for that sector of philanthropy is no doubt quite similar.

While, as indicated, nearly half of all giving was to religious institutions, these donations include a substantial amount given through churches and synagogues for social welfare purposes. The other half of the annual total includes an astonishing range of educational, cultural, and research institutions, health and welfare agencies, and worthy causes of one ilk or another.

There is also the matter of donations of time, through volunteering of various kinds. A study by Independent Sector, Inc. showed that in 1985 some 89 million Americans contributed unpaid service to a voluntary organization, worth an estimated $110 billion. The American Cancer Society reports that in 1985 it had 2,474,160 volunteers,

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the American Heart Association 2,200,000, the National Council of the Boy Scouts 1,086,161, the Salvation Army 912,000, and the Boys Clubs of America 125,000. Although some kinds of service are of far greater value than others, and the 89 million figure could, perhaps, be a bit inflated, there is no doubt that, in the aggregate, volunteering is an activity of enormous dimensions and of tremendous importance to the society.

Finally, in rounding out our definition of philanthropy, we come to the myriad of charitable institutions and organizations, at least 300,000 of them, existing for a very wide range of purposes, that are the beneficiaries of charitable giving. Should they be included in a discussion of philanthropy? In general, I am inclined to think that they should be, because the activity we call philanthropy cannot be confined simply to the act of *giving*. It also includes an inextricable element of *doing*—doing by individuals when they volunteer their services and doing by organizations and institutions, supported by gifts from foundations, corporations, and the general public or the income from past gifts of endowment by wealthy donors such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller. Philanthropy, indeed, without recipient institutions to impart substance, form, and reality to it, is a meaningless concept.

Including recipient institutions in our definition of philanthropy does, however, raise the question of its relationship to the broad concept of voluntarism. Are the two essentially the same? Often they appear to be at the operational level, but at bottom they are quite different, because the motivations behind them are quite different.

In the case of philanthropy, the motivation behind it is altruism, or concern for the welfare of others. This is a trait that, as far as we know, has characterized the human species since its earliest origins. Certainly, it has been present in all civilizations, and is a recognized aspect of all the world's great religions. It is among the noblest of human virtues.

Private voluntary association for publicly beneficial purposes, however, while it often contains elements of altruism, is usually the product of other motivations and human characteristics as well—individualism, self-reliance, distrust of government, or simply impatience with public authority and eagerness to get on with the job.

The spirit of voluntary association for the common good, though not peculiar to the United States, has always been a prominent feature

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of the American ethos, so prominent, in fact, as to have almost infallibly occasioned comment by foreign visitors to our shores. Since no discussion of voluntarism by an American can possibly be considered authentic without at least one reference to Alexis de Tocqueville, he must, of course, be mentioned here! Without question, he was the most astute foreign observer ever to write about the American people—although all of twenty-six years old when he visited the young American republic in 1831. Among his many penetrating observations about us, recorded in his work, *Democracy in America,* were his comments on the propensity of Americans to form associations for publicly beneficial purposes, a phenomenon that is as impressive today as it was a century and a half ago at the time of Tocqueville's visit.

It should be noted, however, that in those days the role of government in the United States was extremely limited, which, in the Jeffersonian tradition, was considered both normal and desirable. Thus, if there was a need for something of a public nature to be done, it was as likely that a private association would be formed to do it as for a suggestion to be made that government respond.

Over the years, nevertheless, the private association has become far more than simply an alternative to action by the state. At a deeper level, firmly grounded as it is in the rights to free speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, it has become a fundamental part of our American concept of a democratic society, complementing the role played by representative political institutions based on the universal franchise.

Whether tax-exempt, nongovernmental, not-for-profit activity in the United States is more the product of altruism or of voluntarism is perhaps not of overriding importance. What is important is that, between them, these two powerful impulses have spawned a vast number of charitable organizations and institutions through which we accomplish some of our nation's most important purposes. Indeed, this area of activity, forming a triad with the business and governmental sectors to that end, has become so important that it has acquired a distinctive name, the independent sector, to delineate it, and an umbrella organization with the same title, Independent Sector, Inc., to give a sense of unity to the disparate entities that make up the sector and to represent their interests with the legislative and executive branches of our federal government in Washington.

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Fundamental to the growth of the independent sector in the United States has unquestionably been the tax-exempt status of the philanthropic and voluntary organizations of which it is composed, and the deductibility for tax purposes of gifts to these bodies. Despite several attempts over the years to restrict these tax provisions, the charitable exemption and deduction—because they enjoy wide public support—have proven to be highly durable features of American public policy.

The immense value of these tax provisions to organizations that can qualify for them has served as a powerful force in recent decades toward a broadening of the definition of charitable activity in the tax code. In 1959, Treasury Department regulations extended this definition from the traditional "relief of the poor and distressed and advancement of education and religion" to include a broad new range of activities such as the defense of human and civil rights and the combatting of community deterioration.

A decade later, during consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there was intense debate over the question of whether private philanthropic foundations should be allowed to lobby or to make grants that supported voter education or that had a bearing on the formation of public policy. While limitations were placed on the ability of foundations to lobby, their general right to support voter education and activities having to do with public policy formation was clarified and confirmed. A year later, in 1970, the right of tax-exempt public interest law firms to engage in advocacy by the use of litigation and other forms of legal action was established.

Finally, in 1976, after a five-year battle, legislation was enacted that greatly liberalized the rules allowing public charities—that is, generally, those organizations that receive their support from donations by the public at large—to present their views directly to the Congress or to other legislative bodies without fear of losing their tax-exempt status. In introducing that very important piece of legislation, Senator Edmund Muskie said:

> Today the business community spends enormous sums of money trying to influence public opinion and Congress on legislative matters. Yet public interest groups, conservation groups and other nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations speaking for other parts of our society, have their voices stifled by the tax code. Why should the government encourage private business to communicate with Congress by making lobbying a business expense which can be deducted from taxes, while preventing strong efforts of public-

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interest groups to speak to law makers by removing their tax-exempt status when they raise their voices?. . .

If we are to maintain a democratic form of government in practice, and if Congress is to reach reasoned judgments on the important issues before it, we must be sure that every segment of our society is able to communicate with Congress.

All in all, there can be little doubt that broadening the definition of charity in the tax code and extending the domain of permissible activity in the development of public policy by tax-exempt organizations has been good for the nation. There have been abuses, to be sure, and some people have had to come to terms with the fact that charitable status can be used as legitimately to advance reactionary as progressive causes. Nonetheless, allowing independent sector organizations to play a more significant public policy role has enriched and strengthened the nation's administrative, legislative, and even judicial processes and has added important new safeguards to the preservation of American democracy.

Let us look now at the present state of the independent sector, as it has been affected by and has responded to changing economic, political, and social conditions. Indeed, one cannot address the question of philanthropy in today's changing world without reference to what is happening to the independent sector generally, so closely are the two intertwined.

As indicated, the independent sector is very large and extraordinarily diverse, being made up of organizations and institutions concerned with education, research, health care, welfare, the arts, culture, the environment, recreation, day care, and many other fields. Although expenditure by the sector as a proportion of the GNP is small in comparison with the governmental and business sectors, its annual outlays, currently about $131 billion, are far from negligible. Paradoxically, the largest source of financial support for the sector is government, followed by service fees, dues, and charges, then by charitable donations from individuals, and finally, gifts from foundations and corporations.

Although many of the institutions that make up the sector have long histories, a surprisingly large proportion of the sector is of recent origin, being composed of organizations and institutions established in the past twenty-five years—the period that also saw the burgeon-

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ing of the American welfare state. In fact, there is a close connection between the two phenomena. Contrary to popular belief, the growth of government spending did not make the nongovernmental sector redundant or anachronistic but, in fact, stimulated its growth and led to the development of a broad partnership between the two—a partnership that, overall, has proven to be a remarkably effective way to get a number of important things accomplished in the nation.

Despite this success, it is clear that the future of the partnership between public and voluntary effort is in considerable doubt, having fallen victim to a sharp reduction in federal funds available through grants and contracts to private organizations. From 1982 to 1985, according to a recent study, federal support for nonprofit organizations, exclusive of that provided through the big health-care programs, Medicare and Medicaid, dropped $17 billion below the level of 1980. Social service organizations lost $9 billion, or more than 35 percent of their federal aid, and organizations concerned with housing and neighborhood improvement lost a similar percentage. This reduction in public support for voluntary effort came during a period when President Reagan was urging the voluntary sector to take on a much larger share of responsibility for social welfare. Thus, paradoxically, just when more was being asked of the sector, its capacity to respond was severely weakened by a dramatic reduction of its chief source of financial support—governmental funding. On the face of it, this seems a curious contradiction in the pursuit of public policy objectives.

In no regard has the erosion of the public/private partnership been more severe than in the area of assistance—social services, job training, counseling, legal aid, nutrition, health care, and so on—to the poor, the near poor, and especially young people living in poverty. Some voluntary organizations operating in these fields have made a valiant effort to keep up their services by trying to increase their private support, an effort, however, that has had only limited success. In the main, foundations and corporations, believing that their resources can be better used for other purposes, have not regarded it as their responsibility to assume the continuing burden of meeting basic welfare needs of the poor, and the increase in donations from the public at large for this purpose has fallen a long way short of replacing the lost government funding.

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Many voluntary organizations, therefore, faced with having to close their doors, have adopted the expedient of reducing or eliminating their free services and expanding delivery of services to those who can afford to pay for them. Consequently, the poor have suffered a double blow—a reduction, first, of direct help from government, followed then by the loss of assistance from voluntary organizations caused, in turn, by their loss of government funding. In no respect does this development offer greater cause for concern than in the case of children, where their declining numbers in a rapidly aging population should make them our most important resource.

Yet another aspect of the changing environment within which the independent sector must now operate is the growth in recent years of interest in "privatization"—the deliberate stimulation by government, either through regulation or financial incentive, of for-profit, proprietary human service delivery systems that might otherwise be the province of government itself or the voluntary sector.

The notion that someone should be allowed to make a profit from the provision of basic human services that in most instances people have little alternative in seeking has generally been quite foreign to American experience—except, of course, for the all-important status of physicians and certain other types of health practitioners as independent entrepreneurs. The assumption has been that human services should be provided by public or voluntary agencies, the former because they have a direct responsibility to the public, the latter because they are considered to be invested with a public trust and to seek no special advantage for themselves.

There were, of course, in addition to physicians, a few exceptions to this prevailing pattern—some proprietary nursing homes, a few proprietary hospitals, and a range of for-profit technical and vocational training schools. In general, however, in those human service areas where professional training and professional ethics are of central importance, public and voluntary agencies have had the field to themselves.

Although there is probably still some skepticism, even antipathy, on the part of many Americans toward proprietary institutions, there is no doubt that the market for proprietary services is growing apace. In the health-care field, for example, investor-owned hospital chains now control a sizable proportion of hospital beds, and profit-making ambulatory care facilities are also expanding rapidly. This

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growth has been stimulated by the burgeoning demand for human services of all kinds, by the availability of third party funding, and by public disillusionment with some traditional service deliverers.

It has also been influenced by the actions of public officials at all three levels of government, some of whom are motivated primarily by ideological commitment to free enterprise, some of whom believe the profit-making sector can deliver services at less cost and more efficiently, and some of whom simply see in privatization a convenient way to reduce public expenditure and thereby avoid the politically distasteful necessity of voting taxes.

The future of for-profit human service delivery—whether or not it continues to be aided and encouraged by government—is hard to predict. On one hand, it may be demonstrated that some services can be provided by the business sector more efficiently, with more consideration for the consumer and at less ultimate cost to the taxpayer. On the other, there is clearly the considerable public policy issue involved that for-profit services may tend to skim off those clients who have insurance or personal resources, leaving the uninsured and the needy to public and voluntary institutions. This could not only undermine the latter's financial viability but would very likely before long lead to the development of a two-tier system of service—a good one for those who can pay and a poor one, or even none at all, for those who cannot. In proprietary service delivery *profitability* inevitably has to be the principal criterion by which an activity is judged, demoting to secondary importance those traditional and, some would say, essential elements of a proper human service delivery system such as equity, compassion, and personal financial disinterest on the part of the provider.

The important issue of whether the delivery of human services should be confined to public and voluntary agencies or should be shared with the proprietary sector has, thus, now been clearly posed and will almost certainly be the cause of some bitter battles in the period ahead, involving not only the immediate protagonists but employers, trade unions, clients, and elected officials as well.

One might suppose that these changes in the social, political, and economic environment within which independent sector institutions must now operate—changes that have affected the poor and the unfortunate so adversely—would have troubled our national conscience. While there has been an effort by many churches and

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voluntary organizations to provide shelter to the ever-increasing numbers of homeless people and food to the hungry, the public generally seems only moderately concerned by the plight of the unfortunate. This, perhaps, is the result of an effort in recent years to discredit the poor, to portray them as societal parasites whose destitution is solely the result of their own laziness or moral delinquency. There is also, no doubt, a disturbing element of racism in current attitudes. Whatever the origins of the present public mood, reversion to the classic stance of blaming the victims of poverty rather than trying to eradicate its causes seems, once again—as it has throughout history—to be providing a convenient excuse for ignoring the needs of the poor and the unfortunate.

The paradox today of continuing poverty or near poverty for so many, perhaps as much as a quarter of the population, in the midst of unparalleled affluence for many others, brings to the fore once again two quite fundamental and interrelated questions that have agitated the political life of our country as well as that of other Western democracies for many decades. The first is whether social welfare should, in the main, be a collective responsibility of the entire population, exercised through the institutions of government, or a private responsibility of the individual, the family, and private charity. The second is the issue of whether the free market, if only it is allowed to operate in an unrestricted manner, will not bring such economic benefits to the entire citizenry that governmental social welfare programs will be unnecessary.

These questions, many thought until recently, were answered once and for all several decades ago. It was believed then that in a complex, highly developed society such as ours, with its inevitable wide disparities of income distribution, its periodic economic recessions, and its manifest market failures, private enterprise and private charity could never meet social needs adequately and should not be expected to. Only government could do that. It seemed obvious.

Now, however, in the face of new currents of thought, one cannot be sure that these answers are the prevailing public philosophy. One has to wonder whether today's public attitudes are simply a natural reaction to perceived excesses of the welfare state that will have no long term consequences or whether they represent something more fundamental: a reversion, perhaps, to a nineteenth-century laissez-faire, social Darwinian philosophy that would leave the well-being of

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society essentially to the workings of a free market economy, supplemented by private charity for the "deserving" poor, and would deny the legitimacy of any governmental social welfare role at all.

This is a large question and one to which the answer may not be wholly clear for some time to come. It may be that the pendulum of public opinion will continue to swing away from belief in the efficacy of the welfare state. That is possible. On the other hand, having reduced benefits to the poor about as much as is possible without endangering public order, those who would like to see the government's social role reduced even further must now confront the thorny question of middle-class benefits. It is one thing for politicians to jettison programs for the poor, quite another to deprive middle-class voters of benefits on which they have come to depend as an integral part of their standard of living. In one case, political power is negligible; in the other, it is enormous, and the reality now is that close to half of all American households are receiving one or more types of benefit, either cash or in-kind, from the federal government.

It may be, therefore, that we have reached a kind of stasis in which there will, for the foreseeable future, be no further erosion of the welfare state but also no restoration of the reductions that have already been made in it—leaving the disadvantaged as the principal losers; this would not be surprising.

There is also the possibility that discontent with the welfare state is, in fact, not really caused by any widespread perception that it has failed and needs to be discarded, but is simply the product of an indiscriminate disillusionment with the institutions of government generally.

If that is the case, we may, before long, see a revived interest in an affirmative social role for government, as the nation's social problems continue to grow and fester and as confidence in government necessarily returns.

These, then, are the principal characteristics of the current environment for philanthropy: an apparent decline of compassion for the unfortunate and neglect of the needs of children; dissolution of the public/private partnership as a mechanism for attacking social ills as a result of federal budget cuts; a turning to the needs of middle-class clients and to profit-making activities by voluntary agencies, to ensure their survival; the development of a faddish interest in privatization of human services, with what consequences we know not; and considerable uncertainty about the future of the welfare state.

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In these circumstances, there will be—indeed, there already is—heavy pressure on philanthropy to revert to its earlier role as a major provider of charity in the old-fashioned sense of relief to the elderly poor, the destitute, the homeless, the hungry, and the handicapped.

There will be some, of course, perhaps many, who will have no qualms about seeing the welfare burden pass from government to the philanthropic sector, since they believe that old-fashioned charity is the proper function of philanthropy. This, they will say, is what philanthropy *ought* to be doing rather than trying, through stimulation of social action, shaping of public opinion, monitoring government, lobbying, and so on, to influence the development of public policies designed to affect social change. Such people are not likely to understand that, even if the entire resources of philanthropy were devoted to basic welfare purposes, they would be able to replace only a tiny fraction of what government is providing.

Nor are they likely to be aware of the damage that would be done to the independent sector at large were the entire, or virtually the entire, resources of philanthropy to be channeled into welfare alone—important as it is that some philanthropic funds be devoted to such a purpose. While philanthropic giving does not loom all that large in the present financing of many independent sector institutions and organizations, the importance of the philanthropic contribution is out of all proportion to its size, because it provides that very margin of uncommitted income that allows the independent sector to *be* independent and thereby to perform its many vitally important roles in our national life—roles such as serving as an effective critic of, and a restraining influence on, the governmental and business sectors, encouraging individuality, providing a sanctuary for unorthodox opinion and freedom of expression, being a watchdog for the nation by calling the public's attention to wrongdoing and dangerous practices, setting and enforcing professional standards in a number of fields, providing variety and choice in the arts and education, serving as the locus for truly independent research uncontaminated by the political process, and, most importantly, providing a margin for experimentation and innovation. All of these roles, so essential to the maintenance of an open, free, and dynamic society, would be jeopardized were the limited and very precious resources available to private philanthropy to be diverted to basic charity as the result of a desperate situation caused by the elimination of public funding.

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The picture, distressing as it is, is nevertheless not one of unrelieved gloom. On the encouraging side, there has been in recent years an enormous growth of self-help groups, there is a new interest in tackling social problems at the state and local levels, and in some depressed inner-city areas, new efforts led by nonprofit community development organizations offer hope of urban revitalization. It is also true that some nonprofit organizations involved in the partnership with government had become too dependent on federal dollars, and the leaner period they are now experiencing is enabling them to recapture that precious sense of independence that is the very essence of the independent sector.

Furthermore, while callous and short-sighted attitudes are widely evident today, so also are some of the nation's finer characteristics. Among these especially is a continued willingness on the part of many Americans to give generously for charitable purposes—which indicates that the broadly humane American spirit is not dead and will in due course re-emerge as the motivating force behind fresh efforts to create a just and compassionate society.

Whatever the future holds, it seems clear that there will continue to be a major role for philanthropy. In the short run, through its support for voluntary agencies, it can help to keep alive the caring instinct that is the test of a truly civilized society. And it can work to develop experimental new approaches to our most pressing social problems. In the longer run, when the tide of public opinion has turned back toward a concern for community and a recognition of collective responsibility for social welfare, it can help independent sector institutions and organizations build a new and better partnership with government. At that time, philanthropy will be needed as perhaps never before.

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Patrick McCaughey

Native and Nomad: Winslow Homer and John Singer Sargent

THERE IS NO MISTAKING the popularity of Winslow Homer and John Singer Sargent. The familiarity of their names appears to encourage exhibitions and publications. Last year Winslow Homer's watercolors were again the subject of a large exhibition, starting at the National Gallery of Art and ending at the Yale Art Gallery. Hard on its heels came the Whitney Museum's substantial, puzzling Sargent retrospective. Both exhibitions were deservedly popular with an audience which clearly enjoyed the images of the artists. The world of Winslow Homer and the world of John Singer Sargent drew the crowds, providing a relief from looking at every exhibition through the lens of self-improving art history.

It extends beyond that. Both contribute powerfully to the development of the American consciousness; both are representative American artists. The juxtaposition of two major exhibitions of their work provokes a fresh consideration of the "complex fate" of the American artist; each has a career and output possible only for an American artist. Yet each offers sharply opposing notions of the outcome of that "fate." They are generally so separately regarded that it comes almost as a surprise to recall how much their careers overlap. Although Homer (1836–1910) had a twenty-year start on Sargent (1856–1925), they were both well-known and share the crucial period from the late 1870s through the 1890s. While never coming into contact with each other and generally reticient in their opinions of the art of their day and, to my knowledge, never

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choosing to comment on each other's art, it is curious that contemporaries rarely thought to draw parallels between them.

The differences in their careers are sufficiently sharp to magnify the complexity of "fate." Homer, the very image of the solitary man, retreats to the isolation of Prout's Neck in Maine in 1883–4, and withdraws ever deeper into seclusion as the years go by. Even his winter forays to the South or his sketching holidays in the Adirondacks do not break his solitariness. Sargent, born into a restless, expatriate American family which moved from Florence to Geneva to Rome in the year of his birth and continued that pattern through his childhood, carried always the image of a highly social being. Charm, cultivation, cosmopolitanism are the attributes constantly mentioned by both his contemporaries and his later biographers.

Homer visited Europe twice. He spent ten months there in 1866, principally in France, and with what appear to be negligible results. In 1881–2 he lived for twenty months in England, most of the time at the northern fishing village of Cullercoats, far from the fashionable centers of art and society. This was to be a crucial time for Homer. Sargent visited America for the first time when he was twenty, in 1876; for the next fifty years he developed an irregular but unremitting transatlantic existence, drawn, it would appear, by American patronage, public and private. His second visit to America, from September 1887 till May 1888, gave him some twenty commissions to do portraits; his career in England was then only scarcely begun. A third visit to the United States for ten months in 1890 brought him twice that number of requests, together with the first big public commission, an undertaking to do the murals for the Boston Public Library. The commissions came principally from those who were socially and culturally prominent at the time. Isabella Stewart Gardner was prepared to pay $3000 for her portrait in 1888. Winslow Homer, by comparison, after the initially promising debut with *Soldiers from the Front* (1866), was struggling to sell his work. At the end of the 1870s, he was asking $1500 for his oil paintings and generally failing to sell them. His watercolors remained fairly constantly priced at $50 to $75. An occasional spectacular sale, such as *The Life Line* for $2500 in 1884, was wholly exceptional.[1] While patrons sought out Sargent, Homer had to slog his way through the commercial galleries. He exhibited regularly in the annual exhibition

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of the National Academy and the Water Color Society. Cautious, even curmudgeonly, he declined membership of the new Society of American Artists; Sargent was elected at the age of twenty-four in 1880. Homer made his own way as an artist through popular illustration and was largely self-taught as an oil painter; Sargent became the star pupil when he was only twenty at Carolus-Durand's Atelier, then among the most fashionable in Paris.

These differences in background, schooling, opportunity, and patronage can be multiplied many times; they point to even more profound differences in sensibility and consciousness. Lloyd Goodrich has rightly said of Homer, "at forty-five his greatest growth was about to begin."[2] At forty-five (at the turn of the century), Sargent's most important paintings were all behind him. His last twenty-five years elicit barely a handful of works of real quality. Homer's career culminated in the experience of the natural world, made possible by an intense solitariness. He only deepened his art through his withdrawal. Sargent enjoyed ever-increasing fame, with new demands for his talent and prestige, declining to paint the coronation of Edward VII, and then refusing a knighthood. "Sargentolatry,"[3] as Walter Sickert tersely described it in 1910, knew no bounds. Sargent suffered from "the culmination of his career at its beginning."[4]

Even Sargent's most intelligent admirer, Henry James, felt a certain unease about this in 1887, noting "the slightly uncanny spectacle of a talent which on the very threshold of its career has nothing more to learn."[5] James kept wondering "whether it be an advantage to an artist to obtain early in life such possession of his means that the struggle with them, discipline, *tatonnement,* cease to exist for him."[6] It remains the central question about Sargent today. The Whitney Retrospective serves to underscore the problem. James, in writing about Sargent's mastery, says:

> It is difficult to imagine a young painter less in the dark about his own ideal, more lucid and more responsible from the first about what he desires. In an altogether exceptional degree does he give us the sense that the intention and the art of carrying it out are for him one and the same thing.[7]

At first sight, James seems to be doing nothing more than admiring Sargent's prodigious natural gifts as a painter, his ability to render all observation in paint. There was nothing alien to his brush. Sargent's

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grasp of his subject is so readily apprehended by the viewer that we never lose touch, sight, or feel of his hand and handling. The material of his art flows directly into its *matériel.* The *louche* quality of Sargent's first Venetian scenes of 1880–1 lies both in the image and in the description. More fatally, perhaps, the high artifice of English aristocratic style and its imitation in upper middle-class taste will soon intrude into Sargent's pictorial taste. The natural painter, able to subject all observation to pictorial realization, will, in turn, fall subject to the world. For James, such a painter represented the perfect vehicle for consciousness: a temperament able to transmit the finest calibrations of mode, appearance, and feeling.

Twelve years earlier, Henry James wrote the most penetrating account of Winslow Homer. Lloyd Goodrich has said that "James recognized in Homer's work the pictorial embodiment of everything he loathed in his native land."[8] The James judgment, often quoted since Goodrich unearthed it in his 1944 monograph, is worth quoting at length. It suggests something of the fierceness and comprehensiveness of James's scrutiny:

> Before Mr. Homer's little barefoot urchins and little girls in calico sun-bonnets, straddling beneath a cloudless sky upon the national rail fence, the whole effort of the critic is instinctively to contract himself, to double himself up, as it were, so that he can creep into the problem and examine it humbly and patiently, if a trifle wonderingly. Mr. Homer's pictures, in other words, imply no explanatory sonnets; the artist turns his back squarely and frankly upon literature. In this he may be said to be typical of the general body of his fellow artists . . . Mr. Homer goes in, as the phrase is, for perfect realism, and cares not a jot for such fantastic hairsplitting as the distinction between beauty and ugliness. He is a genuine painter; that is, to see, and to reproduce what he sees, is his only care; to think, to imagine, to select, to refine, to compose, to drop into any of the intellectual tricks with which other people sometimes try to eke out the dull pictorial vision—all this Mr. Homer triumphantly avoids. He not only has no imagination, but he contrives to elevate this rather blighting negative into a blooming and honorable positive. He is almost barbarously simple, and to our eye, he is horribly ugly; but there is nevertheless something one likes about him. What is it? for ourselves, it is not his subjects—his barren plank fences, his glaring, bold blue skies, his big, dreary, vacant lots of meadows, his freckled, straight-haired Yankee urchins, his flat-breasted maidens, suggestive of a dish of rural doughnuts and pie, his calico sun-bonnets, his flannel shirts, his cowhide boots. He has chosen the least pictorial range of scenery and

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civilization; he has resolutely treated them as if they *were* pictorial, as if they were every inch as good as Capri or Tangiers; and to reward his audacity, he has incontestably succeeded.[9]

The tense ambivalence of James's account does nothing to diminish its penetration. Between James's expectations and his experience falls the shadow of Homer's truthfulness. There is no avoiding it. The pictures require "no explanatory sonnets"; the artist has turned his back on "literature"; we are left with his "realism." The catalogue of Homer's disabilities—his incapacity "to think, imagine, select . . ."—is only matched by James's detestation of his subjects. The conflict within James is precisely over Homer's Americanness. Its grip compels him to state the reasons for his admiration—so vaguely and reluctantly formulated when compared with the vehemence and penetration of his distaste. How far this is from the schooled and cultivated Sargent of Henry James's imagination, where "the freshness of youth combined with the artistic experience, really felt and assimilated, of generations."[10]

No sensibility felt more acutely the conflicting claims and allegiances of the American imagination than Henry James. Homer and Sargent mirrored that conflict. It is fundamentally the difference between the native and the nomad. The world of the native entrenches itself in its environment, as if to draw the distinctiveness of artistic production from the singularity of place. The coast of Maine, the woods of the Adirondacks are subjects that guarantee authenticity and originality precisely because they remain "an unappropriated world." To the nomad this world must appear narrow and constrained, settled rather than civilized; he flees it, forever seeking the richer textures, the subtleties and velleities of society, or the civilized landscape of leisure and relaxation. Custom and class, the ironic interplay of nature and artifice, instinct and nurture: these are the bearers of consciousness. Sargent's landscapes frequently have for their principal motif the painter painting in the landscape. It may be Monet at Giverny, Denis Bunker at Broadway, Paul Helleu at Fladbury, or Jane von Glehn at the Villa Torlonia; it is as if the natural requires the mediation of the artist to become "interesting." For Sargent, such a world has to be sought out. Restlessness, brought on by an indefatigable search for the new setting of the old world, is the burden of the nomad.

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For all of Sargent's opportunities and gifts, there is the steady failure of his art to envince a powerful and lasting consciousness. The anonymous reviewer in *The Critic* of 1886 who claimed that "he is the Henry James of portraiture and I can't help wishing he were not, as I can't help wishing that Henry James were not the Sargent of the novel" could scarcely have been more wrong about both.[11] The reasons for Sargent's decline are profoundly instructive. They reflect, in part, the patronage he sought; in part, the enterprise of the nomadic artist. The moral imagination that so deeply informed the development of Henry James's consciousness was unavailable to the painter. Without it, the fall from grace was Luciferian in scale.

Against all probability, and in increasing isolation, Winslow Homer contributed to the development of American consciousness as no other painter in the last quarter of the nineteenth century did, save Thomas Eakins. The central path through Homer's art is precisely that of a developing consciousness. From being a popular illustrator to becoming the artist able to assay the epic landscape, Homer took the human figure and placed it in the landscape, and indeed against the landscape, with a resonance that no earlier artist had achieved. What the figure became, and how its presence transformed the landscape into an arena of human consciousness, are among the more signal achievements of late nineteenth-century American art—a pictorial accomplishment equal to what Melville and Hawthorne, Whitman and Twain achieved in the description of human nature.

II

Winslow Homer's art is surprising by the narrowness of its range at any given moment in his career. He worked exclusively, almost obsessively, with a restricted group of subjects for extended periods; women and children predominated in the late 1860s and throughout the 1870s. Such a concentration was more than accidental; it is not to be explained in terms of either audience or patronage. While his early successes in dealing with the Civil War had been confined wholly to the world of men, his turn to women and children reflected his own internal reaction against these themes. For a time, Homer enjoyed nothing of the public success that his earlier Civil War pictures brought him, but the private theme remained his major domain.

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The development of his art in these important stages may be traced through his depiction of children both in his oil paintings and in his water colors. The *Kinderszenen* were fundamental parts of his artistic enterprise; they cannot be seen as simply providing an attractive opportunity for illustration. Indeed it is through his images of children that he made his way from being a popular illustrator to becoming a major figurative painter. His first watercolor subjects, of children—some produced as *Harper's Weekly* illustrations—show aptitude and skill, a kind of freshness and freedom that made watercolor mirror perfectly the new subject he had settled on.

Helen A. Cooper, in her comprehensive and suggestive catalogue *Winslow Homer Watercolors*, correctly noted that "Homer did not portray children in relation to parents; rather, he conceived of childhood as a distant period of human life in which adults played little or no part."[12] The first of these watercolors are conspicuous in their concentration on the rituals, games, and pastimes of children. The improvised clam bake on the beach, the picking of berries, bird nesting, and messing around in boats—all these comprise the sovereign world of the child. At first, the old *Harper's Weekly* illustrator undergirds the new watercolor lyricist. The charm of the scene depends greatly on the anecdote related. Steadily, through the 1870s, the anecdotal drops away, and the occasion that brings the children to mind—the game or the pursuit—is divested from the painting or watercolor; they are simply found sitting together in a field, perched on a fence, standing in an orchard. What makes these images powerful and unsentimental is the rapt concentration that Homer gives to the subjects. They are obviously deeply engrossed, frequently turning away from the viewer into a more secretive world, concentrating on an object, scene, or activity quite outside the viewer's field of consciousness. Homer holds himself back, rarely giving his children the specificity of portraits. Disguising the features of his children under those notorious sun-bonnets and broad-brimmed straw hats that Henry James so violently objected to, he makes us aware of an inward alertness on the part of these children—an alertness to each other and also to the world of their own divining. When he casts them as shepherds and shepherdesses, the pictures lapse into conventionality; they lose that sense of individual consciousness.

All this happens in a landscape bathed in the sunlight of a New England summer. The empty meadow, the flowering orchard, the

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nets and boats of the beach are all recognizably ordinary, part of the daily landscape of American reality. Where the figures are at ease in their environment, consciousness is discovered.

Paralleling his children of the 1870s are his remarkable depictions of women. Like the children, the women populate a world of their own. Privacy replaces the secretiveness of the children's world. Some of the more memorable paintings and watercolors of the late 1860s and 1870s show women reading; whether it be letters or books, they are absorbed in acts of deep concentration. They seem to share the raptness of the children in their own world. Homer, time and again, enclosed his women in safe and secure settings, whether in the landscape, or around architectural frames; they are found seated in windows, standing on porches, surrounded by a rose garden, alone in a New England schoolroom. The repetition of these enclosed settings is sufficiently marked to act powerfully on the image of the women themselves. The enclosed settings recall the *hortus conclusus*, the enclosed garden associated with certain early representations of the Virgin. It is a powerful image of chastity: the woman secured by nature or custom, inviolate and singular. Homer evokes this resonance in many of his depictions of women: they are the emblems of purity. His lighting only supports his theme. Generally, he makes his women walk or move in the same direction as the light so that they can become the exponent of the light within the picture. In major paintings, such as *The Morning Bell,* the light falls on the woman's back, obliterating the portrait qualities of the figure, with the face deeply shaded. In such instances, the women transcend the anecdotal and the particular; they are the embodiments of the light, the principal object on which it falls; they become themselves both luminous and crystalline.

There are two striking exceptions to this depiction of women as the genius of the *hortus conclusus: High Tide* (1870) and *Waiting for Dad* (1873). Both, interestingly and prophetically, introduce the marine landscape in the depiction of women. Nothing could be more alien to the *hortus conclusus* than the boundless and uncontainable sea. Both paintings convey a palpable air of apprehension, unease, fear. In *High Tide,* three fully-clothed women dry themselves at the edge of a calm, glittering sea. Homer composes his group so that each figure seems curiously discontinuous from the other two. Separated from each other, unprotected and alien from the landscape, the beach

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Winslow Homer, 1870, Eaglehead, Manchester, Mass. (also known as *High Tide*). The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Gift of Mrs. William F. Milton, 1923. (23.77.2)

becomes a landscape of uncertainty; the figures have the air of being "rescued." The transaction between figure and landscape, without narrative or anecdotal significance, creates the web of consciousness: there is a heightened awareness of the vulnerable condition of the human figure in the familiar landscape.

The suggestion of a threatening landscape in *High Tide* becomes much more explicit in *Waiting for Dad*, where the world of children and women meet at the sea's edge. Homer has the boy perched on the prow of a boat, staring and straining as he looks out to sea, presumably awaiting the return of his father, the woman standing in columnar rigidity, holding a younger child, turning away from the sea to present us with a three-quarter view of her tension-filled face. Anxiety amidst the blaze of the noon sun provides again the consciousness of figures interacting with a powerful landscape. The anxious figures become themselves the landscape of anxiety.

The turning point in Homer's career came in 1881–2 when he spent twenty months at Cullercoats, a fishing village on the northeast coast of Britain. Forty-five at the time, this was his second and last

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visit abroad. If it seems strange that the turning point in such a career should have come in England, the explanation is easily given. Cullercoats was not St. Ives. Although a picturesque fishing village, noted for the beauty of its women, this was not an artist's colony, but a true working environment. It was Homer's most sustained experience of the sea as a working, dangerous landscape. Helen A. Cooper, in perhaps the best account of the Cullercoats period, says:

> . . . in the villagers of Cullercoats he discovered a vehicle for the profound level of expression he had been seeking. . . . The inhabitants of the small fishing port, particularly the women at their daily tasks, gradually became archetypes for him, like ancient sculpture, imbued with a sober and noble simplicity. They seemed to Homer indivisible from nature and hence became his connection to nature's power.[13]

Cullercoats provided the landscape of experience, of daily labor, that coincided with his developing consciousness of the human in his relationship to landscape. Women played a key role in the cycle of labor within this village. Taking the catch at dawn from the returning men, carrying it in creels to sell in neighboring towns and villages, they mended the nets by day, and waited anxiously by the storm-tossed sea at night. Homer, exposed to this landscape for an exceptionally long period, abandoned his usual habit of wintering in the city and working through the summer and autumn sketches in his studio. Instead, he remained at Cullercoats throughout the winter of 1881–2, observing the savage world of the sea, peering over the edge of his sketchbook. The twenty months at Cullercoats were crucial for him and for his watercolors. Working almost exclusively in that medium as well as in pencil and charcoal sketches, it seemed as if he hoped to encompass experience as widely and immediately as possible. The slower and more deliberate studio work in oil painting would come much later, as the Cullercoats experience fed into his art through the 1880s and 1890s.

The heart of that experience was the discovery of a more intimate and more organic relationship between the human figure and the landscape, particularly as it focused on women. The whole of life at Cullercoats was based on the sea, which governed the rhythm of existence; the wildness and danger of fishing shaped the awareness

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both of participant and observer. In the mundane rhythms and harshness of this life, Homer found powerful and compelling images. The men who set out at dusk returned at dawn to be received by their women, who performed their tasks each day—figures of equanimity, normality, and light. Far removed from the protectiveness of an enclosed setting, they were deeply engaged in life. The most moving of the watercolors of the Cullercoats period depict the dangerous world of the sea confronting the stable world of women. At Cullercoats, Homer developed the trope of the storm-tossed sea opposed by indomitable and statuesque women.

These led Homer to his most profound consciousness of the meaning of the encounter between the human and nature. The Cullercoats experience haunted him. Once again in America, he moved from New York to the fastness of Prout's Neck. The marine pictures that followed depict a sea both destructive and powerful, threatening the fisherman even as he carries on his most normal tasks. Even without the human presence, the sea is represented as the uncontrollable element in nature—"what seas, what shores."

Sunset, Saco Bay, Winslow Homer, American 1836–1910. Reprinted courtesy of The Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute. Williamstown, Mass.

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W.H. Auden's wonderfully suggestive romantic iconography of the sea, *The Enchafed Flood,* shows real understanding of the tradition in which Homer couched his experience of the sea:

> The sea or the great waters . . . are the symbol for the primordial undifferentiated flux, the substance which became created nature only by having form imposed upon or wedded to it. The sea, in fact, is that state of barbaric vagueness and disorder out of which civilization has emerged.[14]

The sea, for Homer, has that sense of primal existence, malign and fearful. It is boundless, invasive, inevitable, perilous, unknown, unknowable. It is the image of death and final extinction. His great "rescue" pictures of the 1880s: The *Life Line* and *Undertow* (1886)[15] are explicit reminders that death and the sea are closely linked in his mind. The rescue, in both cases, is of a woman. The *Life Line* is Homer's *Liebestod:* as man and woman, rescuer and rescued, cling to each other, suspended over the boiling fury of the sea; the device of letting the woman's scarf drift across the man's face further emphasizes the "Liebestod." Death, masked and disguised, holds the maiden.

The final paintings on the theme, particularly *The Light from the Sea* (1897),[16] bring a new equilibrium into the work. The familiar columnar women are placed against the elements: earth, sea, and sky are no longer beholden to the sea. They act as counterweights, solitary and inviolate, opposed to the frothing, invasive sea. A profound sexual drama is played out. Homer's early view of the pure and chaste woman remained with him. No longer protected, the women are represented as the equals of the untameable elements of nature, capable of withstanding its wildest moments. The recognition of the power of the human was derived from the experience of the American landscape. But it had to be lived in—not just visited. Homer, at Prout's Neck, brought to the American pictorial imagination both the sense of the tragic in nature and of the redemptive powers of the human.

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III

". . . the culmination of a career at its beginnings, Sargent's subsequent shortcomings as an artist were attributed to his hot-headed removal from Paris with the determination to overcome failure with popular success."[17]

—Robert de Montesquiou

While this judgment may be a little too glib, it raises the central and most troubling question regarding John Singer Sargent's art. His debut, as extraordinary as that of any nineteenth-century artist, as the first few rooms of the recent Whitney Retrospective vividly attested, led to unexpected results. Accepted into the Salon on his first attempt in 1877, when he was only twenty-one, Sargent produced a string of masterly portraits and genre scenes in unbroken succession until 1884 when he exhibited the sensational, notorious, and highly charged *Madame X (Madame Pierre Gautreau)*. In the resulting furore, Sargent quit Paris, moved to London, and decisively changed the pattern of his early work. Although the latter 1880s and 1890s saw the production of remarkable paintings, the consistency of the earlier achievement was never regained. The uncertainty of the taste governing his art failed to sustain it; the decline is evident in the last decade of the nineteenth century, and clearly accelerates after the turn of the century. Many artists, of course, fail to sustain their early promise; still, the disparity between the quality of the early Sargent and the disastrous later Sargent is too extreme to escape comment, although it generally does, even in the helpful Sargent *Studien*[18] contained in the admirable Whitney catalogue.

What makes for the outstanding quality of Sargent's early work is exactly what Henry James found: intention and execution fit precisely. The early portraits have poise. The sitters are treated within the range of knowledge and insight available to a cultivated, self-educated, self-possessed artist in his twenties. There is a level of both respect and distance, which neither flatters nor dominates his subjects. The command of his plastic means is so assured that the stylishness of the portraits astonishes; they lack showiness. The immense giftedness serves observation truthfully. Yet, these are not simply neutral acts of recording. The uncanny quality of these early

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Sargents resides in the balance between the presence of the sitter's personality and the full-bodied sense of Sargent as an artist: rendered and renderer, the painting and the painted, are perfectly balanced. The tonal restraint of the palette, with an impeccable feel and eye for the half-tone is married to a full, painterly touch. Sargent's "hand," while confident and heavy, is without bravura. These are among the most natural and unstrained portraits in late nineteenth-century art.

The early Venetian scenes, resulting from two visits in 1881 and 1882, are admirably characterized and described by Linda Ayres in the Whitney catalogue;[19] they extend the view of Sargent's early giftedness, working freely, and never falling into virtuosity. The absence of the obviously picturesque in these first Venetian scenes contrasts markedly with the touristic obviousness of certain of the later watercolors. Henry James noted how "free from humbug"[20] they were, as Sargent sought out the dark and straitened life of the calle, the dusky hallways of palazzi converted to workshops. The fact that he painted Venice well into winter—the figures enveloped in shawls, coats, and scarves—enabled him to depict the ongoing life of the city, and not only its seasonal bustle. The casualness, the inconsequence of it all—these are the clues to the quality of the works. Experience is lightly worn, glanced at; there is an engagement with the life around them. The paintings exist happily and securely between the sketch and the finished work; they are imbued equally with the qualities of spontaneity and consideration. This is an impressionism that owes nothing to Impressionism, the product of observation and experience, unselfconscious of the requirements of style.

Sargent's capacity to synthesize his gifts in these early years is remarkable. In 1879, he made a pilgrimage to Spain to see Velasquez paintings; he copied *Las Meninas*. Velasquez's realism, painterliness, and aesthetic self-sufficiency were important models for Sargent, who put the lessons to use without falling into imitation in *The Daughters of Edward D. Boit* (1882).[21] The casualness of the Venetian scenes recalls the formality of the early portraits. They meet in the high, bare space of the hotel room of Velasquez-like mystery. A picture "of assimilated secrets and of instinct and knowledge playing together,"[22] as Henry James characterized the work, it embodies the best of the early Sargent, both his ambition and his restraint. The sparse interior, with its huge Chinese vases, threatens to overwhelm

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the four girls; their luminosity lights the gloomy, rented room. Sargent painted closer to his experience than might be suspected. He had known a cosmopolitan childhood, but had been constantly on the move, perpetually displaced. The Boit children, similarly, were painted abroad, away from their native Boston. The scattered figure composition, the strange separation of the children, allied to the high formality of the presentation, is of four girls separated from their normal domestic setting.

The Daughters of Edward D. Boit brings to a climax Sargent's "first world," his best and most assured. They are the works of high sensibility, of acute consciousness. A contemporary French critic, Jules Comte, rightly said that it was difficult to know what to admire



The Daughters of Edward D. Boit, 1882, John Singer Sargent. American, 1856–1925, Oil on canvas. Gift of Mary Louisa Boit, Florence D. Boit, Jane Hubbard Boit, and Julia Overing Boit, in memory of their father. 19.124, Courtesy, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

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most: the simplicity of the means or the brilliant result. T.S. Eliot's famous dictum on Henry James could be truthfully applied also to Sargent: "... his mastery over, his baffling escape from ideas; a mastery and escape which are perhaps the last test of a superior intelligence. He had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it. . . ."[23] Sargent, less elegantly, suggested a similar notion in a letter to Vernon Lee in March 1882 when he was starting to work on the Boit Daughters: "It is certain that at certain times talent overcomes thought or poetry."[24] In his brilliant debut, Sargent invested the traditional means of oil painting with the sensation and feeling that belongs to the visual alone. The difficulty lay in sustaining such an enterprise, in being satisfied with the rewards of the visual.

The pivotal painting in Sargent's career is the splendid and controversial *Madame X (Madame Pierre Gautreau)* (1884). Here, he both attempted and succeeded in going beyond the visual to embark on a difficult and treacherous *idea*. The story of *Madame X* has often been told. Madame Gautreau, the American wife of a rich French banker, a famous professional beauty of her day, dyed her hair with henna, made up her ears, applied lavender powder to her body, which gave her an unnatural, even corpselike appearance. Displaying her body boldly in daring decolletage, "Virginie Gautreau molded and shaped herself into a painted object, a veritable work of art,"[25] according to Albert Boime. Sargent sought her out as a subject. She was to be at once his entrée to the securing of portrait commissions from the fashionable world and also his most ambitious attempt at painting the truly modern subject: the professional beauty who combined in herself artificiality and sexuality. Sargent spared neither. *Madame X,* disdaining both painter and viewer, turns her head away to show a sharp and enigmatic profile while her body is presented fully, frontally. For Sargent *Madame X* was no mere image. Twisting her right arm into a vigorous serpentina as it grasps a small table, the painting, for all its artifice, shows a bodily reality. Exhibited at the 1884 salon, it was a *succès de scandal,* both in style and substance. Sargent was quite unprepared for the reaction, being neither by inclination nor aptitude suited to the role of rebel. Retreating from Paris to London, Sargent lost the momentum and direction of his art. What really had gone wrong with Sargent's art and his imagination in the controversy that swirled around *Madame X*?

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If his early pictorial brilliance reached its zenith in *Madame X,* it also marked the point of his departure from apparently casual or natural subjects. The portraits and the Venetian scenes, like the early genre pieces, were perfect vehicles for his natural talent. The character of his art depended on what he observed. In *Madame X,* this was still true, but the subject's artificiality and sexuality created a certain confusion for those who imagined they understood the nature of Sargent's art. The youthfulness of both subject and painter—she was twenty-four and he was twenty-seven when the portrait was painted—further blurred the relationship between the character of the sitter and the character of the artist. Both exhibit a sort of wordliness, even of extreme precociousness. Sargent's talent was used to mirror the mannered, dehumanized, and even absurd refinement of his sitter. His gift was a consciousness so unfettered by any preconceptions that it could enter fully into the objects of its contemplation. This was the danger to Sargent's art. Restlessly searching for external stimuli, Sargent became the victim of his nomad life, and also of the taste of his patrons.

Sargent's English years brought him a long summer of success. This did not happen immediately; in the later 1880s there was a brief flirtation with Impressionism. It is a puzzle why Sargent's impressionistic painting—a style he might have been expected to excel in, an art of the strictly visual—in his hands had "an unnatural, artificial quality to it,"[26] as Albert Boime so correctly says. Although both Monet and Pissarro spoke warmly of Sargent personally, neither regarded him as one of "theirs" even when his painting superficially resembled their own. The Whitney Retrospective does nothing to revive Sargent's reputation with Impressionism. Appearing alternately drab or decorative, and frequently confusing mere sketchiness for the full blooded abbreviated mode of Impressionism, Sargent lost his nonchalance as a painter. In England, as George Moore sneeringly remarked, he became "the Prince of the Atelier."[27] What he took to be the failure of *Madame X* became a spur to win the applause and the patronage of the fashionable, the rich, and the aristocratic.

The aristocracy prevailed upon him to paint in the grand style portraiture tradition of the eighteenth century, "updated"[28] as Carter Ratcliff neatly puts it. Both Sargent's full-length and group portraits show a bravura gigantism, which perfectly reflects the fatal nexus between the grandiose taste of a patron and the virtuoso skills of a

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

John Singer Sargent, 1884 *Madame X* (Mme. Gautreau).
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Arthur H. Hearn Fund, 1916.

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painter. These works fall far short of the more modern portraiture he had so insouciantly produced in his early twenties. The consciousness that reveals itself takes on the values of both the class and the country being portrayed. Much is made of the "tension"[29] of Sargent's aristocratic sitters; as though uncertain of their high place in late Victorian society, they turned to the glittering images that Sargent alone could provide.

The sudden flow of portrait commissions really started in America, on Sargent's visits in 1887–8 and 1890. These led to Sargent's eminence as a public painter, which was only confirmed by the Boston Public Library Commission. In this instance, the nexus between the subject and style worked in Sargent's favor. The pretensions of the English upper classes, which required that they be viewed as the unquestioned descendants of Reynolds and Gainsborough sitters, fell wholly away. The American patrons of Sargent allowed him to express his trust in American fact and experience. Strikingly, the Americans are painted in day clothes, very different from the court and evening dresses favored by Sargent's English sitters. In the American portraits, the bareness of the studio or the austere studio prop constitute the whole of the *mise-en-scène;* there is no place for the imaginatively reconstructed drawing rooms or hallways found in the English aristocratic portraits. When Sargent painted the Sitwell family, they thought it reasonable to move a Chippendale commode into Sargent's studio, together with a French tapestry from their great house, Renishaw Hall.[30] The severity of Sargent's American portraits say something of his ambivalent position in both English and European society. On native grounds, Sargent no longer served an alien culture, acknowledging false gods.

The Boston Public Library murals give further evidence of the quality of his American works during his most fashionable period. There is no equivalent achievement in his English works. The high Symbolist mode he chose, with its over-ambitious theme, the history of religion, comes as something of a surprise from a painter who earlier had spurned everything that was not strictly addressed to the eyes alone. Only in America did the opportunity come for Sargent to expand upon his natural giftedness. The lower line of Old Testament prophets at the northern end of the hall take one back to the very start of his career, both in terms of quality and in the directness of their address and apprehension. The studio models, the feeling for

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portrait-like vividness show Sargent's gifts intact, and they remained so, until the turn of the century.

The last twenty-five years were not good ones for Sargent. An experienced eye will pick out a handful of distinguished paintings. The Whitney selection, unnecessarily brave, selected some of the worst, as if to show the depth of Sargent's decline. Largely and unwisely declining portraiture after the turn of the century, he preferred to concentrate on his own self-elected subjects. The banality of these is disconcerting. Not compelled to do these slippery and facile works, he chose them, and the blame cannot be shifted to his patrons. Sargent was not ruined by what he was asked to paint. He ruined himself; the very nature of his giftedness—the extraordinary consciousness which entered so fully into what it apprehended—showed itself highly liable and vulnerable to corruption. It is an irony that the American artist who was so valued by the old world should have lost himself to its commands, when work, which might have given him immortality as an artist, lay in the straitened circumstances of his native land.

ENDNOTES

[1]Lloyd Goodrich, *Winslow Homer* (London: Macmillan, 1944), p. 87.
[2]Ibid., p. 75.
[3]Walter Richard Sickert, *A Free House! or the Artist as Craftsman,* ed. Osbert Sitwell (London: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 78–82.
[4]Count Robert de Montesquiou quoted in Trevor J. Fairbrother: "The Shock of John Singer Sargent's Madame Gautreau," *Arts Magazine* 55 (5) (January 1981).
[5]Henry James, *Pictures and Text* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1893), p. 97.
[6]Ibid., p. 106.
[7]Ibid., p. 94.
[8]Goodrich, *Winslow Homer,* p. 53.
[9]Henry James, *The Galaxy* (July 1875).
[10]Henry James, *Pictures and Text,* p. 97.
[11]H.B., *The Critic* (May 22, 1886).
[12]Helen A. Cooper: *Winslow Homer Watercolors* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 26.
[13]Ibid., p. 92.
[14]From *The Enchafed Flood* by W.H. Auden. Copyright 1950 by The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc.
[15]*Life Line* (1884), Philadelphia Museum of Art, George Elkins Collection; *Undertow* (1886), Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, Williamstown.
[16]*The Light from the Sea* (1892), The Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.

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[17]Quoted in Trevor J. Fairbrother, "The Shock of John Singer Sargent's Madame Gautreau."
[18]Patricia Hills, ed., *John Singer Sargent* (Whitney Museum of American Art, 1986) afterwards cited as Whitney catalogue.
[19]Linda Ayres, "Sargent in Venice," in *John Singer Sargent*, ed. Patricia Hills, pp. 49–75.
[20]Henry James, *Pictures and Text*, p. 109.
[21]*The Daughters of Edward D. Boit* (1882), Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.
[22]Henry James, *Pictures and Text*, p. 56.
[23]T.S. Eliot, *Little Review* (1918).
[24]Evan Charteris, *John Sargent* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1927), p. 56.
[25]Whitney catalogue, p. 88.
[26]Ibid., p. 81.
[27]Carter Ratcliff, *John Singer Sargent* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1982), p. 177.
[28]Ibid., p. 178.
[29]Whitney catalogue, p. 43.
[30]See the entertaining account of this commission in Ratcliff, *John Singer Sargent*, pp. 223–227.

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Mordechai Feingold

Philanthropy, Pomp, and Patronage: Historical Reflections upon the Endowment of Culture

It is good to be charitable—But to whom?
—La Fontaine

PHILANTHROPY IS AS OLD as civilization. Despite its universality, however, the Judeo-Christian tradition transformed philanthropy into a cornerstone of Western society. Certainly, the bulk of our educational, cultural, and welfare facilities would be inconceivable without the flood of private benefactions. It is surprising, then, that the subject has never received much sustained attention, even by scholars. Conspicuous by their absence are any comprehensive studies that seek to delineate the origins, nature, and evolution of philanthropy. More often than not, we are offered instead either compendia of good deeds or laudatory, partisan accounts of man's altruistic impulses.[1]

The reasons for this tendency either to evade the issue of philanthropy or to reduce it to the most simplistic and naive terms may be attributed to the way the topic defies easy moral categorization. Few other historical phenomena hinge so completely on an interpretation of "human nature"—a subject unquantifiable, sparsely documented, and therefore unpalatable to most serious scholars: hence, their virtual abdication of the field to religious partisans, who were happy to applaud Christian morality. The one scholarly exception is the

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large group of historians who eagerly embrace all "radical" and "progressive" groups and ideas, especially those of the early modern period, which witnessed the infusion into Protestant England with what we have since come to regard as the hallmarks of modern society—capitalism, new science, and a new aggressive philanthropy.

This article seeks to establish a non-partisan historical framework, stretching from biblical times until the twentieth century, in which to view the phenomenon of philanthropy. My focus will be the motives and ideologies animating benefactions, which brings me to the distinction I would like to make between philanthropy and patronage. To be consistent with contemporary conceptions, philanthropy will be interpreted as charity, or support of the less fortunate, while patronage will be defined as the support of high culture, involving scholarship, art, science, music, and the like. Such a distinction is important, not only because of the different nature of each domain but because there existed fundamental differences between the aims and expectations of the benefactors themselves, differences that were crucial to the shaping of modern Western culture.

Although philanthropy is to be found in most societies, I should nevertheless like to confine my historical discussion to England, with an occasional glimpse at the United States. My reasons are two-fold. First, there is a prevailing assumption that in the last three centuries philanthropy has become a salient feature of the Anglo-Saxon world. Second, certain peculiarities of the British Isles make a comparative study with the Continent the subject for a book, not an article.

In line with my beliefs concerning the very different roles philanthropy and patronage played in the shaping of culture, I should like to discuss them in separate, but parallel, sections. Hence, the first section of the article will chart the evolution of philanthropy through the centuries. My focus will be the motives of the benefactors, rather than the volume of benefactions, the reason being that the achievement of English benefactions in the last four centuries has been frequently enumerated in great detail. The issue of motives, on the other hand, is territory that is largely unexplored. The second section will be devoted to a comparative discussion of patrons' motives, in the hope that by conflating the two, we can arrive at a richer, and more balanced, understanding of each phenomenon.

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Implicit in the Old Testament promulgation to care for the weak is the assumption that, human nature being what it is, virtue alone would not feed the poor. Hence, the moral precepts are adjoined by abiding injunctions under the auspices of a just—if vengeful—God. Although a causal relationship between charitable acts and rewards, either temporal or other worldly, is not germaine to the Old Testament, the rhetoric of remuneration, of both praise and blame, promises and threats, places charity firmly within the religious sphere.

Christianity incorporated and systematized the Jewish concepts of philanthropy; duty and obligation as well as reward and punishment became cornerstones of the New Testament. Indeed, early on, the notion that a benefaction bestows at least as much good on the benefactor as on the beneficiary became a central tenet of Christian thought. In addition, Christianity elaborated on the Old Testament's undeveloped concept of love, of both God and one's neighbor, as the highest motive for doing good. However, it would be wrong to conclude that Jewish charity was created through compulsion, while Christian charity was a gift of love; both testaments contain similar rhetorical devices in praise of disinterested philanthropy, as well as stiff injunctions to ensure the success of a system that would fail if it had to depend on love alone. The difference between the two testaments, then, is more one of weight and balance than of content. In this context, it is instructive to note the parallel between the Hebrew term *tzedaka,* which amalgamated the concepts of charity and righteousness, and the Greek and Latin terms *agape* and *caritas,* both of which denote the coalescence of love and charity. Similarly, just as the Jewish concept of *tzedaka* was stressed above all other commandments, so charity, for its part, was promulgated as the highest of graces, next to the love of God. (I might add that my purpose here is not to engage in scriptural exegesis, but to suggest the sort of reading and interpretation that such issues will receive by Englishmen following the Reformation.)

As befitting a new religion whose charter members were generally from the less fortunate classes of society, Christianity both placed greater emphasis on the need to provide for the poor and developed a critical attitude toward wealth. Again and again, we encounter strictures against the pursuit of excessive riches, lest man succumb to vanity, pride, and covetousness. Not surprisingly, the element of

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self-denial becomes an important part of Christian teaching, the wealthy now being merely the custodians of God's riches, with an obligation to care for the poor. Nevertheless, the notion of coercion in acts of charity remained as central to Christianity as it had to Judaism before it. Neither religion could ensure philanthropy any other way.

Out of both testaments and the later teachings of the church fathers, there emerged an enriched concept of philanthropy that combined the conception of religious obligation with societal expectation. Such a notion suited the needs of the great benefactors—particularly members of the aristocracy of both sword and robe—for it provided them with an assurance of the world to come as well as with temporal respect and fame.

In the Middle Ages, "Men of property were expected to give to the church and to the poor, during life and at death, both to justify their inequitable status in the social hierarchy and to buy prayers for their own souls."[2] The laity's mounting obsession with death and an afterlife was welcomed and later increasingly encouraged by the church. Both sides benefitted from this transaction. The "purchase of paradise," as historian Joel T. Rosenthal termed it, was, from the donor's viewpoint, the ultimate investment. The church, for its part, received these massive endowments of land and monies that could be used for a host of purposes other than charity, including the support of culture.

Allegedly, all this changed with the Reformation. Most scholars who have in any way dealt with "modern" philanthropy claim that the rationale behind charity, as well as its scope and volume, was radically altered as a result of the "Protestant ethos." According to W.K. Jordan, whose studies of English philanthropy have molded later scholars, the Calvinist constitution was "sublimated into a sensitive social conscience that was secular in its aspirations and fruits." The result was, in Jordan's words, "one of the few great cultural revolutions in Western history: the momentous shift from men's primarily religious preoccupations to the secular concerns that have moulded the thought and institutions of the past three centuries."[3] This so-called transformation, or redirection, of man's aspirations brought an end to the antiquated and corrupt system of medieval alms-giving.

Taking their cue from a few disparaging remarks made by English theologians in their bitter polemics against their Catholic foes, Jordan

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and other scholars ascribe to the Protestants a novel concept of philanthropy, one approaching the precise, almost scientific definition we are accustomed to today. This new philanthropy, they argued, was a calculated program to eliminate poverty and reform society on secular lines. In order to deepen and widen the perceived chasm between Puritan philanthropy and medieval Catholic charity, such scholars depicted philanthropy in the centuries before the Reformation as the indiscriminate and degrading provision of alms to the poor—a sentimental "do-gooding"—which, in the final analysis, did more harm than good. What we are confronted with, if we are to believe this dichotomy, is that Puritan philanthropy already preached the religion of humanity and the ideology of liberalism as early as the second half of the sixteenth century!

Upon closer scrutiny, such a hopeful, even naive, portrayal of the Puritan attitude toward philanthropy fails to support the evidence. First, many of the secular manifestations of philanthropy cited by Jordan as "proof" of the Protestant ethos had, in fact, their origins long before the Reformation. Second, as we shall later see, the religious motives animating Puritan philanthropy remained as strong as they had ever been. That scholars remained dismissive of these religious motives is more indicative of their eagerness to credit a comprehensive group with an altruistic, secular ideology than of an attempt to model a realistic construct of life in the post-Reformation period.

Recently, a few medieval historians have begun to document evidence of many of the quintessential accomplishments attributed to the Puritan ethos, yet dating back as early as two centuries before the Reformation. Education, that litmus test for so many early modern historians, is one example. The studies of Orme and Moran demonstrate that the so-called "educational revolution" began at least a century before the Reformation, and that neither humanism nor Protestantism can be singled out as the *sine qua non* of widespread endowment of schools.[4] My own studies, on the other hand, indicate that Puritanism as a religious ideology had little to do with the bulk of educational endowments, even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and least of all with support for higher learning.[5] What happened, in fact, during the sixteenth century was the acceleration of a process that was well under way before the Reformation. The reasons for such an acceleration include a host of

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social, political, cultural, and—certainly, but not solely—religious pressures, a subject well-beyond the scope of an article.

The same caution should be exercised in approaching other claims for the so-called shift to secular philanthropy, such as the spate of endowments for poorhouses and hospitals (as contrasted with casual money gifts), as well as the increasing responsibility of laymen for their foundations. In both cases, Englishmen of the sixteenth century were extending and developing ideas and practices initiated by pious Christians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Most important, to say that the institutions to which Protestants gave were—to the modern mind—secular does not mean that their motive for giving was any less religious than that which animated their Catholic counterparts. Both were fulfilling the same Christian duties; *ex post facto* only the justification was different. In this context, we might quote author J.A.F. Thomson's warning, which is equally applicable to the Middle Ages and the post-Reformation period: "It is often impossible to separate pious gifts from charitable ones because no such differentiation existed in the mind of the donor."[6]

Thus, it seems to me that one major consequence of Jordan and those scholars who followed him has been to propagate a false notion of the relations between philanthropy and religion after the Reformation. The transfer of benefactions from the church to schools and hospitals is not conclusive proof of the birth of a secular society. Conversely, church giving does not represent the true influence that religion exerts over philanthropy. Indeed, Protestant theology could claim to have dispensed with both purgatory and the doctrine of good works—both traditionally considered the cornerstone of Catholic charity—without in the least dispensing with the terror of damnation or severing the umbilical cord that had joined philanthropy and religion since biblical times. The reason for this is two-fold. To a large extent, the original scriptures embraced by the Protestants with renewed zeal contained the core of a charitable philosophy of action that, ironically, they had just rejected under a different guise, in Catholicism. As we previously noted, both the Old and New Testaments contained injunctions to care for the poor as well as promises of temporal, and even heavenly, rewards in return for charitable works. English Calvinists, who were now given license to read and interpret the Bible on their own, were quite relieved by such promises, especially when, toward the end of the sixteenth

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century, English theologians such as William Perkins began to modify the harsh Calvinist doctrine of predestination. The new possibility of attaining some assurance of grace in this life paved the way for the encouragement of a limited number of good works. Also frequently heard was the tautological argument that the charitable act itself was "proof," of sorts, of one's membership in the elect. Hence, the new twist to the age-old merit system: man is charitable, not in order to be saved, but because he is inherently endowed with the propensity to do good, because he *is* saved. By following the injunction to be charitable, he merely reassures himself of his salvation.

Although such philosophical distinctions preoccupied some thinkers and theologians, I suspect that the multitudes remained indifferent to such theological gymnastics and continued to regard philanthropy as a way to obey God and gain their just reward. As the very popular preacher, Richard Sibbes, put it: "God sometimes doth delight to make good his temporall Promises to a religious, industrious and faithful man and that in the eyes of the World."[7]

One interesting by-product of the post-Reformation's obsessive debate between Catholics and Protestants over the issues of grace, justification, and purgatory was the way charity was added to the arsenal of weapons used by each side in order to strengthen its own doctrinal position and undermine that of its opponents. Thus Catholics not only codified purgatory as an abiding doctrine of post-Tridentine dogma, but they continually challenged the Protestants to match the magnitude and splendor of medieval Catholic philanthropy. The English Calvinists who, at this time, were still on the defensive, retorted the only way they could: they denigrated both the purpose and intent that lay behind Catholic philanthropy, arguing instead for the superiority of their own motives.

An early example was the fiery sermon delivered from St. Paul's pulpit in 1578 by John Stockwood, who, in the midst of his harangue on stage-plays, profane writers, and Machiavellians, added some barbs on Catholic charity:

> Almes . . . doth not consiste in the greatnesse of that which is bestowed, but in the minde and disposition of the giver. . . . All the large givings of the Papists, of whiche at this daye many make so greate bragges, bycause they be not done in a reverent regarde of the commaundement of the Lorde, in Love, and of an inwarde being touched with the calamities of the needie, but

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for to be well reported of before men whilest they were alive, and to be praised for after they are dead, . . . are indeede no almes, but Pharisaicall trumpets.[8]

Half a century later, similar charges were still being brought against the Catholics, only now the Protestants were able to rally with their own munificent benefactions. Arthur Hildersham, for example, boasted that the English poured more money into hospitals, charity, and education during his lifetime than the Catholics had in the previous century. Such sentiments continued to be echoed throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth and even into the nineteenth centuries, as polemicists delighted in recording in minute detail the good deeds of their fellow countrymen after the Reformation.

While some Protestant divines blissfully ignored the complex motives behind benefactions, including the fact that Protestants were motivated by an ideology similar to the one they maligned in Catholicism, others faced the dilemma of reconciling "good deeds" with less than altruistic motives. A good example is Thomas Fuller, whose monumental *History of the Worthies of England* included many instances of Protestant munificence. However, Fuller's work was in part a response to the acerbic pen of the Catholic Edward Knott, who pressed for a comparison between the scope and nature of charity on each side. Having begun by reiterating the traditional distinction between Catholic and Protestant charity—the latter of which was "not parched up by the fear of the fire of purgatory, but kindly ripened with the sun; viz. a clear apprehension by the light of the Scripture that they were bound to do good works"—Fuller nonetheless felt it necessary to account for the earthly motives of Protestant benefactors. Using all his rhetorical skills and mastery of the Scriptures, Fuller sought to make philanthropy virtuous in its own right, regardless of the motives. Even if benefactors "having lived like wolves, turn lambs on their death beds" by giving a handsome benefaction, " 'Charity,' saith the Apostle, 'thinketh no evil.' " He continued, we "are bound to believe the best of such founders [of alms-houses], especially of such who lived since the Reformation, whereby the dangerous error of merit has exploded."[9] Fuller thus replaced one double standard with another.

It is impossible to gauge the sincerity of Fuller and other Protestant divines in their scholastic distinction between what they termed the

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Catholic doctrine of merit and the Protestant notion of reward. There are certainly many unabashed pronouncements that clearly suggest the existence of a double standard; this appears to have bothered no one. In *The Pilgrim's Progress,* for example, John Bunyan freely promised that his God would repay a charitable man handsomely: "He that bestows his good upon the poor, / Shall have as much again, and ten times more."

By the eighteenth century, English theologians and moralists had abandoned their defensive position. Their previously perceived inferiority to Catholic philanthropy had long been replaced by an aura of preponderance. To quote a boastful Henry Fielding: "Charity is the very characteristic virtue of this time. I believe we may challenge the whole world to parallel the examples which we have of late given to this sensible, this noble, this Christian virtue."[10] He shared such pious convictions with John Wesley, the father of the new Methodist revival, who opined self-righteously that more good works had been founded in his century than in the previous five hundred years. Certainly the "pride" of the Protestants helped create the "Age of Benevolence." Now, preachers and other religious enthusiasts brazenly elaborated upon the previously muted promise that good deeds on earth would earn a share in the world to come. One of the most effective eighteenth-century preachers to encourage charity openly on such lines was "pious" Robert Nelson, who delighted to remind his crowded audiences of Judgement Day, when those who failed in their charitable giving "shall certainly perish among the Reprobate." As for their charity, it would be deposited "in so many spiritual banks where their money is secured by the word of infallible truth, and where the profit is as durable as their souls." But the world to come is not the only reward for charity; equally tangible is immediate profit on earth. "An unexpected inheritance, the determination of a lawsuit in our favour, the success of a great adventure . . . are sometimes the recompenses of charity in this world."[11] Not surprisingly, such "down-to-earth" promises sparked the sermons of the well-known cynic Jonathan Swift who was himself convinced that a Christian would do good only to avoid divine punishment.

Additional inducements for the wave of charity that swept England during this same period were the ingenious new joint-stock concept and the proliferation of umbrella charities that catered to smaller charities. Based on the assumption that numerous minute donations

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would eventually amount to a major benefaction, they offered the multitude of small donors the assurance that their shillings indeed counted. The result was a sweeping new fashion. As M.G. Jones aptly wrote, "the charitable mob paid its guinea and crowded the annual charity sermons to hear its generosity extolled and its investment for the next world approved." Samuel Johnson feared the consequence of such fashionable giving upon the future of charity: "Hospitals at the present time subsist only by gifts bestowed at pleasure, without any solid fund of support, there is a danger lest the blaze of charity, which now burns with so much heat and splendor, should die away . . . lest fashion should suddenly withdraw her smile."[12]

These fears were unfounded. Giving was too sweet and profitable to die out in a society that, on the one hand, would become increasingly absorbed in a religious fervor of one sort or another, and on the other, would have to cope with the unprecedented hardships of the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, the new forms of evangelism from the middle of the eighteenth century on helped transform philanthropy into a craze and, for many cynics, a plague. Already, Sir Thomas Browne, in the middle of the seventeenth century, gave expression to the intent of charity to ameliorate the condition of the benefactor, not the poor, for whom the donor actually may have had very little regard: "I give no almes to satisfie the hunger of my Brother, but to fulfill and accomplish the Will and Command of my God."[13] Clearly, his remarks suggest a reversal of traditional scriptural teachings, for now poverty—instead of being a holy state and the poor the favorite of God—is perceived as a disease, conducive to sin and wickedness that may infect the healthy members of society if not treated.

Such a view was—in less philosophical apparel—at the core of the new evangelical movements of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hannah More and her saintly colleagues introduced with renewed vengeance the old doctrine that a benefaction bestowed far greater good upon the benefactor than on the beneficiary. In fact, according to her evangel, charity is meaningless or redundant if it does not "spring from a settled propensity to obey the Whole will of God." Indeed, the beneficiaries counted for little. Loathed and snubbed, they were important only in so far as they offered the evangelists the opportunity to prove their worthiness and discharge their duties. Thus, piety, based on indifference to the poor and a new

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coherent doctrine of good works became the mother of philanthropy. Self-righteousness and man's conceit had never seen better times.

Scholars and cynics widely recognized the mounting malaise. Carlyle had nothing but disdain for what he styled "indiscriminate philanthropy"; across the ocean, his "disciple," Ralph Waldo Emerson, was no less sardonic: "Men do what is called a good action . . . much as they would pay a fine in expiation of daily non-appearance on parade. . . . Their virtues are penances." His friend Thoreau was convinced that philanthropy was made by the rich into a device to atone for their evil methods of accumulating wealth. The editor of *Punch*, Douglas Jerrold, so loathed to be called a "philanthropist" that he threatened to murder a child just to get rid of such a reputation. But the givers did not care. God, after all, was on their side. Eager for praise by their neighbors as well as their Maker, they could scarcely defy what had become, by the nineteenth century, a social imperative. Besides, what a pleasure it was to give! Richard Potter, the father of Beatrice Webb, found it such a joy to do good that, having donated £5 to the poor fund (more than the rest of the congregation), he felt "good for the rest of the day."[14]

To conclude, then, the reintroduction of the merit system into England brought about a renewed sentimentality in the attitudes toward the poor. In so doing, Anglo-Saxon Protestants brought full circle the Christian ideology behind charity. However, by the nineteenth century there already existed a new religion—the religion of humanity—which would put the entire issue of philanthropy on a new footing.

* * *

Philanthropy, with fear of God and societal duty as its animating motives, is in many ways the very opposite of patronage. Even if many patrons tend also to be philanthropists—how can they afford not to be? —their activity in the domain of culture is motivated by an entirely different set of reasons and seeks equally different ends.

Philanthropic activity was conceived, at least in theory, as an expression of love, duty, and justice. Charity, with its dual meaning of love and alms, also implied an inseparable bond between the ethical and religious realms, for if love faltered there still remained

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God's injunctions to ensure the success of the charitable enterprise. In the domain of patronage, however, all such notions are conspicuously absent. To begin with, the Scriptures provide little inducement for the support of culture. Consequently, such terms as love, duty, and justice rarely entered the rhetoric of patronage, and societal expectation—save for *noblesse oblige*—never became an important component in its motivation. For all these reasons, patronage in the Anglo-Saxon world has evolved as a matter of choice rather than obligation (with the possible exception of support for religious culture during the Middle Ages, a subject to which we shall return).

Such distinctions between philanthropy and patronage became even more rigid in the post-Reformation period. At the core of early Christianity was a tradition of hostility toward riches and antagonism to luxury. The Catholic church, however, without condoning wealth, nonetheless allowed the upper class to indulge in luxury without fear of damnation, providing that they were charitable and repentant. Such leniency was absent from Calvinist dogma, which took a far more somber view of luxury. Indeed, the Puritan obsession with salvation caused them to regard worldly goods and pleasures as inconsequential, even sinful. In fact, we can take the issue one step further and say that in Puritan England culture itself was conceived of as an indulgence. The offspring of conspicuous consumption and plenitude, it courted profanity and idleness—the nemesis of godliness and frugality. This contrasts sharply with the situation during the Middle Ages, when much of high culture was not only commissioned and consumed by the church, but many of its practitioners were either ordinary or secular priests. Certainly, the important role that music, the arts, and scholarship played in church life encouraged an indulgent attitude toward the cultivation of culture and its handsome support, if not directly, then through the church as the organ of patronage.

Paradoxically, the regrouping of religious incentives and the return to scriptural literalism that occurred during the Reformation resulted in a renewed concern with charitable giving on the one hand, and the expropriation of culture from religion on the other. As a result of this severing of the bond between the arts and religion—which in turn eliminated the element of duty—the major rationale for the practice and support of culture was removed. Of equal import, the Protestant implementation of the scriptural prohibition against images, which

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was now extended to include all practices and ceremonies of the Catholic church, brought about an iconoclastic crusade marching to the tune of the Second Commandment. The result, from the point of view of culture at least, was disastrous. Protestantism nearly managed to eliminate all arts and music from the British Isles. (We might note that, as was the case with the doctrine of merit, such iconoclasm was motivated, in part, by the need to defy that which was regarded as "essential" to the enemy and in so doing establish the Protestant identity.)

Fortunately for England, the Reformation was a long process, full of unexpected twists. Radical Protestantism was never able to exert full control over the greater part of the population, especially the upper classes, and consequently the iconoclastic crusade was never entirely successful. It was strong enough, however, not only to damage severely the motivation for the support of the arts, but—by removing the religious dimension from art—to strip them of their content. And for a country like England, which on the eve of the Reformation already suffered as a result of its geographical isolation and its lack of a healthy pool of local talent and patrons, the toll was disproportionately high. Also, in contrast to the situation in such Protestant countries as Germany or Holland, England lacked common borders with Catholic countries and therefore could not benefit from a certain degree of infiltration of ideas and artisanry. These same geographic and religious conditions posed equally strong impediments for prospective patrons, as they now had to travel to hostile lands in order to view and learn to appreciate culture. That this culture had, by the middle of the sixteenth century, become interwoven with the threat of counter-Reformation, only added to the inherent Protestant suspicion of all the arts. In fact, the flirtation of the court of Charles I with the high art, the music, and the splendor of the baroque period—which occurred simultaneously with attempts to introduce "new" church practices as well as a more "absolutist" form of government—was interpreted by many Englishmen as additional "proof" of the succumbing of the English nation to the Catholic yoke. Thus, only slowly and hesitantly would the English open their eyes, hearts, and pockets to post-Renaissance European culture.

Scholarship and literature fared somewhat better than art and music in the Protestant world. At the outset, the iconoclastic crusade

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affected letters as well as images. Manuscripts were burnt in the same chapels and libraries where stained glass windows were destroyed. Certain subjects that had absorbed the minds of late medieval intellectuals, such as canon law and substantial parts of scholastic philosophy and theology, were prohibited. However, the attitude of Protestant reformers toward the role that profane letters should be assigned in the community of the godly was ambiguous, and remained so well into the eighteenth century. On the one hand, the reformers regarded with indifference if not hostility any aspect of knowledge not considered essential for salvation. Although there was no explicit scriptural prohibition against secular learning, the more zealous reformers insisted that "knowledge" in the biblical sense ought to be interpreted as knowledge of God and His teachings. On the other hand, despite such theoretical bias against profane letters, most reformers would agree that some secular learning—if limited in scope and beneficial to the community—was justified and necessary. And under such protection, supported by the aristocracy, literature would flourish.

Such a partisan view of knowledge should make us wary of those champions of the "Protestant ethos" who credit English Puritans with a conscious, even premeditated, countenance of the intellectual and scientific revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In retrospect, we ought to realize that secular knowledge came to flourish, not because of Puritanism, but despite it. The reasons for this are too complex to enter into here. Suffice it to say that in contrast to what occurred in the arts, the practitioners of knowledge, the scholars themselves, remained *within* the newly-formed Anglican Church. Such a phenomenon may be explained in large part by the fact that church employment—and this includes the universities—was the only form of support that the majority of men of letters, or men of science, had open to them. This circumstance resulted in a reversal of the situation on the Continent, where intellectual reform came principally from outside the establishment. In England, it occurred largely from within the church.

Most interesting is the way English clergymen who were also men of letters tackled those issues that constituted that large grey area shared by both secular and divine knowledge and, hence, an increasing source of discord. The rich intellectual growth that characterized the early modern period was not the direct consequence of a

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particular religious ethos; rather, it was the result of the scholarship of these divines who—with the help of like-minded colleagues fortunate or wealthy enough not to depend on church livings—went beyond proscribed doctrinal boundaries. In so doing, they determined for themselves and eventually for the church, a new course. Such a course did not go unchallenged. The more "godly" brethren tried, at various junctures, to impede these developments but with little success. The absence of an effective proscriptive mechanism similar to the one exercised by the Catholic church ensured that in the long run the "free" intellectual spirit would prevail.

Let me hasten to add that this development is visible only in retrospect. The English scholars rarely, if ever, claimed to engage in any novel intellectual venture that was in the least subversive to Calvinist doctrine. Nor did the men of science among them wholly realize—or admit—the direction that their advocacy of both the "new philosophy" and natural religion would lead them. Without any significant exception, these men were sincere in their piety. However, the natural tension between their desire to "know" without boundaries, and the religious view that subordinated all knowledge to theology eventually became incompatible. From the point of view of the purists, however, the claims for free intellectual curiosity not only bordered upon the sin of pride but were bound to lead to atheism. An important aspect of the cultural history of England in the early modern period is the antagonism between these world views. It is surely no coincidence that many of the abusive terms used by uncompromising Calvinist divines against those who indulged in luxury were similar to those directed against "subversive" modes of thought. Commencing in the seventeenth century, the unholy trinity of epicureanism, materialism, and atheism became the battle cry of the godly in their campaign against the libertines, both among the wealthy and among men of letters.

Returning to the issue of patronage, the important questions are: How did this shift in the public conception of culture—from a semi-protected area of religious endeavour into a secular, non-binding entity—affect the issue of patronage in England? Who were the new supporters of culture now that the church relinquished its previous prominence? (In this context we should remember that, at least in terms of scholarship, an indirect sort of church patronage still existed, for many men of letters were also clergymen.) The answers,

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I believe, are to be found in large part in the social aspirations of the middle and upper classes, who stepped in as the new secular patrons of the arts and letters.

Although the Calvinist doctrine against opulence and gratification may have existed as a coherent doctrine in the minds of the reformers, it never fully reconstituted the social reality of post-Reformation England. No matter how frivolous—or even wicked—Puritans may have considered earthly riches, wealthy noblemen and merchants continued to thrive in their midst. Indeed, without the support of such men, Puritanism itself would not have survived the official campaign to eradicate it during the last two decades of the sixteenth century. At any rate, wealth—as economists and sociologists remind us—seeks gratification. Calvinist dogma notwithstanding, these men wanted not only to invest their surplus wealth, as a good capitalist should, but to enjoy it. Wealth, therefore, provided an underlying ripeness, or readiness, to possess the costly, the pleasing, the useful, and the extraordinary, and it was under this guise—of culture as a sought-after luxury—that the upper class was first induced to patronize post-Reformation men of letters.

However, the impetus for this new secular patronage came not from the upper class but from the men of letters[15] themselves, who initiated an intensive campaign to win their support. Fortunately for these clients there already existed a solid precedent for upper-class patronage, as evidenced by such Renaissance manuals of conduct and education as Castiglione's *The Courtier*. Building upon the issue of education, these men soon realized that the best way to ensure solid and continuous patronage was to educate prospective patrons to appreciate and desire that which they countenanced, if possible to even practice it. Since in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this patronage of culture took the form of supporting literature and learning—the fine arts and music lagged far behind owing to the still raging religious battles—the task of men of letters was to convince the upper classes that their services were indispensable for the flourishing of letters and knowledge, the foundation of all great past civilizations.

Hence, in addition to their scholarly activities, these men assumed the new function of self-proclaimed educators, advisers of sorts, who both recommended the proper education and exercises for aristocratic sons, and sought to actively engage their patrons in the various

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branches of learning. The dozens of manuals that made their appearance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attest to this deliberate attempt to reformulate the role of learning among the upper class; in general, their efforts were successful. The sons of the aristocracy began to flock to the universities, once considered the domain of clerics; noblemen and gentry joined in the writing and praise of poetry; literature and drama flourished; and books immortalizing the names of patrons by their grateful clients poured from the presses.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, a shift had occurred in the sensibilities of the upper class. Scholarly literature, which hitherto had served as the core of their attention and patronage, was increasingly being supplanted, first by science (or at least its pleasing, entertaining aspects such as clocks and mechanical gadgets), and later by art and music. Such a shift may be attributed to at least three factors. First, a decline in the intellectual pretensions of the upper class, and consequently in their willingness to support scholars, had been evident for some time. Second, owing to the sudden increase in Continental travel, the aristocracy discovered the art treasures of Italy and baroque music, and returned home with an insatiable appetite for these newly-acquired tastes. As a result, whatever local talent existed began to attract patronage, while foreign musicians and painters found in England a congenial and rewarding atmosphere. Third, now that learning, including "science," had become somewhat "common," it lost some of its attraction. Instead, the upper class turned to the arts as the new defining feature of elite culture.

Although men of letters sought to adapt themselves to the new fashion, which needed both rules of taste and canons of criticism, it became clear that they could not depend solely on capricious patronage. In practice, certain aspects of culture, such as drama, had been supported by the public for some time. However, it was not until the early eighteenth century that music joined theater as a public art form and that a growing number of authors were able to make a living from their writings. Science, too, had its increasing share of the public domain; the eighteenth century witnessed the popularity of the itinerant lecturer, who entertained coffee-house audiences with demonstrations of Newtonian experimental philosophy. Even art made some inroads in the public realm through the popularity of cheap prints.

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Despite the prospect of some financial gain in the public sector, however, most men of letters continued to search out private patronage rather than to rely solely on the impersonal "mass market." In part, their reluctance was formed out of a fear of modifying their art to public taste, whether this took the form of ruthless publishers or, later, unscrupulous art dealers. More important, however, men of letters still longed for the congenial intellectual atmosphere that characterized the various circles that sprang up around patrons and, even more, the social gratification such mingling with the upper class provided. Indeed, throughout the early modern period, social status was at least as important as financial remuneration in the evolution of the patron-client relationship. No doubt this dual motivation explains the various schemes devised by men of letters in order to formalize and harmonize both financial and social relationships. The multiple designs to establish private and public academies are one example. Such academies—which invariably sought the imprimatur of the monarch—were premised on the idea that the more renowned men of letters should be allowed to congregate with the upper class and at leisure pursue their respective disciplines as a form of public recognition. Such rubbing of shoulders would not only satisfy the social ambitions of the men of letters but would introduce them to an ever-increasing number of patrons, both within and outside the academy. It was this motivation that prompted, in part, the foundation of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century, the Royal Academy and the Society for the Encouragement of Arts in the eighteenth century, and a host of other societies in the nineteenth century. The initials F.R.S. or R.A. next to the names of academicians certainly served to confer a social standing on their recipients and were eagerly sought. However, not to make our men of letters sound too crass, it is important to note that the foundation of an academy offered more than social prestige and access to influential patrons; it enhanced the intellectual and social status of the discipline, which in turn was an important step in the institutionalization and professionalization of cultural life in England.

The Industrial Revolution brought to the fore a new class that would quickly challenge the traditional upper class, both in wealth and willingness to assume the responsibility of patronage. The first discipline to benefit directly from this new class of commercial and

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industrial patrons that blossomed in the latter half of the eighteenth century was science. Neither despised by the upper class nor too closely identified with the aristocratic "cultural value system"—as were the arts—science was well-suited to the needs and aspirations of a class of men who sought to compensate for their inferior social position and exclusion from politics. To enhance its attraction, science provided "rational" and utilitarian recreation; it also appealed to the religious scruples of those dissenters among them who viewed art with suspicion, even disdain. Hence, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the new middle classes proudly supported the visiting lecturers who supplanted the itinerant preachers, organized philosophical and literary societies, and with pride and reverence published their transactions in their yearly proceedings.

However, like the aristocratic patrons before them, the new bourgeoisie was also vulnerable to changes in values and tastes. As many historians have noted, by the third generation, the dissenting tradition had been abandoned; once integrated into the establishment, these industrialists and bankers relinquished science in favor of the more artistic and aristocratic expressions of elite culture. An interesting point of contrast between aristocratic and essentially bourgeois patronage that began to flourish in the late eighteenth century was the tendency of the bourgeoisie to take a more intrusive attitude toward their clients and his work. A shrewd businessman, the new patron carried over into the realm of culture what Rosenthal termed in another context a "proprietorial interference": "The man of property is concerned with the wisdom and the risk of his ventures, and he demands the appropriate return." In response to this new attitude, the men of arts and letters began to modify and, in some cases, lower their standards. Canons of taste and polite culture produced to suit upper-class patrons were now adjusted to take into account bourgeois sentiments and virtues. In the arts, for example, subject began to be given precedence over technique; morality and emotions were exalted, to comply with the more sentimental bias of the middle class. Hence, the alliance of money and culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in the redirection of art and letters.

It is difficult to speculate on the role the new monied patronage played in the replacement of eighteenth-century high culture with Victorian philistine society, which, to quote Houghton, "was perme-

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ated by a scornful or frightened view of the intellectual life, both speculative and artistic, and the liberal education that fosters it."[16] However, it is instructive to note that one of the first great patrons of art among the new rich was Sir Robert Walpole, a man accused by his critics of collecting because it was "the instinct of all new, self-made millionaires to buy pictures by established Old Masters in order to acquire a dignity they have not inherited." Hume carried this connection between class and culture one step further, claiming that it was during Walpole's statesmanship that "trade . . . flourished, liberty declined, and learning gone to ruin," a statement with which Goldsmith concurred.[17]

The third possible source of patronage in England was the monarchy, or government. The English situation regarding state patronage has always been unique within the European context. Neither in the Middle Ages nor in the Renaissance did there exist an English equivalent to Continental court culture, either in number or splendor. Certainly, the multiplicity of Italian and German courts benefitted European men of letters, for it both increased significantly available employment and, owing to the element of rivalry between various courts, provided artists and writers with prestige and bargaining power. In England, in contrast, there was only one "real" court after the late Middle Ages, that of the King, and it was a very modest one at that. Indeed, Henry VIII tried for a short while to establish a splendid court on the European model, but he abandoned the attempt as soon as more pressing issues demanded his attention. A second important—if short-lived—attempt to establish a European-style court was made by Charles I. However, the Civil War pulled it down, together with its hapless monarch. Apart from these two ventures, patronage of culture by the court was of no major consequence. English monarchs are famous for the tight hand they have always kept on their purse strings. Although they've been known to support one or another individual or cultural cause, these are the exceptions. From the second half of the seventeenth century, for example, much of their patronage of culture took the form of allowing liberal use of their names in order to lend "respect" to a project and thereby attract alternative sources of support: rarely, if ever, did they finance or invest heavily out of their own resources. Indeed, the monarchs believed it was the role of the aristocracy and gentry to administer patronage in their respective counties.

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This "hands off" attitude persisted in the working practices of English statesmen during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fully aware of the magnitude of private philanthropy and patronage, the government remained convinced that a system that worked so well should not be tampered with. Such an attitude was as evident in the government's reluctance to intervene, even in such pressing "social" issues as the poor laws and education, as it was in the refusal of English monarchs to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the church from the domain of patronage.

Thus, from the point of view of a government that never admitted to any surpluses, Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism made complete sense: "Among rich and prosperous nations, it is not necessary that the public should be at the expense of cultivating the arts and sciences of amusement and curiosity. Individuals will always bestow upon these that portion of reward which is proportioned to the pleasure they bestow."[18] This "sensible" attitude of the utilitarians—that the government ought not to take charge of a domain that benefited the few—was strengthened by statements expressive of a deep-rooted philistinism as well as lack of sympathy for various forms of culture. For example, when the government was asked to contribute toward the purchase of the Soulages pottery art (majolica) collection, Palmerston retorted, "What is the use of such rubbish for our manufacturers?" Gladstone, in turn, took a piece of majolica to keep in his office to constantly "warn him against public extravagance."[19]

No, the government would intervene only in exceptional cases, when national prestige and honor were at stake, and then only following much pressure by influential government members. Thus, for example, the committee appointed in 1816 to consider the purchase of Lord Elgin's marbles endorsed the purchase with the comment: "How highly the cultivation of Fine Arts has contributed to the reputation, character and dignity of every Government by which they have been encouraged." Despite such rhetoric, the final decision of the government to take positive action may well have been motivated out of increasing cultural rivalry with France, especially in the wake of the Louvre's opening in 1793.[20]

In many ways, the methods employed by men of letters in their attempts to gain government support for culture were similar to those used in the private domain. Just as in the seventeenth century a candidate for a college fellowship or church living would request his

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patron to write a letter of recommendation to the appropriate authorities, so in the nineteenth century a client would request a patron—or a friend of a patron—to initiate a political action. The diaries of Benjamin Haydon, for example, are full of instances of his unrelenting efforts to obtain government support for the arts by continually hounding powerful officials.

Although there is a long tradition of men of letters seeking to obtain government support, most of these men were nevertheless ambivalent about the desirability and scope of state patronage. The reasons may be explained by a lingering distrust of government intervention in the private domain, as well as by a deep pride in the private tradition of giving. More to our subject, quite a few men of letters feared that government intervention and the control clerks would influence disciplines they did not understand—especially in the arts and sciences—and would stifle creativity. To quote Alexander Beresford Hope (1863): "While it is well that whatever Government attempts on behalf of art should be more systematically and better regulated than at present, it would be fatal if this were to lead to free opinion and free work being subordinated to bureaucratic authority."[21]

Despite this natural bias against government intervention and the long tradition of the state remaining outside the patronage system, state patronage came to be a necessity. In a world in which government was slowly gaining control of education and poor relief; in which private individuals were no longer able, or willing, to support scientific research; in which capricious private patronage was too risky to ensure the continuance of museums, academies, and libraries, a certain amount of government protection became inevitable. The state, while not replacing private patronage, nonetheless regulated culture by supplementing private support with its own resources.

* * *

When Bernard Mandeville published his *Fable of the Bees* (1714, 1724), he caused a sensation. Better known by its subtitle, "Private Vices, Publick Benefits," the author set himself the task of exposing the hypocrisy underlying moralists' discussions of human motives. Nevertheless, after mercilessly demonstrating the absence of virtue from human action, he still condones the benefits that fear, vanity,

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and pride have showered upon society and finally, to the utter dismay of his contemporaries, concludes by reaffirming his belief in Christian ethics. My intention in this article is not a Mandevillean exposé of philanthropy. Nevertheless, one of his conclusions is indeed relevant to my discussion: "Writers are always teaching Men what they should be, and hardly ever trouble their Heads with telling them what they really are."[22] My purpose has been to demonstrate the necessity of scrutinizing motives in any discussion of philanthropy and patronage, not in order to cast aspersion on the benefactors or pass moral judgement, but simply to credit human nature and historical processes with their due complexity. We cannot ignore the observation of Mandeville and his mentor, La Rochefoucauld, that, in the words of the latter: "We often do good, in order that we may do evil with impunity." Nevertheless, we may choose to conclude—as many critics have—that any action resulting in the relief or happiness of another is meritorious, regardless of its motives.

ENDNOTES

[1]See, for example, B.K. Gray, *A History of English Philanthropy* (London: P.S. King & Son, 1905); David Owen, *English Philanthropy, 1660–1960* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[2]Joel T. Rosenthal, *The Purchase of Paradise* (London and Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 8.

[3]W.K. Jordan, *Philanthropy in England* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 16, 18.

[4]Nicholas Orme, *English Schools in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1973); Jo Ann Moran, *The Growth of English Schooling, 1340–1548* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[5]Mordechai Feingold, "Jordan Revisited: Patterns of Charitable Giving in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England," *History of Education* 8 (1979) pp., 257–73.

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[7]Cited in J.T. Cliffe, *The Puritan Gentry* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 109.

[8]John Stockwood, *A Sermon preached at Paules Crosse on Barthelmew day* (London, 1578), pp. 106–8, cited in C. Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution* (New York: Schocken, 1958), p. 232 n.1.

[9]Thomas Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England*, ed. P.A. Nuttall, 3 vols. (London: Thomas Tegg, 1840), vol. I, pp. 52, 47.

[10]Quoted in Owen, *English Philanthropy*, p. 11.

[11]Robert Nelson, *An Address to Persons of Quality* (London, 1715), pp. 103–4, 254.

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[12]M.G. Jones, *The Charity School Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 12; Samuel Johnson, *The Idler and the Adventurer*, ed. W.J. Bate, J.M. Bullitt, and L.F. Powell (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 15.

[13]*The Works of Sir Thomas Browne,* ed. G. Keynes, 4 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), vol. I, p. 72.

[14] B. Atkinson, ed., *The Complete Essays and other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 149; B. Jerrold, ed., *Specimens of Douglas Jerrold's Wit* (Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1858), p. 16; Owen, *English Philanthropy,* p. 165.

[15]For lack of a better term, "men of letters" will be used hereafter as the generic title of all practitioners of high culture—authors, poets, men of science, artists, and composers.

[16]Walter E. Houghton, *The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830–1870* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 110.

[17]John Steegman, *The Rule of Taste,* 2nd ed. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), p. 93; David Hume, *Philosophical Works,* ed. A. Green and T.H. Grosse, vol. II, p. 396; A. Friedman, ed., *Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith,* 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), vol. I, p. 311.

[18]Jeremy Bentham, *Works,* 10 vols. repr. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), vol. II, p. 255.

[19]D.W. Sylvester, *Robert Lowe and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 209.

[20]Janet Minihan, *The Nationalization of Culture* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp. 14–15.

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[22]Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, 2 vols., ed. F.B. Kaye (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1924), vol. I, p. 39.

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